


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Officer Passivity Shows Need for Incentives

90UM0399B Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA
in Russian No 2, Jan 90 pp 18-19

[Article by Guards Captain A. Kalashnikov, Siberian Military District: "A Reader Raises a Problem: Incentives are Needed"]

[Text] A meeting was held in our regimental party organization. The agenda was very topical: how to eliminate formalism in competition, how to increase the active participation of Communists in the organization of competition, and how to increase their responsibility for fulfilling the pledges. But neither the pressing nature of the agenda nor the pointed report presented by Lieutenant Colonel V. Churakov were what was remarkable about the meeting: what was remarkable was the fact that the participants in the meeting were not stirred up. The Communists simply said nothing. Those who made presentations spoke the generally correct and necessary words; but they did not move anyone.

Why did the Communists remain indifferent toward the urgent matter of the party meeting? I believe that the reason can be found in the oversimplified organization of the competition among the officers; the competition does not have the needed foundation for motivation.

At first glance it can be shown that everything is as it should be insofar as the organization of the competition among the officers is concerned. At the start of each training period we make our pledges. Their fulfillment is strictly controlled and the successes or shortcomings are publicized. There is a screen for displaying the fulfillment of the socialist pledges, where the results are tallied. The office of the regimental party organization personally evaluates the contribution of each Communist to the common cause and regularly publishes bulletins generalizing the experience of the best officers, whose photographs are placed on the walls.

It seemed that quite a bit is being done. And the majority of the officers are laboring conscientiously. But they do not show a lively interest in the competition. Why? Has it already become obsolete? Or is there another reason? We often say that the officer and warrant officer do not serve for the sake of military decorations and titles. And this is true. But it is also true that any one of us will strive to do a better job if we know that our labor is encouraged in an appropriate manner. In some cases this can be a kind word, in others an acknowledgement of thanks, and in still others some other form of recognition. The main thing is that the encouragement correspond with the achieved results and the contribution to the common cause. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. It seems to me, that the inadequately thought out system of moral and material motivation of officers is one of the reasons for this.

What do I have in mind? I believe that at this stage of competition incentives such as a thank-you and a certificate of merit simply have ceased to have any effect. For

example, who has not seen an experienced officer, who repeatedly receives such certificates, indifferently put them into his desk drawer where there are already dozens of such certificates.

Some may respond to me by saying that any commander or chief has at his disposal quite a few other ways to provide encouragement. For example, an outstanding officer can be written up for a state military decoration, given an early promotion to the next highest military rank, perhaps given a non-competitive slot in a military-educational establishment, and so forth. But in practice are such things done? Very rarely. And if someone does receive decorations and medals, is given an early promotion, or is assigned to an important post—only rarely are such things directly connected with results in a socialist competition.

Let us take our regimental party organization. We have promising officers. But there are quite a few of them who for various reasons are long overdue in receiving new assignments and promotions. It is necessary to give some thought to motivating their labor.

Is there a solution? It seems to me that there is. For example, why couldn't commanders and chiefs be given the authority to extend the leaves of officers by ten to fifteen days depending upon their successes in military service and in socialist competition? One could differentiate leaves by time of the year: the best officers could be given leave in the summer while those who are not working to the best of their abilities would be given leave in the winter or in the autumn. I think that this would be correct from the point of view of social fairness.

In a word, the passivity of the Communists in the party meeting, of which I spoke at the beginning, was not accidental. Such passivity is caused by the fact that we presently are unable to make the competition truly effective and have not found the incentives, which would spur the officers to labor to the full extent of their abilities.

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Election to LiSSR State Commission on Military Service Held

90UMO399A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
No 52, 3 Mar 90 p 3

[Elta article: "Meeting of the State Commission"]

[Text] A meeting of the state commission, which is preparing recommendations regarding the status of the USSR Armed Forces in the Lithuanian SSR and about military and alternative (labor) service for the citizens of the republic, has been held. The secretary of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, Lyudvikas Sabutis, was selected to be the chairman of the commission. The deputies selected are: Mechis Laurinkus, who is a senior scientific worker of the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the Lithuanian

Academy of Sciences, as well as a deputy of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet; and Valerienas Shadreyka, who is the chairman of the Commission on Military Service Affairs for the Young People of the Republic as well as the deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Presidium of the Collegium of Lawyers. Sabutis will head up a working group, which will prepare recommendations about the status of the USSR Armed Forces. Shadreyka will be coordinating the work of the group, which will be involved in the preparation of a draft law on alternative (labor) service as well as changes and additions to the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, to the criminal code, and to the code of administrative infringements of the law as well as to other laws of the Lithuanian SSR.

Members of the Commission on Military Service Affairs for the Young People of the Lithuanian SSR participated in the meeting.

Draft Statute on Army Komsomol

90UM0373A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15, 17 Mar 90

[Parts one and two of three-part article: "Draft Statute on Organization of USSR Armed Forces Komsomol"]

[15 Mar 90, pp 1, 3]

[Text] As our newspaper already reported, the 1st Plenum of the All-Service Komsomol Organizations Council adopted the draft "Statute on Organization of USSR Armed Forces Komsomol." We begin its publication for discussion in Army and Navy youth collectives.

Based on the Komsomol Bylaws, this Statute reflects the content of activities and features of the organizational structure of the USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organization stemming from Soviet military organizational development.

I. General Provisions

The USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organization unites in its ranks Komsomol members who are servicemen; students at Suvorov, Nakhimov and military schools; and workers and employees of enterprises, establishments and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense for their joint involvement in increasing the combat readiness of Army and Navy forces, for realizing socially important and personal interests, and for protecting the rights of the youth under conditions of military service.

The chief political task of the USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organization is to deepen the process of democratization of social relations in military collectives by shaping and implementing youth policy in the Army and Navy in close coordination with commanders, political entities, and party and public organizations.

The USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organization operates on the basis of Komsomol Bylaws and program

documents, decrees of Komsomol congresses and the Komsomol Central Committee, directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and this Statute.

Komsomol organizations operate in the USSR Armed Forces under the direction of corresponding political entities, which exercise this direction by political methods on principles of total trust and of respect for the Komsomol's organizational independence. The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy coordinates basic questions of Komsomol work in the Armed Forces with the Komsomol Central Committee through the All-Service Komsomol Organizations Council.

Komsomol organizations build their mutual relations with CPSU organizations on the basis of close ideological ties, political support and comradely criticism of each other, party members' participation in Komsomol leadership entities, and joint actions with the CPSU organizations.

Komsomol organizations cooperate with other public elements based on a commonality of programs, platforms and interests.

Komsomol organizations assist in strengthening one-man command. Commanders (officers in charge) rely on Komsomol organizations and ensure conditions for their normal operation and for realizing the initiatives of the youth.

II. Rules and Principles of Membership in the Komsomol. Rights and Obligations of Komsomol Members

1. Procedure for acceptance in the Komsomol.

Komsomol organizations in the USSR Armed Forces accept new members into the Komsomol in accordance with the Komsomol Bylaws.

A Komsomol member is accepted under a strictly individual procedure and exclusively on a voluntary basis. The Komsomol organization assists the young person to prepare for entry into the Komsomol.

The question of acceptance in the Komsomol is discussed and decided by a general meeting of the primary Komsomol organization (or one having rights of a primary organization). The decision is considered adopted if at least half of the Komsomol members present at the meeting voted for the person. A decision on acceptance into Komsomol membership by an organization having rights of a primary organization enters into force after its approval by the Komsomol committee.

Based on the decision of the primary Komsomol organization, the appropriate political department issues Komsomol documents to the person who has joined the Komsomol.

Length of Komsomol membership of a person who has joined the Komsomol is figured from the day of the Komsomol organization meeting's decision on acceptance into the Komsomol.

2. Membership in the Komsomol can be extended for a period up to two years in accordance with the Komsomol member's application by decision of the primary Komsomol organization.

3. Membership in the Komsomol ceases in accordance with the Komsomol Bylaws.

4. Consideration of cases of minor offenses of Komsomol members.

A Komsomol member can be held answerable to the Komsomol right up to expulsion from the Komsomol for nonfulfillment of requirements of the Bylaws and other minor offenses. The Komsomol organization in which the Komsomol member is registered determines the measures of indoctrinational influence.

The question of expelling a Komsomol member from the Komsomol is discussed and decided by a general meeting of the primary organization or organization having rights of a primary organization; the decision is considered adopted if at least half of the Komsomol members present at the meeting voted for it. The decision on expulsion from the Komsomol by an organization having rights of a primary organization is subject to approval by the primary organization Komsomol committee.

The question of holding members of central elective entities of the Komsomol and of councils of Komsomol organizations answerable to the Komsomol is discussed in primary organizations; decisions on imposing punishments on them are made by the usual procedure. The appropriate elective entity is informed of such decisions.

5. The question of reinstating in the Komsomol a person who has lost ties with the Komsomol is considered and decided in the primary Komsomol organization based on his personal application. The decision of the primary Komsomol organization is final.

The political department issues Komsomol documents to the person reinstated in the Komsomol based on a decision for reinstatement in the Komsomol.

6. Rights and obligations of Komsomol members.

Rights of Komsomol members specified by the Komsomol Bylaws and conditions of military service are not restricted.

A Komsomol member is obligated:

- To take an active part in accomplishing tasks specified by the Komsomol Program and by this Statute;
- To be concerned with the authority of the Komsomol and his organization, with worthy augmentation of the Komsomol and the cleanliness of its ranks, and to observe Komsomol discipline.

III. Organizational Structure

7. In connection with features of military organizational development, the Komsomol organization in the USSR Armed Forces is structured with consideration of exterritoriality of military service and the work or study of Komsomol members.

An organization uniting Komsomol members of a given military unit, enterprise, establishment and organization of the USSR Ministry of Defense is superior with respect to all Komsomol organizations comprising it.

IV. Primary Komsomol Organizations

8. The primary organization is the basic, organizationally formalized, voluntary association of Komsomol members ensuring specific results of their joint activity through development of sociopolitical activeness of Komsomol members and the realization and protection of their interests and rights.

Primary Komsomol organizations are established at the place of military service, work and study of Komsomol members. The decision on establishing a primary organization is made by a constituent meeting of at least three Komsomol members and is registered by the superior Komsomol entity and by the appropriate political entity.

Provisional Komsomol organizations may be established in duty sections of units and ships performing alert duty and in subunits and teams formed for performing assignments of the command authority.

By decision of a general meeting of the primary Komsomol organization, Komsomol organizations which are granted the rights of a primary organization may be established within the primary Komsomol organization. Komsomol groups also may be established within primary Komsomol organizations based on the principle of commonality of socially important interests.

9. The general meeting of Komsomol members of a given organization is the highest entity of a Komsomol organization. The general meeting of a primary Komsomol organization, of a Komsomol organization having rights of a primary organization, and of a Komsomol group is held at times established by the Komsomol committee or bureau, or at the initiative of one-fourth of the given organization's Komsomol members.

In cases where there is no opportunity to convene general meetings of the primary Komsomol organization because of conditions of Komsomol members' service, work or study, Komsomol meetings may be held in organizations having rights of a primary organization and in Komsomol groups with a common agenda.

Komsomol meetings may be held by shifts in Komsomol organizations of units, ships, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense with a shift work system.

10. The primary Komsomol organization elects a committee or a secretary, organizations having rights of a primary organization elect a bureau or a secretary, and a Komsomol group elects a group Komsomol organizer to carry on current work for a period of one year. Primary Komsomol organizations may elect a control commission.

A secretary and his deputy are elected in a Komsomol organization numbering less than 10 Komsomol members.

Elections of leadership entities of primary Komsomol organizations are held in accordance with the Komsomol Bylaws and Komsomol Central Committee documents on elections of Komsomol leadership entities, and with this Statute.

All members of the Komsomol leadership entity are invested with equal rights.

If a member of a Komsomol entity does not justify the Komsomol members' trust, he may be removed from it at the initiative of such entity or by demand of lower Komsomol organizations.

Sessions of Komsomol committees or bureaus are held in accordance with a time limit established by the meeting which elected that committee or bureau, or at the initiative of one-fourth of the committee or bureau members.

Being a collective leadership entity, the Komsomol committee or bureau organizes fulfillment of all tasks facing the Komsomol organization and fulfillment of decrees of general meetings and bears responsibility to Komsomol members for their realization.

The Komsomol committee or bureau plans its work based on tasks facing the unit, ship, subunit, or labor collective with consideration of the opinions and suggestions of Komsomol members, recommendations of higher entities, and adopted decrees. The Komsomol committee or bureau is responsible and ensures the necessary procedure in accounting for Komsomol members, receiving membership dues, and carrying on business correspondence and financial-economic activity.

Komsomol committees of primary Komsomol organizations where over 800 Komsomol members are registered may be granted the right to issue Komsomol documents depending on the features of their activity by decision of appropriate political directorates of Airborne Troops, Railroad Troops, military construction units, military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and political departments of large strategic formations of the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force and Air Defense Forces.

Secretaries of Komsomol organizations, members of Komsomol committees or bureaus, and group Komsomol organizers give an account to Komsomol members and superior entities on results of their activity, on realization of critical comments and suggestions which have been received, on and fulfillment of decrees of meetings.

The duty reassignment of secretaries of Komsomol organizations is accomplished by agreement with corresponding Councils of Komsomol organizations and with Komsomol committees.

The position of relieved Komsomol committee or bureau secretary may be provided for depending on the table of organization structure of the military unit, enterprise, establishment or organization of the USSR Ministry of Defense where the primary Komsomol organization or organization having rights of a primary organization has been established. A decision to open a vacant position in this case is made by the general meeting of a primary Komsomol organization having over 75 registered Komsomol members.

Strict compliance with principles of intra-Komsomol democracy and free and businesslike discussion of questions of Komsomol work must be ensured and an atmosphere in which each Komsomol member would have an opportunity to openly express his opinion and make a suggestion must be created at Komsomol meetings and at sessions of Komsomol committees and bureaus. Any Komsomol member regardless of his position and any Komsomol entity may be discussed and criticized at meetings.

[17 Mar 90, p 2]

11. In their day-to-day work, primary organizations are guided by the Komsomol Bylaws and Program, by this Statute, by decisions of their meetings and conferences, and by decisions of superior Komsomol entities.

12. In addition to powers spelled out by the Komsomol Bylaws, primary Komsomol organizations have the right:

- To turn to any echelon of the USSR Ministry of Defense on questions of realizing and protecting rights of Komsomol members and the youth specified by existing legislation, by military regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, and by other legislative instruments;
- To make suggestions to the command authority and political entities on questions of improving indoctrination work with servicemen, organizing their duty and everyday routine, and creating necessary conditions for the work of Komsomol organizations;
- To participate in deciding social questions of the youth through representatives in people's control entities, housing commissions, sports committees and other public elements;
- To take part in official performance appraisals of servicemen who are Komsomol members and to give them character references in duty reassignments and in other necessary instances;
- To establish and support the functioning of public youth elements (clubs, circles, centers, sections and so on) having a political-education, sports-leisure, and scientific-technical direction;
- To nominate candidates for electing Komsomol members as people's deputies of the USSR as well as to local soviets of people's deputies;

- To reward with Komsomol committee awards, valuable gifts and bonuses, prizes and pennants, and to send letters of thanks to the Komsomol organization at the place of Komsomol members' previous work or study;
- To conduct correspondence with central and local Komsomol entities, public organizations, and the mass media on their own behalf.

13. Primary Komsomol organizations promote a strengthening of unity of the Armed Forces and people, maintain close ties with local Komsomol organizations, and carry on joint work in preparing the youth to defend the socialist Motherland and in realizing the interests of Komsomol members in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces.

14. The Komsomol group arranges its work based on the interests of Komsomol members, tasks facing the collective, and decisions of the primary Komsomol organization. Decrees of general meetings of the Komsomol group are in the nature of a recommendation.

15. The decision for dissolving a Komsomol organization or group is made by the general meeting of the primary Komsomol organization when the majority of members of such organization or group recognizes the inadvisability of further joint work, or it is made by the appropriate political entity in case of the actual cessation of the group or organization's activity, as well as if its activity contradicts the Komsomol Bylaws and Program and this Statute.

16. Primary Komsomol organizations of military units, ships, subunits, shops and so on are consolidated in Komsomol organizations of the appropriate military units, establishments, enterprises and organizations according to the USSR Armed Forces structure.

Conferences convened once every three years are the supreme entities of these organizations.

A conference elects a Komsomol Organizations Council and a control commission for directing the organization's current work in an accounting period.

Komsomol organizations of USSR Ministry of Defense formations, establishments, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations, large strategic formations, districts, groups of forces, fleets, Airborne Troops, Railroad Troops, military construction units, and branches of the Armed Forces arrange their work on the basis of the Komsomol Bylaws and Program, this Statute, their conferences, and decisions of superior or supreme Komsomol entities, and with consideration of the opinion of lower Komsomol organizations.

Relationships of Komsomol Organizations Councils among themselves are arranged on principles of democratic centralism and respect for the rights and independence of lower Komsomol Organizations Councils. Decisions of Komsomol Organizations Councils are mandatory with respect to primary Komsomol organizations within limits of the competence granted them.

USSR Armed Forces Komsomol Organizations Councils take part in the work of local Komsomol entities, and local Komsomol entities take part in the work of USSR Armed Forces Komsomol Organizations Councils.

17. Komsomol Organizations Councils are elected by appropriate Komsomol conferences in accordance with the Komsomol Bylaws and the Komsomol Central Committee Instructions on Holding Elections of Komsomol Leadership Entities. The quantitative makeup of members of the Komsomol entity being elected is determined by voting by a show of hands.

Nomination of candidates for Komsomol Organizations Councils is conducted on a broad democratic basis, usually with preliminary discussion at Komsomol meetings and conferences of lower Komsomol organizations. Political entities also have the right to nominate candidates for corresponding Komsomol Organizations Councils. Candidates for the Komsomol Organizations Council may be nominated from among Komsomol members and young party members who are not delegates of the given conference.

In the period between conferences, the makeup of the Komsomol Organizations Council is augmented to replace members who have left based on suggestions of primary Komsomol organizations and lower Komsomol Organizations Councils, as well as suggestions of political entities. A decision to introduce new members to the Komsomol Organizations Council is adopted in voting by a show of hands at a plenum of the corresponding Council by at least two-thirds of the votes of its members.

Komsomol Organizations Councils elect a chairman and his deputies. A bureau may be elected from the Council makeup to direct the work of the Komsomol Organizations Council between plenums. Elections of the chairman, his deputies, and bureau members are held at plenums of the corresponding Councils or, by decision of the conference, by direct voting at a conference session.

After the chairman of the Komsomol Organizations Council has been elected, the chief of the corresponding political entity decides the question of his appointment as assistant chief of this political entity for Komsomol work under the established procedure. In the absence of a positive decision, the Komsomol Organizations Council chairman performs his functions on a public basis.

18. The chairman of the Komsomol Organizations Council:

- Convenes the Council session, conducts it, and organizes preparation of the necessary documents and materials. (By agreement with the command authority, representatives of the command authority, political entities, staffs, and party organizations may take part in preparing documents and materials for Council sessions, and may take part in its work);

- Invites representatives of the command authority, political entity, party organizations, local Komsomol and public entities, and Komsomol officials and activists to take part in the Komsomol Organizations Council sessions;
- Organizes the work of the Komsomol Organizations Council and the activity of the bureau between Council sessions, and informs its members and the aktiv about fulfillment of decisions;
- Together with the political entity, organizes training of Komsomol Organizations Council members in the practice of Komsomol work.

19. Duty reassignment of servicemen elected chairmen of Komsomol Organizations Councils is accomplished by agreement with superior Komsomol Organizations Councils. Komsomol character references issued by the corresponding Komsomol Organizations Councils are taken into account here without fail.

20. All Komsomol Organizations Council members have equal rights and exercise their power throughout the time they are on the Council.

As a rule, a Komsomol member may be elected to no more than two Komsomol Organizations Councils.

If a Komsomol Organizations Council member does not justify the trust of Komsomol members, he may be removed at the initiative of such Komsomol Organizations Council or by demand of lower Councils or primary Komsomol organizations which delegated him to such Council.

The question of removal of a Komsomol Organizations Council member from a Komsomol entity is decided in voting by a show of hands at a plenum of the corresponding Council. The decision is considered adopted if at least two-thirds of the Komsomol Organizations Council members vote for it.

21. Plenums of Komsomol Organizations Councils of branches of the USSR Armed Forces, military construction units, Railroad Troops, Airborne Troops, and political directorates of districts, groups of forces, fleets and large strategic formations are held at least once every six months; plenums of Komsomol Organizations Councils of military units, formations, establishments, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense are held by decision of the corresponding bureaus of Komsomol Organizations Councils or political entities or at the initiative of one-fourth of lower organizations.

Komsomol Organizations Council bureau sessions are held in accordance with the time period established by the corresponding Komsomol Organizations Council plenum or at the initiative of one-fourth of the members of the Komsomol Organizations Council bureau.

Komsomol Organizations Council bureau plenums and sessions are competent if over half of their membership is present. All questions are decided by a majority of

votes of Council members present. Members of the Komsomol Organizations Council whose proposals were not supported have the right to appeal to the superior Council, with mandatory fulfillment of decisions made by the Komsomol Organizations Council.

Appeals, letters and applications of Komsomol members are examined at sessions of bureaus or corresponding commissions elected from the membership of the Komsomol Organizations Council.

Any Komsomol member can take part in Komsomol Organizations Council sessions with the right of a consultative vote.

(To be concluded.)

Sections IV-VI of Draft Statute on Army Komsomol

90UM0377A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Conclusion of draft statute printed in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 15 and 17 Mar 90: "Statute on the Organization of the VLKSM (All-Union Komsomol) of the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text]

IV. Primary Komsomol Organizations

22. The functions of the working apparatus of the Councils of Komsomol Organizations [SKO] are performed by the sections (departments) of Komsomol work of political organs. They provide assistance to the Councils in exercising their authority, prepare proposals and materials to plan SKO work, to coordinate the activities of its members, to prepare and conduct sessions and other measures, and to maintain communications with members of the SKO between sessions, send them materials and documents related to the work of the SKO, and maintain the paperwork of the SKOs and bureaus.

The sections (departments) of Komsomol work of the political organs have the right to analyze the work of the VLKSM (All-Union Komsomol) organizations and lower SKOs, issue recommendations regarding their activities if they do not contradict the decisions of the SKO, and hold instruction classes with activist ranks.

The paperwork of the Councils of Komsomol Organizations is maintained in accordance with procedures established by the VLKSM Central Committee for Komsomol committees, and the instructions of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

23. The Councils of Komsomol Organizations have the jurisdiction granted them by the primary Komsomol organizations (with the exception of questions of admission and expulsion from the VLKSM, and recommendations to the CPSU), and in addition:

- Jointly with the VLKSM political organs and committees organize the work of the Komsomol organizations

- to implement the decisions of VLKSM congresses and plenums, decrees of the VLKSM Central Committee and Komsomol conferences, and directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, aimed at strengthening combat readiness and military discipline, forming high political, moral, and spiritual qualities in the young soldiers, and developing the social activeness of youth in the cause of strengthening the socialist system and the friendship of peoples of the USSR;
- Provide comprehensive support and assistance to the primary Komsomol organizations, promote their organizational-political strengthening and development of initiative and independence, synthesize and publicize leading-edge experience of Army and Navy youth work, and organize the training of Komsomol cadres and activist ranks;
 - Consider appeals, letters, and statements of Komsomol members, and make decisions regarding the reinstatement of those expelled from the Komsomol;
 - Introduce proposals on the bestowal of awards of higher SKOs and VLKSM central committees on komsomol members and youth.

V. Organization of the VLKSM of the Armed Forces

24. Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Services, Airborne and Railway Troops, military construction units, and other formations of the USSR Ministry of Defense are joined together in the Organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces.

25. The Organization of the VLKSM of the Armed Forces, as a component part of the VLKSM, has the rights and jurisdiction defined by the VLKSM Charter for the Youth Leagues (with the exception of the right to leave the VLKSM, or to have their own Charter and Program).

26. The All-Army Komsomol Conference, convened once every three years, is the highest organ of the Organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces. An All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations (VSKO) is elected at the conference to carry out its day-to-day work in the reporting period.

Special All-Army Komsomol Conferences are convened by VSKO plenum, and also at the demand of ¼ of the organizations belonging to the Organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces, or by decision of organizations containing ¼ of the VLKSM membership.

The calling of the All-Army Conference and its agenda are announced no later than three months before the conference. The norms for representation and procedures for electing delegates to the All-Army Komsomol Conference are established by the VSKO Plenum.

27. It is exclusively in the jurisdiction of the All-Army Komsomol Conference:

- To receive, discuss, and approve reports of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations and the control committee of the Organization of the VLKSM of the Armed Forces;

- To elect the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations and the control committee of the Organization of the VLKSM of the Armed Forces;
- To define the immediate tasks of the Komsomol organizations on the basis of general VLKSM policy;
- To adopt the Statute on the Organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces and to make addendums and amendments to it;
- To elect the chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations;
- To consider any question within the jurisdiction of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations.

28. In the period between the All-Army Komsomol Conferences, all the work of the organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces is directed by the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations within the framework of the rights delegated to it by the Komsomol organizations. It represents the organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces in dealings with Youth Leagues belonging to the VLKSM, other youth organizations, and state and party organs, exercises the right of legislative initiative granted by the USSR Constitution, and also has all rights and jurisdiction of the lower Councils of Komsomol Organizations.

29. It is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Plenum of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations:

- To form VSKO bureaus;
- To re-elect the chairman and members of the VSKO for the period between All-Army Komsomol Conferences;
- To convene All-Army Komsomol Conferences, to determine the time and place they are to be held, and the norms for representation of delegates;
- To consider appeals of VLKSM members;
- To decide questions related to the use of monetary and material resources of the VSKO.

On behalf of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and in accordance with the proposals of the Organizations of the VLKSM, the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations:

- Prepares and implements proposals regarding the basic trends of youth policy in the Army and Navy;
- Makes proposals regarding amendments and addendums to the VLKSM Program and Charter, the normative documents of the Army and Navy Komsomol;
- Recommends Komsomol representatives of organizations of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces for election as members of central VLKSM elective bodies, and also makes proposals regarding their recall and replacement;
- On behalf of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy coordinates the basic questions of Komsomol work with the VLKSM Central Committee;
- Prepares proposals regarding the selection of assistant chiefs of political directorates for Komsomol work of armed services, branches, districts, groups of forces, and fleets;
- Coordinates with state, party, and social organs and organizations and the mass media on questions of training of youth to defend the Motherland;

—Briefs the VLKSM Central Committee, USSR Ministry of Defense, and the chief of the Main Political Directorate regarding the results of its work, the attitudes of Komsomol members and youth, and problems and prospects of their work.

30. Members of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations are elected on the basis of representation: one representative from each Council of Komsomol Organizations of an Armed Service, Airborne and Railway Troops, and military construction units. With respect to representation based on membership size of the organizations—1 individual for 80 thousand VLKSM members. Up to 10 percent are elected directly at the All-Army Komsomol Conference.

A member of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations may be accepted to or expelled from the VSKO on the basis of a decision of the Council of Komsomol Organizations of the Armed Services, Airborne or Railway Troops, military construction units, military districts, groups of forces, or fleets.

The decision to recall VSKO members elected by the All-Army Komsomol Conference or accept new members is made at the VSKO plenum by a $\frac{2}{3}$ majority of votes of VSKO members.

31. Plenums of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations are convened by the bureau of the VSKO at least once every six months. A special VSKO plenum may be convened at the initiative of $\frac{1}{4}$ of VSKO members or at the suggestion of no less than $\frac{1}{4}$ of the organizations included in the Organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces.

A VSKO plenum is deemed competent when more than half of the elected members of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations participate in it.

32. The All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations elects a bureau of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations to direct the work of the Komsomol organizations between VSKO plenums, from members of the VSKO.

The number of members of the bureau is determined by the VSKO plenum. The bureau includes the VSKO chairman, representatives of the SKOs of the Armed Services, Airborne and Railroad Troops, and military construction units, who should comprise no less than $\frac{2}{3}$ of bureau members; the other members of the VSKO bureau are elected at the VSKO plenum by secret ballot, for each candidacy separately. Candidates are considered elected when more than half of the VSKO membership have voted for them.

The bureau of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations does not have the right to make decisions within the jurisdiction of the All-Army Komsomol Conference and VSKO Plenum (if this is not consideration of appeals of VLKSM members), with the exception of direct assignments of the above-named organs.

33. The chairman of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations is elected at the VSKO Plenum. By decision of the delegates of the All-Army Komsomol Conference he may be elected directly at the conference. Elections are by secret ballot. A candidate is considered elected when more than half of the participants of the VSKO plenum or delegates of the All-Army Komsomol Conference have voted for him.

34. In the period between the All-Army Komsomol Conferences, by decision of the VSKO plenum or at the initiative of no less than one fourth of the organizations belonging to the Organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces, an All-Army Komsomol Referendum may be held to decide the most important questions arising in the life and activity of the Komsomol of the Armed Forces.

An All-Army Komsomol Referendum is competent to introduce partial amendments to the Statute on the Organization of the VLKSM of the Armed Forces.

An All-Army Komsomol Referendum is considered competent if more than half the VLKSM members on the rolls of the Organization of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces participate in it. A decision of the referendum is considered adopted if more than half of participating Komsomol members participating have voted for it.

VI. Material and Financial Foundations of the Work of the Komsomol Organizations of the USSR Armed Forces

35. Organizations of the VLKSM of the USSR Armed Forces have the right to possess, use, and dispose of the portion of VLKSM property set aside for it in accordance with the VLKSM Charter, and also the material goods acquired in exchange for the monetary resources of the Komsomol organizations.

36. The monetary resources of Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces are generated from membership dues, and funds raised from functions of Komsomol organizations, economic organizations of the Army and Navy Komsomol, and other types of activity.

Other budget income may include voluntary contributions from Soviet citizens and other persons and organizations, including foreign, labor collectives, state, cooperative, and social enterprises, organizations and institutions, and other source.

The monetary resources of Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces are spent for the purposes set forth by the VLKSM Charter and Program, and the Statute on monetary resources of Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces.

37. The amount of the monthly dues is determined by the VLKSM Charter.

VLKSM members who are simultaneously members or candidate members of the CPSU are not obliged to pay Komsomol membership dues.

Komsomol members studying in military orchestras, and students of Suvorov, Nakhimov, and military-music schools of the Soviet Army and Navy are not obliged to pay membership dues or entrance fees, or pay the cost of Komsomol membership cards.

Lithuanian Deserters Subject to Prosecution Under Soviet Law

90UM0460A Moscow TRUD in Russian 30 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by TASS Correspondent M. Zakharchuk: "Reestablishing Legitimacy"]

[Text] "Based on the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Resolution on the invalidity of the 12 October 1967 USSR Law On Universal Military Service on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic, Serviceman Lukoshyavichyus is under the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Commission on Military Service Affairs.

A telegram of this content on a government form arrived addressed to the commander of a military unit. The location of one more of the unit's AWOL [Absent Without Leave] soldiers became known.

According to conditions in the Republic on 29 March, there are more than 250 servicemen who have taken this illegal step. Speeches by certain representatives of Lithuanian government institutions in the press and on television and radio promote this negative process. Therefore, the USSR Armed Forces General Staff has established a special commission that is engaged in finding AWOL soldiers and returning them to their duty locations.

Lieutenant General F. M. Markovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, talked about the commission's work at the request of a TASS correspondent:

"Our officers visited the families of 97 servicemen. In 40 cases, the parents unconditionally assured us that their children, having succumbed to the provocation, will continue service and will also complete it and return home with the feeling of a debt paid in full. At the same time, some of them demanded guarantees from us that [their sons] would not be charged with criminal wrongdoing for what they have done. In 42 families, the situation is as follows: Fathers and mothers bitterly said that they are sincerely ready to help us but they themselves do not know where their sons are. None of our attempts at persuasion and none of our appeals for good sense and parental wisdom affected the parents of 15 deserters.

"I must say something else. Being thoroughly familiar with living conditions and lifestyles of the servicemen's

closest relatives, we arrived at the conclusion that some young people have to be given the opportunity to terminate their service in the Armed Forces. Obviously this solution will be legally formulated in each specific case.

"And still more. Fifty one servicemen, who were AWOL from their military units, have already been returned to their duty locations. I have just been informed that several more servicemen have arrived at Vilkavishskiy, Ukmergskiy, Anikshchyayskiy Rayvayenkomats [Regional Military Commissariats]. They all expressed their readiness to continue serving in the Soviet Army.

"These are the statistics. They to a definite degree also reflect the arrangement of political forces and the state of social consciousness of the republic's residents. We have the basis to assume that many people in Lithuania are beginning to understand that the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 12 March and other normative acts do not release servicemen from criminal liability, including citizens of the Lithuanian SSR, for being absent without leave from their military units."

The following was reported to a TASS Correspondent at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff:

The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense has decided not to file criminal cases with regard to servicemen of Lithuanian nationality who are absent without leave from military units and who have voluntarily stated their readiness to continue service to Republic Vayenkomats.

Furthermore, it was stressed that individuals who continue to maliciously violate the USSR Law on Universal Military Service will be sought, detained, and criminally punished in accordance with appropriate laws.

Alternatives to Military Service Discussed

90UM0424A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 13, 31 Mar-06 Apr 90 pp 2-3

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY interview with Cand. of Juridical Sciences A. Pchelintsev: "Alternative Service. Only For Believers?"]

[Text] Recently we have been hearing more and more about so-called alternative service. What sort of service is this, and does it have prospects in our country—these are the topics of an interview by correspondent N. Soldatenkov with member of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences, Candidate of Juridical Sciences A. Pchelintsev.

[Pchelintsev] Let us begin with the fact that alternative service is that type of state service in which the law allows draftees to replace military service with civilian service, due to their religions or pacifist convictions. In this case the youth work for a set period of time in health care, community service, the social sphere, fire prevention, etc., generally without pay.

I should note at once: at present Soviet law does not provide for alternative service.

[Soldatenkov] But if I am not mistaken, such service did indeed exist in the national legislation at one time?

[Pchelintsev] Yes, back in the last century the law of compulsory military service provided for the possibility of replacing military service with civilian service in the shops of the naval department, and also in fire-fighting and lumbering teams for Mennonite believers.

Alternative service also existed in the first years of Soviet power.

Unfortunately, alternative service was reduced to naught in the second half of the 20s, but legally it was abolished by the 1939 Law of Compulsory Military Service.

[Soldatenkov] We know that this type of service is widespread today in other countries.

[Pchelintsev] Quite right, in almost all countries of the West, for individuals who refuse to bear arms from religious motives, the opportunity has been provided for alternative service in the civilian sector. Of course, in places where the army is manned on a professional basis (by contract), this problem does not exist.

As for the Warsaw Pact countries, alternative service was introduced in Hungary and Poland in the middle of last year. This question is also in the resolution stage in other allied countries.

[Soldatenkov] The objection can be raised—why should some sort of service be introduced there? After all, civilians have constitutional obligations to the state, and they must be met.

[Pchelintsev] Whether or not to introduce alternative service is no longer just a question for discussion. In January 1989 our state signed the Concluding Document of the Vienna Conference, which imposes the obligation on the participating countries, including the USSR, to ensure the practice of freedom of conscience and religious convictions in their laws.

In June 1990 there will be a major international forum in Copenhagen, at which the question of implementation of its provisions will be discussed. I'm afraid that we will have nothing to say there. It is time to understand that alternative service is a kind of international humanitarian standard, an indicator of a society's civilization.

As for the second part of the question, I remind you that point six of the Decree of Freedom of Conscience, Church and Religious Societies of 20 January (2 February) 1918 says: "No one can avoid execution of his civil obligations by reference to his religious views. Exemption from this provision, on the condition that

one civil obligation is replaced by another, is permitted in each individual case by decision of the People's Court." No one ever abolished this decree, it is in effect, and we must return to its provisions.

[Soldatenkov] But in this case how can we explain such a slow rate of resolution of this question? Misunderstanding of the problem, or the fear that all young men will "find religion" so as not to serve in the Army?

[Pchelintsev] Both of these reasons, I think. But imagine a man who has been raised from childhood in a religious family which strictly conforms to the rites, for him conscription into the Army, the taking of a military oath and bearing arms, this is literally a blow. These may be young citizens who are Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, Adventists, and certain others. There are very few of them among the citizens called up every year into the Army. For example, in all of 1989 300 Baptists refused to take the oath. Add to this the individuals of other creeds, and it still is a drop in the ocean. I note that by no means every faith forbids bearing arms.

With respect to the fears that young people will "find religion" so as not to serve in the Army, we need to look at how the question of replacing military service with alternative service was resolved in the 20s, and how it is resolved in other countries.

[Soldatenkov] So how do you see alternative service in our country?

[Pchelintsev] I would allow the existence of two forms of it. First of all, in the military construction detachments of the USSR Ministry of Defense. But in this case the believing conscripts will not take the military oath and will not bear arms. They will perform their service not as military construction workers, who in their legal status are the same as service members, but as blue and white collar workers.

Secondly, service in the civilian sector. In both cases the term of service should be increased, since the difficulties of military service and alternative civilian service are not alike. The form of service may be chosen by the draftee himself, or by the local organs of military administration.

[Soldatenkov] And what about alternative service out of pacifist convictions? As you know, it was recently introduced in Poland, and some Baltic republics are proposing it.

[Pchelintsev] In my view, we are still not ready for this, for objective reasons. At the same time, I do not rule out alternative service for pacifist convictions in the near future. On the condition that as a result of military reform, which is now urgent, a stage-by-stage transition to professional Armed Forces is implemented, military service is humanized, and its prestige raised.

Changes in Role of Polish Military Political Workers Noted

90UM0471A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Mar 90 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Polish Forces Major Tadeush Tsentkovskiy, former deputy regimental commander for political affairs, by Lieutenant Colonel V. Kharchenko: "Officer-Teachers Instead of Political Workers"]

[Text] Officer teachers recently replaced officer political workers in the Polish Armed Forces. Polish Forces Major T. Tsentkovskiy who recently carried out the duties of deputy regimental commander for political affairs, discusses the specific nature of their activities.

[Kharchenko] Tadeush, radical changes have occurred that affect ideological education work in the Polish Forces. What is the essence of them?

[Tsentkovskiy] There are no representatives of any party in the Polish Forces at the present time. The permanent staff is unambiguously unaffiliated with any party. A replacement cuts off contact with his party during his period of active military service. It is a similar situation with youth organizations. If a soldier can belong to the Union of Polish Youth or to groups like "Volnost i pokuy" [Liberty and Peace], "Oranzhevaya initsiyativa" [Orange Initiative] or others prior to being drafted, as soon as he crosses the threshold of the barracks he automatically becomes a member of the "Single Society of Army Youth." This organization unites personnel on the principles of military friendship without regard to political orientation or views on life. The basic element is the battery or company. The youth themselves will decide if they will create an appropriate structure at the regimental level.

[Kharchenko] How have these changes impacted the organizational staff structure? For example, what position does a partkom [Party Committee] secretary fill and how have the positions of the remaining political workers been transformed?

[Tsentkovskiy] A so-called political section existed in the regiment until recently. Now it has been transformed into an education section. The staff categories of these personnel have been changed. I, the deputy regimental commander for political affairs, have currently become the deputy commander for education work. A similar situation has occurred with lower level political workers. The senior instructor for propaganda is now the senior instructor of the education section. The instructors—youth and political and the chief of the club—have become instructor-teachers. The former partkom secretary has now been assigned as chief of the Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants Section. I do not dare judge how personnel changes are occurring in other units. But the process is far from simple and is not occurring painlessly everywhere.

[Kharchenko] And what is the specific nature of the activities of Polish Forces officer-teachers?

[Tsentkovskiy] The political worker's primary task was to conduct political training. Thus, our political studies have been transformed into studies in civic education and political information into current events. I am speaking about the transformation because the previously mandatory section of training, "Leading role of the Party," has been eliminated. The very system of Party training has been eliminated. Visits to soldiers universities of culture have become optional. What is compensating for the training time that has become available? Introduction of the historical cycle into the study program and profound study of the problems associated with strengthening military discipline. In other words, the emphasis is being made on what has a direct relation to the Army and not on the world view or socio-political disciplines.

If we talk about "front rooms" that are similar to your Lenin Rooms, they have been reequipped from centers of ideological education work into recreation rooms. The only wall whose appearance is regulated is the one on which the Polish state symbols have been placed. Concern about the rest of the interior is a matter for the tastes of the soldiers themselves.

There are many variations in the appearance of sleeping quarters. In some subunits, there are photographs that reflect the romantic appeal of military service, in others—icons, in still others—advertisements for the achievements of world automobile design, and still others have women in negligee and wall calendars. In short, to any taste.

Such "freedoms" do not at all signify that soldiers have forgotten about their immediate task—to reliably insure the safety of our borders. The limits of personnel patriotic education have not only not been narrowed but, on the contrary, they have even been broadened. The Polish Forces's genealogy has been increased. At the present time, it takes as its foundation not 1943 as it was the custom until recently, but from the moment of the establishment of Polish statehood and the times of the dynasty of the first Polish kings. Historical justice has been restored with regard to Polish soldiers and officers who fought the Fascists as part of the Armed Formations of the countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition and the Army of Anders. In our view, these changes promote peace of mind and achievement of national agreement.

Thus, quite serious changes have occurred in the Polish Forces. It is still quite difficult to assess them in a simple manner. But in any case, these changes are a reality that we must know and that we must reckon with.

Lithuanian Soldier Comments on Loyalty to Soviet Army

90UM0460B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Soviet Army Private Edvinas Jonovich Lindzhyus of Lithuania by Lieutenant Colonel N. Polosukhin, Kiev Military District: "So We Are Not Ashamed Tomorrow"]

[Text] There are quite a few conversations in soldiers circles about events in Lithuania. And, listening one

more time as 20-year-old lads soberly evaluate the complex political situation, you think: If you could teach someone another newly appeared political buzz word. Teach them common sense and a responsible attitude toward life.

In confirmation of my thought, I want to conduct a conversation with Private E. Lindzhyus (with his consent). To some extent, Edvinas' statements are characteristic of the frame of mind of many soldiers and sergeants—natives of Lithuania who are serving at our unit. And 32 of them are serving with us.

For reference: Edvinas Jonovich Lindzhyus was drafted into the Soviet Army in November 1989 from the Lithuanian SSR. Edvinas' father is a skilled railroad track repairman, his mother is a cleaning woman at a kindergarten, and his brother is a seventh grade student. Before being drafted into the Army, Edvinas worked as a longshoreman and, after graduation from a technological technicum, as a shift chief at a chemical enterprise. He joined the Komsomol in 1987. He has been at his very best side during his service. He was promoted to the military rank of private. Edvinas is a member of the battalion VLKSM [Komsomol] Committee.

[Polosukhin] Edvinas, what do you think, why is the Lithuanian Parliament attempting to present desertion as nearly a heroic deed of a true citizen?

[Lindzhyus] It is difficult for me to answer this question. I think that our respected deputies are really hurrying and want, as they say in Russia, to put the cart before the horse. At the same time, my small republic has been a part of the Union for 50 years, and is tied to Russia, the Ukraine, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia by hundreds of threads. Maybe, we have also not lived together very well during these years and we are not very rich but I understand there would not be much in Lithuania if the republics did not help one another. Can we really cut off all ties without taking other interests into account? It is the same case with [military] service. Our countrymen have served in the Soviet Army for decades and suddenly they are appealing to Lithuanian soldiers to leave their units. It is easy to introduce confusion into a soldier's spirit but who will defend the violated oath later? Nevertheless, some people are leaving their duty locations...

[Polosukhin] Do your countrymen really not understand what kind of trouble they can end up in?

[Lindzhyus] Of course, many understand but they think that they will be lucky and things will work out... Others want to make a political career in Lithuania and some simply are morally and physically not prepared for military service. I think that some people in the background of events that are occurring in my republic are out for themselves and others simply want to avoid service.

[Polosukhin] Some Lithuanian soldiers are inclined toward rash deeds under the influence of letters from home. And what are your parents and friends writing to you, Edvinas if it is not a secret?

[Lindzhyus] My parents write: Serve honorably, like you should, and do not do anything stupid. And I know that the same things are being written to some of my countrymen. And my friends are not agitating for me to desert the Army. You know Lithuanians have always considered service in the Army to be honorable and obligatory for every man.

[Polosukhin] As justification for appeals to Lithuanian soldiers to desert, the new leaders of Lithuania frequently set forth the following arguments: They say that both commanders and fellow servicemen taunt and degrade the human dignity of our young men...

[Lindzhyus] It is possible that there are such cases somewhere but I am not sure that in those places where "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] exists it is particularly directed at Lithuanians. And not everything is easy for female citizens in collectives. But during six months service in our unit, I do not know of even one case of a disrespectful attitude toward Lithuanians. Do not think that I am afraid of something or that I am hiding something. Yes, we have our problems with inter-ethnic education. But this is what I want to say: It is sometimes hard to explain to a person what the value of inter-ethnicity is if the nationalists have already managed to appeal to his loyalty.

[Polosukhin] Edvinas, you must be troubled by the question: What will happen to Lithuania tomorrow?

[Lindzhyus] I do not have a lot of life experience to judge how my people would live better—in a renewed federation or independently. But I am firmly convinced that we do not have to do today what we will be ashamed of tomorrow as it was with the appeal to us, Lithuanian soldiers, to be absent without leave from our units. I think that my people and their leaders have enough political sobriety to properly react to the President of the USSR's appeal to manifest restraint and wisdom and to not lose the respect and friendship of those peoples with whom we have lived side by side for many years.

Veterans, Youth Activists Discuss Waning Patriotism Among Youth

People's Deputy Speaks at Meeting

90UM0469A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 15, 9-15 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by V. Onufriyev: "Indebted to the Fatherland"]

[Text] The All-Union Veterans Council, VLKSM [All-Union Komsomol] Central Committee, the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, and USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] have organized and conducted a meeting between veterans and activists of independent military patriotic youth associations. First Deputy Chairman of the All-Union Council of USSR People's Deputies A. Golyakov opened the meeting. Veterans, he said, are concerned about the fate of the

country's younger generation, by the noticeable slackening of military patriotic education, and by attempts to undermine the prestige of the Armed Forces.

Why has a rift of misunderstanding developed in the interrelationship between veterans and young people? Why do young people prefer discotheques to military patriotic clubs? What kind of army youth movement do we need today? These questions were at the meeting participants' center of attention.

In Major General of the Militia G. Tyrkalov's opinion, the atmosphere of complete license that has developed in our country recently and the cult of violence and immorality in modern literature are having a pernicious influence on young people. Today we have begun to call the young boys who are taking advantage of all kinds of things at stores "lads who are doing their business" even though all of these "businessmen" need to first of all devote quite a bit more attention to their studies and to moral and physical improvement.

Oksana Yaroshinskaya, a Grodnenskiy School No 6 teacher and member of the main staff of the army youth movement who spoke at the meeting, said:

"Each of us needs to know what he specifically can be proud of and who to imitate and then I am sure that the young men will perceive the army youth movement differently and will be drawn toward 'Orlenka' and 'Zarnitsa' and training for service in the Army will become their internal need. Until that time, we will not really attract young men to heroic patriotic work while we continue to talk with them in a didactic tone about the vaguely bright future."

The meeting's participants interpreted differently the story of Leningrad Resident O. Sokolov, president of the Federation of Military Historical Clubs under the VLKSM Central Committee. The young men working in these clubs have selected renowned military leaders of the last century as their idols. Military training and studies are being conducted here in the form and with similarities to Russian Army and 19th Century military art. At the beginning, this has also caused a lack of understanding among the meeting's participants: They said, today what good is it for a young person to know, let us say, what differentiates a guardsman from a grenadier.

They seemed to prefer the activities of the Kuybyshev Young Pilot and Cosmonaut Cadet Training Combine when its leader, Hero of the Soviet Union A. Boytsov, talked about them. Here young people study modern aircraft and spacecraft and learn to fly airplanes. However, it would be incorrect to abandon military historical clubs: In them, young men will learn a bit about the roots of their people and the origins of their valor and morality. Without the past, the meeting's participants stressed, there is also neither present nor future. We need to take everything that is better from the past and move forward. According to the majority of the meeting's participants, it is not important which of the heroes—

Surovov, or Karbyshev, Gastello or Sorge—is the ideal for the young men and moves them with their deeds. It is important that clubs named after them conduct useful work through teaching high moral values among young people that are necessary to defend the Fatherland.

A thorough discussion of the state of research work and participation of young people's detachments in this important work occurred at the meeting. A proposal by V. Shvets, chief of Kazakhstan Republic Headquarters of the Army Youth Movement, to increase the struggle with so-called "black trailblazers" who desecrate the monuments and graves of soldiers who died in the Great Patriotic War was fervently supported.

The meeting's participants talked about how local preparations are proceeding for that glorious date—the 45th Anniversary of Victory [Great Patriotic War].

B.T. Shumilin, member of the Presidium of the All-Union Veterans Council and chairman of the Commission for Work Among Youth, summed up the meeting's results by thanking the participants for their great patriotic work which they are carrying out with the young people in their local areas.

An appeal to the 21st VLKSM Congress was adopted at the meeting whose text is published below.

Appeal Sent to Komsomol

90UM0469B Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 15,
9-15 Apr 90 p 2

[Appeal from the participants of the meeting between veterans and activists of independent military patriotic youth associations to the 21st VLKSM Congress, Moscow, April 3, 1990: "To the 21st VLKSM Congress"]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

The participants of the meeting of veterans and activists of independent military patriotic youth associations appeal to you. Among us are soldiers and partisans of the Great Patriotic War, Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Socialist Labor, Afghan veterans, young Komsomol members, School and PTU [Vocational and Technical School] students, technicum and VUZ [higher education institution] students, and people who joined the Komsomol at the fronts, in the underground, and in partisan detachments. Many people stood at the origins of the youth patriotic movements.

Having gathered on the eve of the 45th Anniversary of Victory [Great Patriotic War], we note with profound concern the reduction of the activities of heroic patriotic work and the slackening of attention to the most important matter—the training of young men for serving the Fatherland and their people.

A process is occurring on the wave of the blackening of the past that is a departure from the life tested forms of

mass defense patriotic education of the younger generation. No adequate new forms are being proposed.

Thousands of public museums, military historical clubs and associations, research groups and detachments are being deprived of required coordination and cooperation and material support. They do not always find proper support of local party, government, and Komsomol organs.

For the sake of political competition in a number of republic and oblast Komsomol organizations, their work is being curtailed or is taking on a formal nature. Moreover, subunits that are engaged with these issues are being eliminated with the reduction of Komsomol organizations staffs.

At the same time, pacifism is being planted in the young peoples' environment, a policy is being conducted to remove the heroes from our history, and a wedge is persistently being driven between the younger and older generations. Internationalism is being replaced by nationalism. Complete license and extremism are being propagandized. Respect for the Armed Forces is being undermined. Is it not sad that certain youth mass media organizations are promoting this.

Veterans also see their own shortcomings and mistakes: Passiveness and at times the inability to convincingly talk with young people and a certain conservatism of thinking. We share moral responsibility along with you for not caring for soldiers graves and for not interring hundreds of thousands of remains of soldiers who fell during battle.

We advocate the formation and unwavering implementation of a state youth policy. We will persistently seek a way to jointly resolve the problem of the rebirth of the mass heroic-historical and defense patriotic youth movement. But much depends on the decisions of the Komsomol Congress.

We appeal to you to maintain and strengthen the Nation's Leninist Communist Youth Organization.

It is time to cease staff games and conversations about the insurmountability of crisis phenomena in the Komsomol and transition to the practical resolution of state and youth problems.

We will always be with you in this work and first of all in the education of young patriots who are devoted to their country and to their people.

We consider it necessary in the situation that has developed that questions of the formation of an active vital position, patriotism, and a readiness to defend the Fatherland among youth be reflected in the Congress' Resolution.

We appeal to the delegates to submit a proposal to the USSR Supreme Soviet in the name of the 21st Congress about the Law on Memory and the establishment of a

single state social program to immortalize the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland.

We consider the Komsomol's most important task to be the education of youth about respect for the Army, preparedness for service in the Armed Forces, and strengthening ties of military patriotic associations with military units.

We support the appeal of the participants of the full-scale Plenum of the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations of the Armed Forces of the USSR to the VLKSM Central Committee and the 21st VLKSM Congress on the adoption of a comprehensive program to render social assistance to young servicemen and members of their families.

We appeal to the 21st Congress of the Lenin Komsomol to organize the broad participation of youth in preparations for and celebration of the 45th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War.

Participants in the meeting of veterans and activists of independent military patriotic youth associations.

Moscow, April 3, 1990.

Ukrainian Youth Protest Military Service

90UN1728A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in *Ukrainian* 10 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by RADYANSKA UKRAYINA correspondent B. Sinkevych, Ternopol: "Who Will Arrange the Accents?"]

[Text] "No-man's-land" or "liberty square," as the unofficial ["informal"] organizations have recently been calling the well-known plaza in Ternopol between Theater Square and the department store, was occupied for 24 hours the other day by members of the Ternopol organizations of SNUM [Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth].

The Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth takes an openly anti-Communist position. Its organization in the oblast center numbers, to quote its regional leader, Yuriy Morhun ("If this is of interest to you"), "approximately five persons." And there are an additional supposedly 20 persons in initiative groups in Borshchev, Berezhany, Lanovtsy, and Chortkov....

Some of them—college students, vocational-school and secondary-school students—brought air mattresses and sleeping bags to the plaza in order to sleep right there, on benches, following their "watch" and, if one is to believe the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth leadership, following a "hunger strike chain across the Ukraine." For what purpose? On a poster hanging from the neck of organization activist Oksana Nazarko we read: "We demand that it be prohibited to use troops against the civilian population."

This political action began in Lvov, and 24 hours later it was picked up in Ternopol like a relay baton, from which it "traveled" to Ivano-Frankovsk and other oblast centers where Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth and SUM [Union of Ukrainian Youth] organizations exist.

Frankly, the hunger strike by these unofficial organizations was a novelty for the people of Ternopol, and for this reason people walked up to the "protesters" out of curiosity, to ask them for what cause they were enduring hunger, whereupon they would receive an exhaustive explanation: "For the elimination of political sections in the Armed Forces, for deideologization of the military, and for the establishment of republic military units in the Ukraine." None of the onlookers, however, was able to persuade the protesters that their hunger strike was wrong. One woman came up, a teacher to judge from her appearance and manner. She exclaimed angrily: "The slogans displayed on this plaza are wrong, and should be removed," turned on her heel, and marched off. Nor did Gen V.O. Malyovanny, former chief of the oblast executive committee MVD directorate, also visited the scene. Vasyl Onysymovych also expressed his dissatisfaction over the actions of the members of SNUM. But the latter complained, as if in self-justification, that so many pictures had allegedly been taken of them, especially from the windows of the nearby Hotel Ukrayina, that they could paper the walls of all offices in the KGB and MVD, and yet not one party or soviet official had shown up. Of course they have a point.

Particularly since there was to be another such event in Ternopol, in order, as the participants explained, to complete the campaign on the eve of the spring military draft call. In short, on the day before the scheduled induction, members of SNUM are demonstrating against Ukrainian young men serving in the Soviet Army which they, the members of SNUM, consider to be an army of "occupation".... We hope that officials will see fit to enter into a public debate and express their position on the matter.

They should also explain to these young people that there are certain sacred things which one is not allowed to trample on, even young people who are unaware of all the details of the difficult, painful history of the Ukrainian people. Playing with pseudodemocracy and extreme chauvinistic patriotism is always very dangerous.

New Party on Ukrainian Armed Force, Draft

90UM0538A

[Editorial Report] Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA publishes in Russian on 1 April 1990 on page 1 an article by S. Romanyuk, entitled: "Lvov: the Week's Chronicle". The article notes briefly that a 10-point declaration has turned up from a "Committee for the Creation of a Ukrainian Armed Force." The declaration is said to provide instructions to draftees on "escaping" service in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Conditions for Establishing Veterans' Cooperatives Presented

90P50007A

[Editorial Report] Moscow VETERAN in Russian No. 17 of 23-29 April 1990 publishes on pages 7-11 a series of draft statutes and enactments on the conditions for establishing voluntary Cooperatives and Associations connected with the Councils of War and Labor Veterans. The purpose of these organizations, according to O.G. Gotsiridze, Chairman of the Organizing Committee under the All-Union Council of Veterans is "to attract as large a number of the veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces as possible to feasible labor activity, since their participation in the work of cooperatives provides not only an improvement of the material well-being of veterans, but has a great moral and psychological significance..." in prolonging the useful, active working life of veterans.

The published articles include the following:

- a "Draft Statute on the All-Union Association of Cooperatives of Veterans of War, Labor, and Armed Forces of the USSR—"Veteran";
- a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers and the All-Union Council of Trade Unions of 23 March 1990, No. 323: "On Creating Additional Conditions for Developing the Cooperatives of the Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces of the USSR";
- a resolution of the Buro of the Presidium of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor on organizing the creation of the veterans' cooperatives in accordance with the 23 March 1990 resolution;
- sample regulations for the cooperatives based on the USSR law "On Cooperatives in the USSR";
- primary recommended directions of production activity for the cooperatives.

Commentary on Problems Attending Withdrawal from CSSR

Logistical, Travel Difficulties

90UM0340A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel P. Chernenko: "The Troop Withdrawal Has Begun"]

[Text] Yesterday a tank division began withdrawing from the territory of Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Soviet Union began to redeploy its troops to the East without delay, on one hand by considering the desires of this nation's broad public circles and, on the other hand, by consistently implementing a policy to reduce the level of military confrontation in Europe. By the way, the USSR is causing itself a lot of bother by beginning such a major action. Is this really not a manifestation of good will? Right now, corresponding steps by NATO would be very appropriate!

I visited the tank regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Churilov while the unit was being prepared for a march by rail.

"Work is proceeding according to plan," said Lt Col S. Chedlyayev, deputy commander for political affairs, "although there is a lot of work and various tactical problems. We do not have enough containers to transport domestic items while only a third of the unit is being shipped out. Difficulties are also arising with train tickets. This is what is occurring: People are arriving at the train station with their children and personal belongings in order to leave and later they return—there are no tickets. But in the last few days, it is as if everything has sorted itself out."

And this is what Battalion Chief of Staff Major V. Berzhanskas told me:

"Officers and warrant officers will find things difficult at the new duty location. Their families have no place to live. Right now they are shipping their household belongings in containers not to their duty location but to relatives and friends. They are also sending their families there. For example, I am sending my family to my mother's house in Lithuania."

Yes, a far from simple situation has developed in this battalion—only three of 22 families of officers and warrant officers have apartments in the Soviet Union. The situation is generally the same throughout the regiment. Of more than 200 families, only 28 have apartments.

The last tank has been loaded on a flat car and secured. The customary locomotive whistle resounds and the troop train sets out on its journey to the East.

Housing Shortage for Returning Families

90UM0340B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90
Morning Edition p 1

[Article by V. Litovkin: "The Road Home: Soviet Troops Are Returning Home to the Fatherland from the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]"]

[Text] On 27 February, the first Soviet troop train leaving Czechoslovakia with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and other vehicles loaded on flat cars and with military equipment in rail cars arrived at Chop Border Station. A tank division, one of those that arrived in the neighboring country 22 years ago, began to return to the Fatherland.

We greet them warmly and cordially. Welcome, sons! Upon your return to the Fatherland!

And other troop trains of ours will follow close behind it on a nearly daily basis. Two dozen columns consisting of a hundred wheeled vehicles each will roll along Czechoslovak roads toward the Soviet border. They have to cover 500 kilometers there and thousands [of kilometers] through our nation's territory.

But of course this is not about numbers. Other thoughts come to mind when you reflect on this road home. You think that it will enter our lives like a small new page in Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. And this painted is painted with good impressions from CSSR President V. Havel's visit to Moscow and the documents adopted during the course of his visit that also include an agreement on Soviet troop withdrawals. You think that the error that we permitted in 1968 will be corrected and we have honestly stated [that we committed this error] at the top of our lungs. And the withdrawal of our troops from Czechoslovakia will remain in the peoples' memory as a very important military-political event signifying a new stage in our nation's international relations....

We know: Negotiations are occurring on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Hungarian Republic; reductions of our units stationed in the GDR are continuing; the Soviet Union has proposed that they examine the issue of withdrawing Soviet troops from Poland if Poland expresses a desire to do so.

We are in fact confirming the USSR's adherence to the position announced by the Soviet government—to withdraw all foreign troops from foreign territory in Europe by 1995-1996 and to eliminate all military bases on foreign territories by the year 2000.

Well, how will our troops withdraw from the CSSR? In three phases. The first began in February 1990 and the last will end in 1991. Why so long? This is caused by a whole series of technical problems. By Chop's comparatively low traffic capacity which is the only railway station through which troop trains pass and where trucks are changed under flat cars and rail cars to those accepted by our railroad tracks. The station is physically

incapable of accepting more than two troop trains per day in addition to economic and national economic cargo. The volume of traffic on Czechoslovak highways and first category roads is also impeding acceleration of traffic. It will also be difficult to support additional loading on these roads.

There is also a social aspect to this problem. The Central Group of Forces is not only 73,500 servicemen, hundreds of tanks, APC's [Armored Personnel Carriers], and other combat vehicles but also hospitals, schools, everyday services and sales facilities, and families of officers and warrant officers many of whom do not have any housing at all in the Soviet Union.

Czechoslovak construction firms are proposing construction of portable huts for 100,000 people in the USSR. We thank them for their concern. But is this really a solution for a nation whose climate could hardly allow [people] to endure not only winter but even less a cold spring or autumn in such homes?! We need capital construction. It is catastrophically inadequate.

Barracks have been readied in the Moscow Military District for the tank division that is leaving Czechoslovakia first. It is for soldiers and sergeants. And combat equipment must be left under someone's care. But housing for families of officers and warrant officers is not abundant on the garrison where they propose basing the tank crewmen. They intend to build more than 10 [apartment] buildings there in the next three years. But that is three whole years [away]! Three years of waiting, maybe, even broken families...

Of course, they are doing what they can to remove the urgency from the "apartment issue." The order has been given to create a boarding school in the TsGV [Central Group of Forces] for children whose fathers will be sent to the new duty location in the near future. A house has been allocated for their mothers near the school. The military has canceled construction of all secondary facilities and all efforts are being rushed into the construction of housing. But they still need schools, kindergartens, and a hospital. And it is already clear today: The Army has extremely few men to accomplish this mission.

Help is required—from the Soviet government to local government agencies. Not only to allocate major material resources for this purpose, but also to receive, to warm, and to give them shelter. And the main thing is to return to families of military personnel that which they have been due in housing in recent years. People judge our decency, honesty, and the purity of our intentions by how we correct mistakes—not only in the international arena but at home as well. We would not [be able to] deceive them the next time.

Our sons, brothers, and sisters are returning home. Let us greet them properly.

State of Reform in Polish Armed Forces

90UM0414A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major A. Farina: "Polish Armed Forces on the Road to Reform"]

[Text] A characteristic trait at the current level of Warsaw Treaty Organization member countries is the improvement of their defensive systems through radical reforms in the military arena. Today we are continuing to publish materials acquainting our readers with changes taking place in the Armed Forces of Eastern European countries.

The reforms taking place in Poland must be reflected in the vital activities of its Armed Forces. Since 1987 the Polish Armed Forces have been taking measures aimed at restructuring the entire army organism under the new political conditions. Their primary goal is to create an Armed Forces that would guarantee the security, independence and military self-reliance of Poland and also respond to the economic capabilities of the Polish State. The task of reorganizing the Polish Armed Forces, a task that is based on the recently adopted defensive doctrine, basically assumes that they concentrate their efforts in three primary areas: restructuring the Army; humanizing Army life; and depoliticizing the Armed Forces.

In the end, the reconstruction process has been called upon to facilitate guaranteeing that the Armed Forces have sufficient combat readiness with the least costs in terms of moral and material expenditures considering the conditions of the Polish State's economic and political instability. This process envisions changing the organic organizational structure of the Polish Armed Forces, reducing the number of its personnel and reducing the basic types of combat equipment and weapon systems to the norms of reasonable sufficiency.

According to information from the Polish press, in early 1990 the Polish Armed Forces had 314,000 servicemen; by the end of this year it will be reduced by another 14,000. At that point it will comprise 0.8 percent of the Polish population. At the same time there is an ongoing process to reduce the number of several types of combat equipment and weapon systems. By the end of 1990 more than 800 tanks, 900 artillery pieces and mortars and 700 armored transport vehicles and infantry combat vehicles will be dismantled. And there is a continuing reduction in allocations for military needs. The Ministry of National Defense budget for 1990 that was adopted in late February is the smallest one in the Polish State's post-war period. As Polish newspapers wrote on this subject, "The budget that was envisioned is a trial version for the Army's survival. A further reduction in the allocation would set a dangerous precedent."

At the same time there is a process on-going to humanize Army life. It represents the rebirth in the Army of the Polish people's national traditions, culture and human values, the creation of an atmosphere of comradeship

and mutual respect in military collectives and the instilling of a more democratic and creative character to military service. The humanization program relies on a fundamentally new concept for educating and training personnel. It is specifically aimed at changing the organizational basis for passage into military service, re-evaluating the goals, forms and methods in the training and educational process and also increasing the cultural level of servicemen. The realization of this program also assumes that we will create conditions in which, as the Army newspaper ZHOLNEZH VOLNOSTI wrote, "The barracks will become more like home." For this to happen, it is recommended that changes that depend on the tastes of the soldiers be made in setting up the barracks, relaxation rooms and soldiers' "dayrooms."

A number of limitations associated with organizing free time for soldiers and sergeants have been removed. First-term servicemen now have the opportunity to freely take leave after completing training exercises or duty details. Soldiers with families are authorized a leave lasting from three days to two months. Sergeants have the right to grant a serviceman leave lasting from 24 to 48 hours and the company commander may grant a leave for up to 72 hours. Depending on their service, every first-term soldier and sergeant is guaranteed an annual leave for the following lengths of time: for privates—seven days; for sergeants—10 days. At the same time the Armed Forces have stipulated measures that guarantee that the necessary levels of combat readiness are maintained. No less than 50 percent of the personnel must be constantly maintained in military subunits.

It is recommended that during educational work with personnel strict attention be concentrated on publicizing the national and patriotic legacy of the Polish people, the military traditions of the Polish soldier and his heroism in fighting for the sovereignty and independence of Poland. A primary role in this area is being given to expanding the influence that the Polish Roman Catholic Church has on servicemen. The law on "The Relationship Between the State and the Catholic Church in the Polish People's Republic," a law that was adopted on 17 May 1989, is the basis for intensifying these activities.

This law states that "first-term servicemen are guaranteed the right to take part in worshipping God and other religious rites on Sundays and on holidays both in garrison churches and outside them if it does not interfere with the accomplishment of their service obligations."

As L. Levandovskiy, the Armed Forces' delegate to the 11th PORP [Polish United Workers' Party] Congress, noted, "Creating the necessary mechanisms that will always close the army barracks to attempts to transfer the political struggle into the Army" plays an important role in the overall process of reforms in the Armed Forces. As a result, the Polish Armed Forces must represent an institute consisting of all its people, an institute that carries out the will of its people exclusively through the highest agencies of State power—the senate, the Sejm and the president of the republic who by the constitution is the Commander-and-Chief of the country's Armed Forces.

As a first step within the framework of this process the Main Political Directorate has been abolished and a new one, the Main Educational Directorate for Polish Forces, has been established. The system of political agencies, a system that is extremely fragmented within the Armed Forces, has been replaced by a corps of officer educators. At the initiative of Minister of National Defense General of the Army F. Sivitskiy the Polish State has decided to propose a legislative initiative imposing a ban on Polish Armed Forces servicemen being members of political parties and conducting political activities during their service in the Armed Forces.

On the whole the processes involved in reconstructing the primary mechanism of life in the Armed Forces, processes that are actively raising havoc in the Polish Republic, are, according to the Polish military leadership, an expression of those democratic transformations that are permeating Polish society and are aimed at radical changes in the State's economic and political systems. They are also being called upon to facilitate the creation of a more modern, and that means combat ready, Armed Forces that is equal to the requirements for guaranteeing Poland's security under the military-political situation that has developed in the world.

Biographical Notes: Maj Gen V.A. Polevik

90UM0344A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*

VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 89

p 92

[Biographical notes on Maj Gen Vladimir Arkhipovich Polevik: "Maj Gen Vladimir Arkhipovich Polevik, assigned as member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Section of the Airborne Assault Forces"]

[Text] He was born on August 12, 1938 in the village of Stradachi in Brest Rayon, Brest Oblast to a large peasant family. He worked at a kolkhoz after graduation from middle school. In 1957, he was drafted into active military service and sent to the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District.

In February 1958, he entered the Tbilisi Artillery Command School imeni 26th Bakinskiy Commissars and graduated in 1960. He began his officer career in that same military district as secretary of an artillery battalion Komsomol organization. He was a platoon commander and later once again secretary of a battalion Komsomol organization and later of an artillery regiment Komsomol organization. He was aide to the chief of a unit political section for Komsomol affairs for three years. He was deputy unit commander for political affairs. From this position, he entered the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin.

After graduating from the academy, he received an assignment to the Red Banner Carpathian Military District as deputy commander for political affairs of an anti-aircraft missile regiment. His later service included four years as chief of a unit political section, three years as chief of the political section of a motorized rifle division, five years as chief of the political section of a rifle corps, three years as member of a military council and chief of the political section of a combined-arms army. His last assignment before being assigned to his current position was first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Volga (currently Volga-Ural) Military District. Previously he also served in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (currently the Western Group of Forces), the Red Banner Central Asian Military District (currently combined into the Red Banner Turkestan Military District).

He is Belorussian and has been a CPSU member since 1961. In various years, he has been elected a member of party raykoms [rayon committees] and deputy of a city council of people's deputies. He was a delegate to the 26th Party Congress.

For successes in combat and political training, he has been awarded three orders—the order of the Red Star (1985), "For service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 2nd class (1978) and 3rd class (1975), and many medals.

He assumed the rank of Major General in April 1985.

He has been married since 1960. His wife is Belorussian and is a pharmacist by education. His daughter graduated from Frunze State University and his son has finished serving in the Army and is now a student at Moscow Automotive Institute.

Details to the biography (from coworkers comments):

"Strong-willed, flexible. Attentive and caring with regard to people and he expresses concern for them while remaining principled and demanding."

"He regards accomplishment of any assigned mission with a sense of high responsibility and he at the same time manifests initiative and creativity."

"He knows how to listen to criticism directed at him and to make the proper conclusions from it. Accessible and unpretentious in manner."

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Lt Gen Krivosheyev Rejects 'Territorial Principle' of Manning

90UM0404A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*

VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 4, Feb 90

(signed to press 13 Feb 90) pp 18-24

[Article by Col Gen Grigoriy Fedotovich Krivosheyev under rubric "Viewpoint": "Military Service: Equality Before the Law"]

[Text] *About the author. Grigoriy Fedotovich Krivosheyev. In Armed Forces since 1949. CPSU member since 1953. Completed the Tyumen Infantry School in 1953, the Frunze Military Academy in 1964, and the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Academy in 1973. Commanded a platoon, company, battalion, regiment and division, and was chief of staff of an army, a district and a group of forces. Since January 1987 has been chief of Main Directorate/deputy chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff.*

Lately numerous letters from Soviet citizens, representatives of public and informal organizations, and USSR people's deputies have been coming both to the USSR Ministry of Defense and to us on the USSR Armed Forces General Staff expressing different options for manning the Army and Navy. It is proposed in particular to sharply reduce their numerical strength and leave a "small professional army," one consisting of national military units of the union republics. Along with compulsory active military service, the authors of the letters request introducing alternative service for persons who for religious or other considerations refuse to perform service involving the performance of combat training missions.

Letters are letters, but in places people already are going further. In violation of Article 73 of the USSR Constitution, the LiSSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution on 29 September of last year to provide for performance of

service by LiSSR citizens on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic beginning in 1990 in accordance with their desire, or if that is an impossibility, then somewhere nearby in the Baltic Military District. There are provisions for re-establishing national military formations in the LiSSR in which Republic citizens would serve and for halting the call-up of Lithuanian citizens into construction units which are not subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Defense. A similar decree was adopted by the GSSR Supreme Soviet on 30 November. Such actions clearly contradict the Basic Law of the Soviet state and are incompatible with tasks of ensuring reliable national defense.

Over just which issues are sharp polemics now going on?

In my view, the most serious of them is the question of **shifting from an exterritorial to a territorial principle of manning the Armed Forces with compulsory service personnel.** The exterritorial manning principle means providing personnel replacements for the Army and Navy from draft contingents living outside military unit stationing (force organization) areas. The territorial manning principle, on the other hand, provides for personnel replacements for the troops from draft resources located in their stationing areas.

What seem to be at first glance advantages of the territorial manning principle compared with the exterritorial principle (from the standpoint of economic expediency movement volumes are sharply reduced, the ethnic environment of the location and customary climatic conditions are preserved for draftees, and near and dear ones have an opportunity to visit servicemen) generate numerous proposals for implementing specifically this and only this manning principle. Especially many such proposals come from citizens and informal associations of union republics of the Baltic and Transcaucasus.

But a more detailed study of the territorial manning principle enables perceiving a large number of substantial drawbacks in it. Above all, **manning according to this principle does not allow providing the Army and Navy with the necessary number of human resources.** It is common knowledge that, based on their strategic and operational missions, the main force groupings of our Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy are stationed along the borders of our federation stretching thousands of kilometers, on the territory of Warsaw Pact member countries, in the Mongolian People's Republic, in the Far East, in the Transbaykal, in areas of the Far North, and in the deserts and semideserts of Central Asia. Navy ships stand watch in the ocean. But draft resources basically are in densely populated areas of the Union's European territory, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The enormous disproportion between the need of Army and Navy forces for draft resources by stationing regions and the presence of resources in these regions makes the territorial principle of manning the Armed Forces essentially unacceptable.

But this is not yet everything. Performance of military service at the place of call-up or residence **absolutely does**

not ensure peacetime training of the necessary number of military-trained reserves of specific military occupational specialties for deploying troops in given areas under the mobilization plan. In other words, the main objective is not achieved here and it is impossible to fulfill the primary mission of active compulsory military service in peacetime.

The complexity of this mission can be realized if only by picturing the number of military occupational specialties. Suffice it to say that for the Ground Forces alone their list consists of almost 2,000 designations. For the Armed Forces as a whole this list includes over 4,000 specialties. Naturally it is absolutely impossible to ensure the training of the necessary number of military specialists for such a vast nomenclature in some one republic or one military district. This would require stationing formations of all branches or arms of the Army and Navy on their limited territory, but is this really within the capability of one republic from the standpoint of economic and technical capabilities?

It is a similar situation with **training specialists required by the Army and Navy in the DOSAAF system** (drivers, Navy specialists, communications specialists and so on). This Society's organizations usually are located in densely populated areas with developed industry where there are appropriate human resources, teaching cadres and a developed training facility for them. If we were to shift to a territorial manning principle, the question will arise: Where are DOSAAF specialists to be trained and from where would they come for forces stationed in lightly populated desert areas, in the Far North, and abroad? It is of course possible also to answer this question as follows: train such specialists directly in units and subunits. A detailed study of the problem, however, shows that in this case specialist training will cost much more, considerable additional draft resources, officer cadres and instructor cadres will be required, and requirements for training equipment and supplies will increase.

The territorial principle of manning the Armed Forces **contradicts the basic, fundamental provision of our official views on defense of the state as a national task**, confirmed at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Its decree states: "Providing a reliable national defense is one of the most important functions of our state." The Congress expressed itself for further qualitative development of the Soviet Army in accordance with existing basic principles of its organizational development: a multinational basis, universality and compulsion of military service, exterritoriality, and nationwide laws. These main principles and directions are fully justified under conditions of the Soviet Federation, since the statewide task of the country's protection and defense cannot be decided within the framework of regional or republic isolation.

Finally, **service at the place of residence also is less preferable from the standpoint of developing and deepening ethnic relations**, since it does not promote the formation of inter-ethnic feeling in young men or the

soldier friendship of young people of different nationalities and deprives them of an opportunity to see the country, become enriched with the culture of another nation, and expand their horizons. Such service does not conform to the principle of social justice and equality of citizens before the Law. In their letters very many Soviet citizens demand observance of a principle of manning the Army and Navy that is uniform for everyone.

If we grant an opportunity for every young man (not just those, for example, of Lithuanian, Georgian, Estonian and Armenian nationality who are insistently proposing this, but of all other nationalities as well) to perform service near his own home, then who is to perform service in the deserts, in the high mountains, in the Far North, in the fleets, and in forces abroad? Just who then will protect the border of our common home, the USSR?

At the same time, the Ministry of Defense and General Staff do not absolutize the exterritorial principle of manning the forces.

The question of establishing ethnic military force elements in union republics is closely related with the previous question. Substantiations cited above for the unacceptability of performing military service at the place of residence also can relate fully to the substantiation of the impossibility of establishing ethnic military force elements under present conditions.

Meanwhile this question has features on which we should dwell, but first some brief historical information. Ethnic force elements of the USSR Armed Forces, formations and units have been established in various periods based on characteristics of the personnel's ethnic affiliation. Formed for the first time during the Civil War from peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus and other parts of the country, they were one form of giving the working masses of outlying national districts access to armed defense of Soviet power. In late 1924 the USSR Revolutionary Military Council approved a five-year plan for establishing ethnic force elements, and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee and USSR Council of People's Commissars decree of 7 March 1938 reorganized them as all-union force elements under an exterritorial manning principle.

The establishment of ethnic units and formations was revived in 1941. A total of 2 rifle corps, 17 rifle divisions, 17 separate rifle brigades as well as a number of separate regiments which received an official ethnic designation (Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Lettish and so on) were formed as part of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War.

By the mid-1950's ethnic formations had been abolished and the personnel had joined the ranks of multi-ethnic military force elements of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Lettish and Lithuanian rifle divisions were disbanded somewhat later (in 1956).

Ethnic units and formations were manned primarily by personnel of one nationality, but this advantage was

manifested negligibly in the quantitative sense. There were only from 30 to 35 percent of soldiers of native nationalities in them. For example, in the mid-1950's there were only 18-20 percent Lettish soldiers in the 43rd Guards Lettish Division.

The upkeep of such units was justified in the years when troops were not yet supplied with modern military equipment and arms, when they did not require a large number of specialists and when considerably less material and financial expenditures were required for their upkeep. We were forced to give up the upkeep of ethnic force elements in the interests of increasing the general level of national defensive capability and combat readiness of the Armed Forces in the mid-1950's with the Army and Navy's outfitting with modern military equipment.

The economic capabilities of a particular republic also cannot help but be considered in this matter. Let us examine this, for example, for the Lithuanian SSR. At the present time military units stationed on its territory have an annual requirement for draft resources that is almost half the number called up for military service by the Republic's military commissariats. Consequently in order to ensure performance of duty within the Republic by all young men of Lithuania, the number of troops on its territory essentially will have to be doubled, which according to tentative estimates will require a minimum of R1.5 billion of state appropriations. The ecologic situation in the region also will be complicated. If we add to this the expenses for building additional everyday social-cultural installations and take into account the possible density with which military units and formations would be stationed on Lithuanian territory as well as difficulties in manning them with officers of Lithuanian nationality (there now are only 1,417 Lithuanian officers in the Armed Forces), the absolute groundlessness of that statement of the question becomes understandable.

It is absolutely not superfluous to note that the status of officer training from among persons of Lithuanian nationality provides no hope for a positive resolution of this question in the near term. For example, the number of young men of Lithuania who have entered military schools is characterized by the following data: 188 in 1987, 124 in 1988 and 93 in 1989. I will note also that, as in certain other republics, the number of "refuseniks"—young men who for one reason or another do not wish to perform the constitutional duty of defending the Motherland—is growing in Lithuania. There is a total of over 7,500 such "refuseniks" in the country. In accordance with the Law, criminal cases already have been brought against many of them.

Thus both from a military and an economic standpoint, the establishment and upkeep of ethnic military force elements in union republics as well as performance of active military duty by citizens only on the territory of their own republic clearly is not substantiated. In addition, the problem also has to be viewed in sociopolitical

terms. We know, for example, that social tension in the Baltic, Transcaucasus and Central Asia arose basically on ethnic and economic soil. Consequently, if there were ethnic units in these regions, the situation there probably not only would not be stabilized, but to the contrary, would become more acute and the consequences would be unpredictable.

Proposals for a significant reduction in the Armed Forces to the level of a "small professional army" manned according to the volunteer principle also are unconvincing today.

Let us dwell on the problem in greater detail. Throughout the entire history of states' upkeep of armies two methods of their manning have existed: by hire on a volunteer basis and by military obligation on a compulsory basis. Hire and recruitment became the basic method of manning armies of many European states as early as the late 15th century. Recruitment was used on a limited scale in Russia up to the 18th century.

By the mid-1970's a significant number of Armed Forces personnel were being "recruited" by hire in many countries. In the United States and Great Britain, for example, even now armed forces are manned fully according to that principle, although laws on military obligation which existed in these countries in the 1950's and 1960's have not been repealed.

Military obligation is the obligation of the populace established by law to perform military service in the armed forces of their country. In the history of armies' existence this obligation was manifested in different forms: the knight's militia; the militia of free peasants (in the era of feudalism); conscription levies (in Russia in the 18th-19th centuries); and universal military obligation (in the majority of world countries in the 19th-20th centuries: in Russia from 1874, in the United States from 1948 through 1973, and in Great Britain from 1949 through 1961).

The USSR presently uses a mixed method of manning the Armed Forces: the makeup of officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, and servicewomen is filled on a voluntary basis, although not by agreement (contract), but in conformity with existing statutes on their performance of duty. Compulsory-term servicemen, however, are inducted according to the Law on Universal Military Obligation.

Inasmuch as the term "all-volunteer army" lately has become equivalent to the term "professional army," it can be said that the nucleus of the USSR Armed Forces (one-third) consists of professional cadres.

The positive and negative aspects of manning an army both by hire and according to the Law "On Universal Military Obligation" have been studied thoroughly and comprehensively in all aspects: military, economic and sociopolitical.

What picture forms? **In the military sense**, in the level of their professional training and proficiency privates and NCO's of an all-volunteer army with a length of service from 3 to 6 years under short-term contracts and from 20 to 25 years under long-term contracts unquestionably considerably surpass the personnel performing service under universal military obligation for a term of 1-2 years. At the same time, upkeep of an all-volunteer army has a serious flaw in the sense that it considerably reduces the possibilities of accumulating the militarily trained reserves necessary for deploying the Armed Forces under the mobilization plan. With consideration of this, the mixed method of manning the armed forces adopted, for example, in armies of the FRG and France, should be deemed most preferable from the standpoint of defensive objectives.

As indicated above, the Soviet Armed Forces, essentially also manned under the mixed principle, have a professional nucleus which is a fully sufficient basis for training personnel in peacetime to repel possible aggression and for deploying military units under a mobilization plan. Moreover, the proportion of the professional contingent objectively will grow as the Army and Navy are further outfitted with sophisticated military equipment and arms.

In other words, from a military aspect a departure from the presently existing principle of Armed Forces organizational development and their replacement with "purely" professional, all-volunteer forces is absolutely unjustified.

Economic expenditures for upkeep of the Army and Navy when manned under the volunteer principle will rise sharply: by triple on condition of an average monthly pay of R300 for privates and NCO's and by 4.3 times with their average monthly pay at R500. But overall expenditures will grow fivefold with consideration of additional one-time expenditures for capital construction and renovation of everyday social-cultural installations. It should be emphasized that the cited calculations conditionally used not the existing strength, but a considerably reduced strength of the Armed Forces.

Consequently from the standpoint of economic expenditures and based on the complicated economic and financial situation which has formed in the country, the proposals of some informal associations and citizens for shifting to a professional army are devoid of real grounds.

Such proposals also are unacceptable **for sociopolitical motives**. Universal military obligation corresponds most fully to principles of a socialist state which provide for everyone's equality before the Law, universality of the state's defense, and every citizen's duty to be ready to defend the socialist homeland.

Voluntariness in itself is too dubious a basis for such an extremely important matter as national defensive capability and Armed Forces combat readiness and combat effectiveness. The fact is, as shown by many years of

experience of filling the positions of warrant officers and extended-term servicemen, it is impossible to count on ensuring full strength in privates and NCO's even if high pay is established for them when we consider that it will be necessary to serve not for two years but, let us say, for 15-20 years while constantly under extreme situations, in difficult climatic conditions, and with our unfortunately "traditional" unsettled state of everyday life as well.

And so let us conclude that the upkeep of a professional (all-volunteer) army is unacceptable for us in many respects: purely military, economic, and sociopolitical.

Much talk now is going on also **about introducing alternative service**. To a certain extent this question can be considered far-fetched. In its statement by individual citizens and informal associations one perceives a desire to have a legitimized opportunity for avoiding the performance of universal military obligation.

There are no grounds for introducing alternative service in our country. If religious convictions or other reasons do not permit a young man to perform compulsory military service, he is given the opportunity to perform constitutional duty by serving the authorized term in military construction units. Service there is specified by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 24 October 1967 and does not involve the use of combat weapons and military equipment. By the way, experience shows that young men who refused to take the oath in the final account performed duty in military construction detachments and criminal sanctions were not applied to them.

The opportunity of serving in military construction detachments also fully conforms to resolutions of the Conference on the Human Dimension (1989 Paris Conference). These resolutions recommend that UN member states in which a system of compulsory military service obligation exists introduce different forms of alternative service. Such forms must not involve service in combat units. At the present time amendments already have been prepared to the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" which provide for including the article "Service of Military Construction Personnel" in it.

And finally on the question of the **length of compulsory military service**, which troubles many journal readers, especially relatives of draftees. The presently existing terms of two years in the Soviet Army, in Navy shore units and in Naval Aviation and three years in the Navy were established by the Law "On Universal Military Obligation" in 1967. With consideration of citizens' wishes as well as of the trend existing in the world toward a gradual reduction in length of military service under military obligation, the possibility is seen of reducing the term of service of Navy seamen and petty officers. Proposals already have been developed on this score and have been submitted to appropriate echelons for approval, but reducing the term of military service for privates and NCO's does not appear possible for now. This involves both the demographic situation in the

country and the problem of training junior commanders and specialists, because the level of modern equipment and arms is rather high and their mastery requires considerable time.

In short, questions of Soviet defense organizational development and Armed Forces improvement which have become the subject of public discussions are inseparably linked with the resolution of a large number of very difficult economic, sociopolitical and purely military problems.

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'Categorically Opposed to Professional Army'

90UM0404B Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 4, Feb 90
(signed to press 13 Feb 90) pp 61-62

[Letter by Sr Lt R. Beknazarov under rubric "Timely":
"Service Can and Must Be Made Interesting"]

[Text] Lately many interesting and in my view business-like ideas have been expressed in the journal's pages on perestroika of our Army house. I agree with many, but I am categorically against those writings which favor a professional army. It seems to me that not only is it impossible to reject universal military obligation, but to the contrary, everything necessary should be done to revive the concept of duty and responsibility to the Motherland for her defense that has been partly lost today. It is also necessary to elevate the halo of romanticism of Army service so that a young person who is called into the Army is proud that he has been entrusted with such an important and responsible job.

Much can be done and it is possible to return the prestige of the service and universal respect for us in the military with the help of glasnost and having rejected the policy of defending the honor of the uniform in cases where it is a question of negative facts that really occur.

I am for having the Army actually become a school of a young man's courage and ideological conditioning. This must be done by rejecting the use of servicemen for performing tasks not inherent to them, by directing all efforts toward combat training and toward mastering authorized equipment, and by increasing the number of hours for physical training classes. I am probably speaking common truths, but life shows that it is for those reasons that dissatisfaction with the Army and service rather often appears. For what do the majority of young men dream of on entering Army life? About seething combat service, forced marches of many kilometers, and difficult exercises requiring good physical as well as specialized training. But instead they engage in quite a different job. Just where can the enthusiasm come from?

I also wish to express my opinion about personnel receiving passes from the unit area. There are no significant changes in this matter in the draft combined-arms regulations. I do not understand just what we are afraid of. Why not, for example, give a private a guaranteed weekly pass from the unit area? From a psychological standpoint it can be said confidently that a soldier's constant presence within a unit hardly promotes his zealous performance of official duties but, to the contrary, acts oppressively. Having been on pass, however, the soldier receives a unique emotional charge which relieves certain stress conditions and helps entertain him.

It is the very same also with free time. If we analyze the daily routine it turns out that the soldier is fully loaded "from dawn to dusk" in the middle of the week. The only place he can sit down and relax a bit is when viewing the program "Vremya." Despite this, nonregulation relationships and infractions of regulation requirements are not decreasing in the least. This means it is not a matter of the workload. Perhaps it is better to introduce certain hours for leisure and at this time send violators of discipline and order to perform fatigue work? It seems to me that such an approach will be more effective. And further, take a matter such as a soldier's incentive in results of service. Here it seems to me we should introduce guaranteed leaves for outstanding persons and for soldiers who have attained good results in the last inspection.

Of course, this is far from everything I wished to say. It would be desirable to improve the soldier's everyday life and his uniform and make it more comfortable and handsome, corresponding to modern demands of youth ethics.

All this together will facilitate a certain psychological comfort for the soldier, his incentive to serve, and the desire to honorably perform his duty to the Motherland.

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Additional Pension Benefits for Retired Servicemen, Families

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 4, Feb 90
(signed to press 13 Feb 90) pp 69-70

[Unattributed article in response to letter from Ye. Kovalchuk, an officer's wife, under rubric "Responding to Readers' Questions": "I Ask You To Explain..."]

[Text] *Tell me, please, about additional benefits for servicemen discharged to the reserve or retirement and their families. I also heard that servicewomen and women workers and employees of the Soviet Army and Navy with young children have had the length of leaves increased. Is this so?*

We respond. A USSR Council of Ministers decree introduced additional benefits for servicemen discharged from active military duty into the reserve or retirement and for their families.

According to this decree, time spent on active military duty by officers, warrant officers and extended-term servicemen discharged for age, illness, a reduction in personnel or a restricted state of health is included in the continuous period of work necessary for payment of allowances for state social insurance, increments to an old-age pension, or a one-time remuneration for years served (a percentage increment to pay), and for granting other benefits and advantages established by law involving a period of work and in effect at the place of work. In this case the break between the day of discharge from military service and the day of entry into work or study in a higher or secondary educational institution (including for the preparatory department), or the day one is sent to raise qualifications or for personnel retraining must not exceed six months. For servicemen indicated in this paragraph who have been discharged from military units or released from enterprises, establishments and organizations located in areas of the Far North and in areas equated to areas of the Far North, as well as in areas where percentage increments to pay are paid under the procedure and conditions prescribed by a previously adopted CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree, the time of their military service in such areas on entering work in these areas within six months of discharge from active military duty is figured in the continuous period of work for obtaining increments to pay and other benefits established by existing legislation for workers in those areas.

In addition, the decree states that the continuous period of work is preserved for wives of officers, warrant officers and extended-term servicemen sent to perform military service abroad regardless of the length of break in work after their return to the USSR in connection with the husband's discharge from active military duty or his transfer to a new duty station in the USSR.

The decree obligates executive committees of soviets of people's deputies and the heads of ministries, departments, associations, enterprises, establishments and organizations to take specific steps to find jobs for servicemen's wives and to use work under conditions of an incomplete workday (or work week), under a flexible schedule or at home more widely for this purpose.

The period wives of officers, warrant officers and extended-term servicemen live with their husbands in localities where there is no opportunity for them to find a job in their specialty is included in the overall period of work necessary for granting an old-age pension (but no more than ten years), if by they do not have such a period of work the day they reach pension age. It is recommended that the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems in coordination with the USSR Ministry of Defense determine the procedure for computing such a period of work for wives of the above servicemen.

The decree obligates the heads of enterprises, establishments and organizations to provide for sending workers from among officers, warrant officers and extended-term servicemen discharged from active military duty in connection with a reduction in the USSR Armed Forces to educational institutions of the cadre training, retraining and qualification-improvement system on a priority basis for the purpose of acquiring necessary professional knowledge and skills for successful performance of production duties. It is permissible to pay these workers the average wage for that position or profession for which they are preparing in the period of training with separation from work.

The military service time of officers, warrant officers and extended-term servicemen discharged from active military duty in connection with the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces is included in the period of work in a specialty if within six months (and in cases provided by law, also longer than this period) they begin work in a specialty obtained before call-up for military service or obtained in the period of service.

According to the USSR Minister of Defense order which announced this USSR Council of Ministers decree, changes have been made to the Instruction on the Procedure for Payment of a Percentage Increment for Continuous Work to Soviet Army and Navy Workers and Employees, placed in force earlier.

In particular, according to these changes, the period of work in USSR establishments abroad or in international organizations is included in the period of work giving the right to obtain a percentage increment if immediately before being sent abroad Soviet Army employees were working in military units and they returned to (or entered) work in the military units within two months from the day of discharge from positions which they held abroad, not counting travel time to the place of work.

The time spent abroad by members of families of servicemen, workers and employees sent to perform service or for work abroad does not interrupt the period of work granting the right to obtain a percentage increment, but is not included in it if after returning to the USSR these family members entered work directly in military units. Here the periods of their work in Soviet forces abroad are added and included in the period of work granting the right to obtain a percentage increment if they began work in military units, and the periods of their work in USSR establishments abroad or in international organizations are included if immediately before traveling abroad they were working in the military units and went to work in military units.

Certain other changes to the above Instruction also were made.

With respect to women with young children, leaves really were increased for them by a USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU decree announced by an appropriate USSR Minister of Defense order.

The decree provides for an increase in duration of partially paid leave to care for a child before he or she reaches one-and-a-half years of age in the following time periods:

—as of 17 December 1989 in areas of the Far East and Siberia, in northern areas of the country (in the Karelian ASSR and Komi ASSR and in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk oblasts), and in Vologda, Novgorod and Pskov oblasts;

—as of 1 July 1990 in other areas of the RSFSR and in areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia and Baltic republics;

—as of 1 January 1991 in areas of Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

In addition, as of 17 December 1989 this same decree provides for an increase in the length of supplemental leave without pay everywhere for caring for a child until he or she reaches three years of age.

Such supplemental leave is counted in the overall and continuous period of work as well as in the period of work in a specialty.

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Col Gen Fuzhenko Commemorates Army-Navy Day, 1990

90UM0360A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
22 Feb 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by Red Banner Turkestan Military District Commander Col Gen I. Fuzhenko: "Army of the People: Tomorrow is Soviet Army and Navy Day"]

[Text] Questions have been discussed of late about the role and mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. Persons who, frankly speaking, are incompetent in our affairs have appeared among some reformers and are declaiming intensively for introducing territorial-militia and voluntary-enlistment principles of Army manpower acquisition and are coming out with suggestions to "post" the Armed Forces in national quarters, disperse them into units and disrupt centralization and the direction of military organizational development.

These positions were affirmed in military sections of programs of popular fronts and movements of the Baltic republics and the Azerbaijan and Georgian SSR's; peoples deputies from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania even sent a letter addressed to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies with the demand to allow forming ethnic territorial military units of people from the Baltic and performing military duty within their republics.

Such views are based on an incorrect assessment of all factors and trends of the development of the present international situation. They are not only deeply erroneous, but also harmful inasmuch as they do not respond

to the cause of perestroika and protection of socialism in its critical stage or to the interests of improving military organizational development. On an emotional plane they confuse Soviet citizens and can lead to dangerous delusions, to even greater aggravation of inter-ethnic problems, and to biases in the youth's military-patriotic education.

Meanwhile, historical experience indicates that a victorious accomplishment of the socialist revolution and creation of favorable foreign political preconditions for building a new society largely depend on workers' readiness to defend revolutionary achievements. V. I. Lenin emphasized that "any revolution is worth something only if it can defend itself." This is a general sociological law and general principle of the socialist revolution regardless of the country or form in which it occurs. Thus, creating the military strength of the state and keeping it at a proper level is an objective necessity as long as a nonviolent peace has not become the norm in international relations. Therefore both in reports by M. S. Gorbachev and N. I. Ryzhkov at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and in speeches it was stressed that ensuring the country's reliable defensive capability is one of the most important functions of the Soviet state. The historical mission of the USSR Armed Forces is defined thoroughly and fully in the country's Constitution.

Our Army's officers and men perform their historic mission with honor. Being an offspring of the working people, the Army was established by their revolutionary creativeness under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party at a difficult time when joint forces of the internal and external counterrevolution pounced on the young Soviet Republic. Based on the specific situation in which the Republic of Soviets found itself, the Council of People's Commissars on 28 January and 11 February 1918 adopted decrees developed at Lenin's initiative on organizing the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet. And when Kaiser Germany's troops launched an offensive on 18 February along the entire Russian-German front, taking advantage of Trotsky's disruption of peace talks at Brest-Litovsk, the country was rocked by the call: "The Socialist Homeland is in danger!" In response to it, the Soviets and Bolshevik party organizations of Moscow, Petrograd and other parts of the country declared 23 February 1918 to be Socialist Homeland Defense Day. The best representatives of the working class, working peasantry and Red Guards began to join the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in a broad stream, bringing with them into the new Army a high awareness, socialist patriotism, efficiency, firm discipline, collectivism and comradeship.

This day became our Army's birthday, marked by a special upsurge of mass self-mobilization of workers into ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and by unparalleled heroism of Red Army units, which received a baptism of fire in clashes against the Kaiser's troops. Now it is being celebrated already for the 72d time as one of the largest, truly national holidays in an atmosphere of

preparation for the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth, and the 28th CPSU Congress.

The Great Patriotic War revealed the Army's popular character to its fullest. The rear was the reliable support of the front during all 1,418 days and nights of the war: in the difficult first months of the war while preparing and accomplishing a fundamental turning point in it, when clearing fascist German invaders from native soil, and during the Soviet Army's performance of the great mission of liberating many countries of Europe and Asia from enslavement.

The past war reaffirmed that an exploit in the name of the Motherland is the standard of conduct of all Soviet citizens regardless of ethnic affiliation. Showing unprecedented heroism and dedication to the cause of the Leninist party, sons and daughters of all peoples of our multi-ethnic country fought in a common formation with soldiers of Russian nationality, who comprised the basic nucleus of the Army and Navy. In the glorious cohort of Heroes of the Soviet Union there are 8,182 Russians, 2,072 Ukrainians, 311 Belorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 91 Georgians, 90 Armenians, 69 Uzbeks, 61 Mordvinians, 44 Chuvash, 43 Azerbaijanis, 39 Bashkirs, 32 Ossets, 18 Mari, 18 Turkmens, 15 Lithuanians, 14 Tajiki, 13 Letts, 12 Kirghiz, 10 Udmurts, 10 Komi, 9 Estonians, 9 Karelians and representatives of many other nationalities. The exploits of Uzbek HSU's K. A. Durdyyev, S. F. Abdullayev, B. D. Babayev, S. U. Rakhimov, U. Uzakov and others are well known in Uzbekistan. Republic workers' labor contribution to development of the wartime economy never will fade. Over 100 major industrial enterprises and a number of military academies and various schools were evacuated to us. The Republic was a powerful arsenal of the Soviet Army, supplying the front with cadres, ammunition, aircraft, food and clothing.

The present life of the Armed Forces, including of our Red Banner Turkestan Military District, is characterized by an expansion of democratism and glasnost, by a steady rise in the sociopolitical and official activeness of servicemen, by a strengthening of inner solidarity of multi-ethnic military collectives, and by an ever fuller revelation of the creative potential of party and Komsomol organizations to support the vanguard role of each party and Komsomol member in performing his military duty and to provide a worthy greeting to the 45th anniversary of the Great Victory and the 28th CPSU Congress. This above all is what determined the high combat and political training results of units and subunits where officers S. A. Shakhulskiy, A. V. Prokopyev, V. V. Levchuk, A. V. Krivoruchko and others serve.

One other good sign of the deepening perestroika in military collectives is a strengthening of spiritual closeness of officers and first-term servicemen. Such closeness is socially dictated by the very nature, purpose and

makeup of our Army, but it is achieved in practice in each specific instance on the basis of such values common to all mankind as honesty; nobility; decency of officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates in joint official activities; mutual respect and exactingness; and the concern of commanders and political officers for their subordinates. One of the most important tasks of perestroyka in the Armed Forces is to eliminate the wall of alienation between officer and private erected by formalism, indifference, arrogance and a lack of respect for human dignity.

The overwhelming majority of our officers are people who chose military service as their profession, who found in it a calling and who are giving it all their strength, knowledge, energy and talent. In our district alone during 1989 over 300 officers and generals were decorated with orders and medals, many were appointed to higher positions, and many went to study in the Academy.

Like all Soviet citizens, personnel of district formations and units today are accomplishing practical tasks of perestroyka and are striving to increase the quality of their proficiency and combat readiness in accordance with principles of Soviet defensive military doctrine and guidelines of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military Council held on 18 October 1989. Modern defensive organizational development is based not on principles of military superiority, but on principles of reasonable sufficiency and maintenance of combat readiness at such a level that no one will be tempted to encroach on the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. A reduction now is taking place in the Armed Forces by the will of the people. Their strength will be reduced by 500,000 persons by the end of 1990. Enormous responsibility to the party and people rests on the Armed Forces in this connection to ensure that the reductions do not reflect on the level of the country's defensive capability or the troops' combat readiness. The primary attention of command-political cadres and all personnel is focused on this today.

The movement toward defense sufficiency includes a reduction of military expenditures, a decrease in arms production and a planned conversion of the defense complex. Proposals for reducing military expenditures advanced at the Congress of People's Deputies are being implemented. In 1990 R70.9 billion were allocated for defense purposes, which is 8.2 percent less than in the previous year. On the whole, the saving in defense expenditures with respect to the approved five-year plan will be almost R30 billion. The volume of arms production in the current year will drop by almost one-fifth.

It should be noted in particular that tens of thousands of skilled workers will pour into the national economy as a result of the reduction in forces. This will require resolution of a number of serious social problems connected with finding a job and providing housing for officers and warrant officers being discharged. This is not a narrowly departmental matter, but a matter of all our people; local

party and soviet entities and public organizations must take a concerned, active part in it.

Today under conditions of democratization and glasnost we often are justly criticized for deficiencies in training, service, military discipline and the organization of everyday routine of subunits and units. This unquestionably contributes to eliminating negative phenomena and helps in accomplishing tasks of perestroyka and attaining a qualitatively new status of the Armed Forces.

Our Army is one bone and one flesh of the Soviet people, and there must be no shortage of attention to their defenders in today's complicated military-political situation in the world.

Supreme Soviet Commission Discusses Draft Law on Military Pensions

*90UM0462A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Apr 90 First Edition p 1*

[Discussion with Chief of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Col Gen V. Babyev: "Under Study—the Law on Military Pensions"]

[Text] On 6 April there was a discussion of the USSR draft Law "On military pensions" in the Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet for Labor Problems, Prices, and Social Policy. The Chief of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Defense Ministry, Col Gen V. Babyev, who took part in the commission's work, describes this event to our correspondent.

[Babyev] The commission considered the details of the draft submitted to it, and a report was presented by E. Busarev, a member of the expert commission. He stressed that the Law affects the interests of three million 180 thousand pensioners from among extended-service and compulsory-service members, warrant officers, officer personnel, and members of their families. This number includes 930 thousand handicapped veterans. What can be expected from the new law if it is adopted? The pensions of service members and command and enlisted personnel of the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and their families will rise an average of 15-20 percent, and for handicapped veterans and the families of fallen soldiers, by 30-40 percent. It was decided to send the draft Law "On Military Pensions" for consideration in a first reading at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet as early as this April.

[Gavrilenko] How will further work on the draft Law be conducted?

[Babyev] A deputies commission will be formed for final modifications, with involvement of experts of the Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR State Labor Committee, the USSR Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Gavrilenko] Vladimir Nikolayevich, work on the draft Law has attracted the attention of many people. This can be seen from the mail to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the Central Financial Directorate of the Defense Ministry. To what extent have their desires and suggestions been considered?

[Babyev] Remember, the draft Law was widely discussed at military collectives, military academic institutions, military institutes, enterprises and organizations, and main and central directorates of the Defense Ministry, and with workers of district finance services and military commissariats involved in pension work. Veterans of the Army and Navy participated extensively in the discussion. This discussion brought 45 thousand suggestions, which were considered, and many have been allowed for in the draft."

Improved Benefits for Disabled Veterans

90UM0508A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed Article: "On the Eve of the 45th Anniversary of Victory"]

[Text] On 14 April, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution "On Measures in Connection with the Celebration of the 45th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War." Preparations for and celebration of this date are being conducted under the banner of the country's comprehensive renewal and implementation of the tasks of perestroika.

The councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics and ispolkoms [executive committees] of local soviets of people's deputies must increase concern about Great Patriotic War veterans, parents and widows of soldiers who died during battles for the Homeland, and rear services workers who selflessly worked during the war—for all those who insured victory.

The resolution provides for adoption of supplemental measures to put into order Great Patriotic War monuments, fraternal graves and other burial sites of Soviet soldiers, partisans, and members of underground organizations who died during battles for the freedom and independence of our Homeland and to stir up work everywhere to create the All-Union Book of Memory.

The USSR Council of Ministers decided to improve the provision of pensions for Great Patriotic War participants and disabled veterans. From October 1, 1990 right up until implementation of the new Law of the USSR on the Provision of Pensions to Citizens, the government resolution increases all types of pensions designated for war participants by 25 percent of the minimum old age pension without limitation by existing maximum amounts (if another is not stipulated by this resolution).

The following minimum pension amounts are prescribed:

Disabled war veterans among compulsory service enlisted servicemen: For group I and II disabilities—150 percent, for group III disabilities—75 percent of the

minimum old age pension amount provided for by the Law of the USSR "On Urgent Measures for Improvement of Provision of Pensions and Social Services of the Population;" —for disabled veterans among compulsory service sergeants, master sergeants, privates and senior seamen—110 percent, for compulsory service (naval) warrant officers and servicemen, junior commanders and enlisted individuals of internal affairs organs—120 percent, and for officers and commanders (other than junior commanders) of internal affairs organs—130 percent of the corresponding minimum amounts stipulated for disabled compulsory service enlisted servicemen.

For Great Patriotic War disabled veterans who are receiving disability pensions, these pensions will be increased by R20 per month if they do not have the right to increase the pension to a larger amount in accordance with this resolution.

The amount of the increase of old age pensions or pensions awarded for years of service established for disabled veterans of war (designated according to USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, or USSR Committee for State Security [KGB] policy) is increased to the amount of the minimum pension for the corresponding disability group; other types of pensions received by disabled war veterans are being increased by the same amount.

The amount of the care allowance to a disability pension for group I disabled veterans is being increased by up to R70 per month. It stipulates an increase in the same amount for the care allowance for single group II disabled veterans who need permanent assistance; pensions in the full amount are being paid to working pensioners who are war participants without consideration of the salary being received and without regard for place of work.

It has been decided that from July 1 1990, Great Patriotic War disabled veterans, in accordance with their desires, will be issued monetary compensation once every two years instead of vouchers to sanatoriums or rest homes: R100 for group I and II disabled veterans of war and R80 for group III disabled veterans of war. Monetary compensation for 1989-1990 will be disbursed in 1990.

Fifty thousand passenger cars will be allocated this year for provision to Great Patriotic War participants, including 32,000 for issue to disabled veterans of war who have the right to receive a Zaporozhets automobile free of charge. The right to receive such an automobile free of charge is afforded to Great Patriotic War group I disabled veterans who are blind or have lost both arms. The councils of ministers of the union republics have been afforded the right within the limits of annually allocated funds for passenger cars and according to the desires of the disabled veterans of war, to sell them other brands of automobiles while deducting the cost of the free of charge Zaporozhets automobile due them.

From July 1 1990, the government resolution affords the right of free travel on urban rail and water transport and

on city bus routes to Great Patriotic War participants and to individuals accompanying group I disabled veterans of war on trips—on all types of city passenger transport (with the exception of taxis) and on common user motor transport (with the exception of taxis) in rural areas within the borders of the administration rayon of the place of residence.

Great Patriotic War participants are authorized, according to their desires, free travel once every two years (round trip) by rail, and also by water, air, or inter-city motor transport regardless of the availability of rail communications or (round trip) travel at a 50 percent discount once per year by these types of transport.

From July 1 1990, benefits provided for by CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 416 dated May 14, 1985, "On Extension of Benefits Prescribed for Great Patriotic War Participants to Citizens Who Worked at Enterprises, Institutions or Organizations of the City [of Leningrad] and Were Awarded the Medal for the Defense of Leningrad During the Period of the Blockade of Leningrad" have been extended to citizens who worked during the period from January 18, 1943 through January 27, 1944 in enterprises, institutions, or organizations in the city of Leningrad and who were awarded the Medal For the Defense of Leningrad.

It is proposed that councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics and ispolkoms of local soviets of

people's deputies with the participation of councils of veterans of war and labor and councils of workers collectives of enterprises and organizations implement additional measures for improving living conditions of war participants, families of deceased servicemen, and rear services workers. Using local funds, it is recommended that payments be made to those categories of citizens to all types of state pensions and render them other material assistance; establish medical service benefits, payment for housing and utilities, and for travel on public transportation; partially or totally pay the cost of fuel and manufactured goods required by veterans, tickets for visits to cultural enlightenment and theater show institutions, to grant benefits for use of sports and health complexes, rest homes, holiday hotels, and sanatoriums under their jurisdiction; and develop various types of veterans social assistance.

The Government of the USSR has obligated the councils of ministers of the union republics to take measures to provide single war participants living in communal apartments with separate housing with all modern conveniences during 1990-1992.

USSR Ministry of Public Health, USSR Gosstroy [State Construction Committee], USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], and the councils of ministers of the union republics are tasked to insure the commissioning of veterans of war hospitals being constructed within prescribed time periods and to bring their material and technical facilities up to contemporary requirements by equipping them with the latest medical equipment and apparatus.

New Appointment: Col Gen. N. A. Moiseyev

90UM0428A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 90
p 67

[Biographical data on Col Gen N. A. Moiseyev under "Appointments" rubric]

[Text] **Colonel General Moiseyev, Nikolay Andreyevich, has been appointed a member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces**

He was born on 17 October 1934 to a peasant family in the village of Novo-Bogayavenskoye in the Pervomaitskiy Rayon of the Tambov Oblast. His father died at the front in 1943. That year Nikolay started the first grade. He became acquainted with work at an early age. Every year during the summer holidays he worked in the kolkhoz field brigade.

In 1952, after graduation from secondary school, he entered the Sumy Artillery School imeni M. F. Frunze. He began his officer service at this same school with Komsomol work, as secretary of the primary Komsomol organization of an artillery battalion. Within a year he was already the senior instructor for Komsomol work of the regiment, then became the deputy chief of the political section for Komsomol work of a motorized rifle division and combined-arms army, then senior instructor of the section for Komsomol work of the political directorate of a district. In 1962 he became the deputy chief for Komsomol work of the political directorate of the Red-Banner Kiev Military District and subsequently of the group of Soviet Forces in Germany (now the Western group of forces).

In 1968 he became the chief of the political section of a division. He remained in this position for five years, then for two years he was the first deputy chief of a political section, and for four years was a member of the military council and chief of the political section of a combined-arms army, and for another three years was the first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Baltic Military District. In 1982 he was a member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Red banner Turkestan Military District, and for the last five years, of the Western Group of Forces.

He was graduated from the Party correspondence school of the CPSU Central Committee (1965), and the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin by correspondence (1974), and in 1970 he took academic refresher and advanced training courses for higher political personnel at this academy.

He is Russian, and has been a member of the CPSU since April 1955. He has been elected member of the VLKSM Central Committee, member of the municipal committee bureaus of the Communist Party of Armenia and Latvia, the oblast committee of the CPSU, a deputy of municipal and oblast Councils of People's Deputies, and

the Supreme Soviets of the Lithuanian and Turkmen SSR. He was a delegate to the 14th and 15th VLKSM Congresses, the 24th, 25th, and 27th CPSU Congresses, and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. He is a member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU. He is a people's deputy of the USSR from the Central Territory of District No. 316 of the Tula Oblast of the RSFSR.

He has been awarded four orders, the Order of the Red Banner for successful accomplishment of the governmental mission of providing international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan (1984), the Order of the Red Star for special excellence in preparation and conduct of the "Zapad-81" maneuvers (1981); two orders "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 2nd class (1989) and 3rd class (1978).

He received the rank of Lieutenant Colonel ahead of his peers (1968), and became a Major General in 1976, a Lieutenant General in 1982, and a Colonel General in 1987.

He was married in Sumy. His wife Tamara Lvovna is a teacher by training. His son is an officer in the Soviet Army and a political worker.

Lines of a Portrait (Comments of Colleagues)

"Principled, exacting on himself, possesses good organizational skills."

"Has a sense of the new, shows a creative approach. Attentive and principled in his critiques, assignments, education and training of cadres."

"Active, honest. Well-developed qualities of comradeship."

From Responses to Questions in the "KVS" Questionnaire

How many times have you had to change your place of service?—With this move, fourteen.

What do you think is slowing the speed of perestroyka in the Armed Forces?—Our personal attitudes toward our work.

Where do you see reserves for raising the prestige of the party organizations?—In the activeness of communists themselves.

What is the greatest difficulty in life that you have managed to overcome?—Not to fear to speak the truth.

Your favorite newspapers, journals, books?—PRAVDA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, SOVETSKIY SPORT, NEDEL'YA, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, NOVYY MIR, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA.

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Performance, Specifications of DT-30P All-Terrain Transport

*90UM0483A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Apr 90 First Edition p 25*

[Article, published under the rubric "Our Defense Arsenal," by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col V. Moroz: "Where Deer Cannot Go"]

[Text] The DT-30P transport can go where deer cannot go and can deliver 30 tons of cargo to the destination....

The reader will probably be surprised to learn that the heavy tracklaying vehicle in the photograph [not reproduced] is one of the most off-road-capable transport vehicles in the world, but this is true.

What is the reason for the unusually high off-road capability of transports of this type? First of all it has an over-snow and swamp-capability tracked chassis with 110 cm track width. The specific ground pressure of a fully-equipped and fully-loaded DT-30P at a gross weight of 59 tons is only 0.27 kg/sq cm. Secondly, the unique properties of this new military cargo carrying vehicle are due to the fact that it is divided into two coupled units.

Dividing a vehicle into two or three coupled units as a means of sharply increasing a vehicle's off-road capability has long since been researched by scientists and tested by design engineers. This principle is relatively seldom utilized in practice, however. What is the "secret" of a transport vehicle consisting of two or three coupled units? Both the forward and trailing unit of the DT-80 are active, that is, they are connected to the engine and have driving wheels. The two units are coupled by a special swivel-coupling device which provides capability, as engineers put it, for the chassis units to "fold" in any plane—horizontal, longitudinal-vertical, and transverse. This forced accommodation is provided by four hydraulic cylinders.

The trailing powered slug unit acts as a constant, powerful pusher vehicle, which helps the forward unit negotiate obstacles. But that is not all. Single-unit tracked vehicles appreciably lose power on turns. And turning requires braking one of the tracks. On this two-unit transport turning is accomplished by a fundamentally new technique—by the folding of the units or, stated in simpler terms, by changing the angle between them. All four tracks are working during the turning maneuver.

Thanks to the swivel-coupling unit hydraulics, the DT can "rear up," figuratively speaking, raising the cab. This increases the vehicle's capability to negotiate a vertical obstacle. The DT-30P is capable of returning under its own power into the hold of an amphibious landing ship, boosting its raised nose right onto the bow ramp. When crossing a wide ditch, a special device will prevent the vehicle from "dipping its nose" prematurely, holding the forward unit firmly tail down.

"A most interesting vehicle," comments Colonel Nikolay Nikitich Parfenov, who took part in testing the DT-30. "Its cross-country capability is amazing. Sometimes we wouldn't even get out of the cab. If you step down, you sink up to your neck in swamp ooze, and yet the DT feels right in its element...."

That is the way it should be. The 10-, 20-, and 30-ton members of the Vityaz family of double-unit coupled cargo transports are designed precisely for use in the particularly difficult road and climatic conditions of the Arctic, Siberia, and the Far East. They come in both amphibious and nonamphibious versions, but they are standardized in components and assemblies to a maximum degree and are powered by the same 710 horsepower 12-cylinder diesel engine. The engine works on various grades of diesel fuel, jet fuel, and A-72 gasoline.

The two-unit coupled transport is very gentle on the environment. Of course with such an imposing gross weight it does leave a mark on the tundra, but it is more sparing than all other vehicles. In addition, the DT is capable of following the same track again and again. Other vehicles in the Arctic are forced to follow a different track each time, in order not to get trapped and bottom out.

The DT-30P is air-transportable, fitting nicely in the cargo space of an Il-76 or An-22.

In the military, double-unit coupled transports are used to haul weapons, equipment, and carry ammunition to weapon positions. Some vehicles are outfitted with seats for personnel. A single DT-30P can carry a motorized rifle company with light weapons. I saw pictures sent from the Leningrad Military District showing them using transports of this type to set up a mobile forward command post, which freed up 19 trucks and 25 men.

In short, the dual-unit coupled carrier is a unique vehicle. Similar vehicles are manufactured in Sweden, Canada, and the United States. But the Swedish vehicle, while designed very well, is intended to carry small loads. In Canada and the United States dual-unit coupled vehicles are based on tractors, which explains their slow speed—16-19 km/h. The DT-30 can travel at speeds up to 37 km/h. In addition, nobody has yet made dual-unit coupled carriers amphibious. The DT-30P can, for example, swim out to a vessel anchored in shallow waters, take on cargo, and deliver it to any point on shore.

The DT was developed by a team of designers led by Konstantin Vladimirovich Oskolkov. Development is currently being continued by Vladimir Ivanovich Rozhin, chief designer at a transport machine-building plant of the Ministry of Defense Industry, where the Vityaz carriers are built. The vehicles are being improved in response to experience gained in practical operations. They have succeeded, for example, in doubling track service life. Versions of the vehicle have been designed with civilian-application equipment: fuel tanker, crane, rigged for carrying pipe, logs, etc.

Experts at the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Motor Vehicle Directorate assess the dual-unit coupled transport as follows: "There is nothing anywhere in the world in the same class as the DT-30P."

Low Level of Knowledge of Foreign Weapons, Equipment Cited

90UM0481A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article, published under the rubric "Combat Training: A Look at the Problem," by Maj S. Tyutyunnik, Western Group of Forces: "Crib Sheets on Tactics, or How We Learn That Which Is Necessary in War"]

[Text] "We had gotten the preparation of crib sheets for examinations on tactics practically on a full-scale commercial basis. They were made in a photo lab from old negatives which had been used time and again. Why old ones? Unit organization as well as specifications and performance of weapons and equipment of foreign military forces do not change that frequently, and we prepared a 'safety line' for ourselves precisely on these items." A certain senior lieutenant, graduate of a combined-arms school, shared with me the reminiscences about the "foibles of his cadet youth."

This was essentially a chance conversation, but I have not forgotten that crib sheet on the "suostat" [enemy], as my companion put it, probably because at some time in the past I became convinced through my own experience that it is difficult to assimilate various figures unreinforced by the opportunity to hold foreign weapons in one's hands or at least to see them.

And how does an officer in a line unit become acquainted with the potential adversary, as the expression goes?

There is a facility with equipment mock-ups at practically every training center of our group of forces. Such is the case, for example, in the combined unit with which Col V. Bogulskiy serves: 15 or so camouflage-painted items with markings typical of several of the NATO member-country military forces. Frankly, however, one would be hard put to identify all these hardware items, since nothing less than an extraordinary imagination would enable one to figure that a given mock-up fabricated of welded-together pieces of iron represents a missile launcher, an armored personnel carrier, or a tank.

"Whenever I look at this pile of iron," stated Gds Maj V. Turin, "I wonder how much labor, valuable materials and time were wasted...."

"Neither I nor my colleagues have ever conducted training classes at such a training facility," stated Sr Lt A. Yampol, "approaching" the question from another direction. "These facilities filled with iron monsters are totally useless, at least in the form in which they presently exist...."

I admit that these officers' judgments appear to be a bit harsh. Do they jibe with facts? In order to "identify" a given mock-up, frequently consisting of an ugly, crooked-shaped box, a special explanatory display is required as a minimum. It is simply ridiculous, however, to fashion display boards with explanatory material when it can easily be accommodated in... an ordinary notebook. I have seen such a notebook containing the specifications and performance characteristics of the armament of foreign military forces, plus notations comparing them with our weapons, in the possession of Gds Sr Lt M. Bessarabov, for example. Theory, but much more convenient and cheaper!

Fine, we shall write off as irrecoverable loss the metal, the cans of paint, the kilograms of welding electrodes and the precious training time expended for the sake of "samples." Well, these mock-ups produce no benefit, nor do they cause any harm, unless Vtorchermet [agency dealing with collection of scrap metal] is "pining" for them.

But I disagree with one thing. There is perhaps no direct harm, but nevertheless there is indirect harm, because an officer, constantly encountering a bad copy, himself ceases to take seriously "the real thing" (that is, that very "potential aggressor"). And in case somebody decides to accuse me of reaching a conclusion distanced from the realities of life, I shall cite as an example a real incident which happened to us at a field training exercise.

When Lt Col O. Kartsev, commander of a defending battalion, made the decision to dispose his troops in such a manner that his companies formed what could be called a "kill sack," his reasoning was not grasped immediately.

"The 'adversary' has tanks with frontal protection equivalent to 600 millimeters of armor," the battalion commander explained. "Nor does the terrain favor hitting them frontally; we shall therefore hit them from the sides."

Kartsev implemented his plan. In addition to the "fire pocket," utilizing his reinforcement assets, he also employed "roving" tanks (a well-known tactic from the war) and, in spite of the "adversary's" considerable numerical superiority, he was able to organize an aggressive, reliable defense. But the most interesting thing was the fact that he proved to be the only one who was operating in conformity with the realities of battle. The neighboring battalion commanders met the "adversary" head-on.

As far as I know, nobody paid particular attention to that incident. This does not mean, however, that it has lost its instructiveness.

Of course one cannot claim that studying the potential adversary is considered a secondary matter throughout our military forces. Take reconnaissance, for example. They can hardly be accused of ignorance of the weapons and unit tactics of foreign military forces. Regimental

intelligence officer Maj V. Mikhaylenko and reconnaissance company commander Sr Lt V. Voronov, for example, use an interesting technique in instructing their men: at an instruction class each private and sergeant is given a card with a picture (a drawing or photograph from the magazine ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE) of an armored vehicle, artillery piece, or machinegun.... That is all—not a letter or symbol more. And each individual is asked to recite everything he knows about that weapon—from nationality to detailed specifications and performance characteristics. This technique proves to be a most graphic and effective device.

Although things are fine with the intelligence and reconnaissance people (this is specifically their area of interest), it would seem that considerable possibilities would also be available to motorized riflemen and tank crewmen. Brief training courses, and scheduled training classes on the appropriate subject within the officer commander training system. In the final analysis there is also available that same ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE....

These possibilities exist, but.... To be quite frank, all this is figured, so to speak, for the ideal officer daily duties and activities, when the officer, having fully devoted his day to combat training and instruction classes, comes home "tired but content" to his cozy quarters, where he continues working on self-improvement. But what if an officer is "crushed" by the problems of daily life, a busy daily routine, and administrative chores, if he has no time even to read the papers, not to mention specialized literature, if he has forgotten a lot of what he learned in school, and the only foreign hardware he has seen "in the flesh" is a crude tank mock-up welded together by a regimental handyman and has only seen an M-16 rifle a couple of times on television? Of course one can put as much blame as one likes on such an officer, but if we squarely face the realities of life, you have to sympathize with him: "Just hope he knows his own hardware, let alone foreign equipment."

Don't get me wrong: I am not saying that we lack a system of studying the potential adversary; I am saying that we are getting insufficient return on expenditure. After all, no matter what, in peacetime one studies the "adversary" only "from a distance." It is another question altogether as to how he should be studied and what specifically should be studied: capabilities of equipment, weapons, units, or the tastes of the inspection teams which visit foreign weapons and military equipment familiarization facilities and the types of welding electrodes used there? If the potential adversary is perceived not as plywood but as an actual force, in my opinion there exist unutilized possibilities of studying him, and not only from a theoretical standpoint.

Let us remember that hundreds and thousands of landmines of French, American, and Italian manufacture were seized during the fighting in Afghanistan. Whole piles of them were displayed to news correspondents

from all over the world. The entire world saw them on television screens and in photographs. And what quantities of weapons came into our hands in Afghanistan, small-arms weapons, for example? I remember in the fall of 1984, following an operation, five fully-loaded KamAZ trucks hauled seized small arms from a smashed mujahideen base. And such "catches" were not a rare occurrence. I can still see those Afghan veteran officers, who at the time called all this equipment an "operations manual." In fact, there was plenty of hardware to study. Such as those nonmetallic mines to which no mine detection devices responded other than sniffer dogs and the simple landmine probe....

Where have they hidden away these landmines, automatic rifles, and SAM missiles? At service schools, in training and line units?

Judging from the stories of young officers, some of this equipment has ended up in service school "arsenals." Gds Sr Lt V. Imanov, for example, who graduated from the Kamenets-Podolskiy Higher Military Engineering Command School, saw "Afghan" landmines when he was a cadet. Gds Sr Lt G. Iliyev, graduate of the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School, recalled that they had once been given a firing demonstration with the M16 rifle and the M60 machinegun in honor of a visit by some commission. Sr Lt A. Yampol, who had graduated at about the same time from the Tashkent Higher Combined-Arms Command School, was even luckier: at his school, in addition to the M16, they also had landmines, a shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher, and several pistols....

But what about line units? Unfortunately both I personally and the great many officers with whom I have discussed this subject have seen nothing of the sort. The only exception of which I am aware (which, incidentally, merely confirms the general rule) is a combat engineer training classroom, equipped with nonmetallic landmines, which God knows at the price of what enterprising effort Afghanistan veteran Gds Maj V. Karpovich, regimental engineer service chief, succeeded in obtaining.

I am going to express one more thought, which may be subject to debate. From time to time one reads in the press about two-sided field training exercises conducted by the NATO bloc, where the opposing force wears Soviet uniforms and uses our weapon systems. Unquestionably forming and shaping the countenance of the enemy in this manner is on the conscience of the organizers of these activities. But from a purely professional point of view the endeavor by NATO to master the weapons and tactics of other armies seems quite logical. How about us, of course with certain adjustments, adopting this most graphic method of training?

This will surely raise objections on the part of those who see in the slight warming of the international climate grounds for diminishing the level of troop combat and psychological training. Forgive me, but "warming" and

total elimination of the threat of war are two different things. And as long as such a threat genuinely exists, all of us—politicians, diplomats, and military men—should in my opinion perform our job.

As for those “foreign military equipment familiarization facilities” discussed above, I am by no means advocating that they be scrapped. Since a great deal of

money has been spent on them, let's give some thought to how all this can be better utilized. It will of course take a good deal of mental effort to come up with a means of utilizing them in tactical exercises and firing activities. But this is no more trouble than to build pseudo-examples of foreign hardware, the attitude officers have toward which, I believe, is quite clear and unequivocal.

New Appointment: Lt Gen N. M. Boyko

90UM0425A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 90 p 65

[Biographical data on Lt Gen Nikolay M. Boyko under "New Appointments" rubric]

[Text] He was born on 1 January 1937 to a large peasant family in the village of Boyky, of the Pavlenkovskiy Village Soviet, in the Shtepovskiy Rayon of the Sumy Oblast. He finished the tenth grade of secondary school in 1955 and immediately went to the Naval Air Defense School (in March 1957 it was renamed the Engles Military-Technical School of National Air Defense Forces). After graduation he served for nine years in various jobs in the Troops of Air Defense.

His first officer position was as leader of the headquarters platoon of a battery of an antiaircraft artillery regiment in the Red Banner Baltic Military District. Then he was a senior technician of a group in a battery of an artillery battalion. He was elected deputy secretary of the VLKSM committee of the regiment and soon was sent to the central officer courses for political training. Subsequently he was appointed deputy chief of a political section for Komsomol work of a regiment, later a formation, and the senior instructor of a section for Komsomol work in the political directorate of the Ural (now Volga-Ural) Military District. Then for four years he was the deputy chief of the political directorate of that district for Komsomol work.

In 1972, as the deputy chief of the political section of a tank division, he was graduated by correspondence from the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin. After this he headed the political section of a motorized rifle division for two and a half years. From there he became a student of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces imeni K. Y. Voroshilov, from which he graduated with a gold medal.

He subsequently served as the first deputy chief of a political section, and then as a member of the military council and chief of the political section of a tank army. From 1984 to 1987 he was the first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, and from 1987 was a member of the political council and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District.

He is Ukrainian. He joined the ranks of the CPSU at age twenty. He has been elected a member of the bureau of a municipal committee of the Belorussian Communist Party, a deputy of the oblast Council of People's deputies, and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian and Belorussian SSR. He was a delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

He has received the Order of the Red Star (1983) and the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 2nd class (1989) and 3rd class (1975) and many medals.

He was made a colonel ahead of his peers in 1975 and major general in 1983, and has been a lieutenant general since April 1988.

He is married. His wife, Galina Mikhaylovna, is Russian, born in 1938, and graduated from the Sverdlovsk Medical Institute. They have a son aged 26, a political officer.

Lines of a Portrait (Comments from Colleagues)

"Self-controlled, calm nature..."

"Attentive to the needs of the men, shows constant concern for their material, living, and cultural needs. Polite..."

"Possesses good organizational capabilities. Persistent in achieving his assigned goal. In a difficult situation he finds his bearings quickly, performs ably and resourcefully. Honest, truthful..."

From Responses to Questions on "KVS" Questionnaire

How many times have you had to change your places of service and apartments?—Fifteen. I received my first permanent apartment after graduation from the Military Academy of the General Staff.

What year of service do you feel was the most memorable?—1975. At that time the division where I was the chief of the political section became the best in combat readiness and military discipline. I received an early promotion to colonel and was sent for training to the Academy of the General Staff.

What was the greatest joy in your life?—When my father returned from the front.

How do you feel about the incidents of voluntary withdrawal from the party by communist officers?—I do not think that these were ideologically convinced party members. They were time-servers.

How do you react to criticism?—I get upset. But I can also look self-critically at myself. I do not take offense at honest criticism.

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Discussion of Performance, Specifications of Su-25

90UM0362A Moscow *VOYENNYE ZNANIYA*
in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 12, 14, C4

[Article by Col (Ret) V. Knyazkov: "Su-25 Attack Aircraft"]

[Text] "The attack aircraft! Everyone at the front was in love with this wonderful aircraft. . . . It was especially irreplaceable when it gave close support to infantry and tanks on the battlefield. . . . The aircraft's survivability astounded everyone: wings pierced, "nothing but tatters," and still it flies and lands on friendly territory.

Half of the stabilizer gone—it flies! No other aircraft could compare with it in the exceptional strength of armor, engine reliability and design simplicity...” These words by HSU G. Baydukov, a well-known pilot, sound like a hymn to the legendary Il-2, justly called the “flying tank.”

Now the famed “Il’s” can be seen only in newsreel frames or in museums. Fourth-generation aircraft born of ideas of the military-technical revolution have come to replace them.

What is the modern Soviet Su-25 attack aircraft? Above all it should be said that it was created in the Test-Design Bureau imeni P. O. Sukhoy under the direction of General Designer M. Simonov, Lenin Prize Laureate. It is intended for close support of the Ground Forces. Its “baptism” took place in March 1979, when test pilot V. Ilyushin took the new aircraft up for the first time. Now let us briefly describe the aircraft’s general and most important features.

First of all, it is distinguished by very economical operation, since the attack aircraft is simple, relatively inexpensive to produce, and not capricious to operate. Secondly, the aircraft does not need much time to react to a call for air. While it is said of a person that he is light on his feet, one can say boldly about the Su-25 that it is light on its wing. The mission departure command has barely sounded when it is already in the air and turning to an attack course, for the length of its take-off run is only 600 m. The attack aircraft is capable of operating from dirt airstrips on the FEBA for which, of course, there is neither time nor conditions for ideal preparation. In general, this is an unpretentious, resourceful workhorse which will hasten quickly to help the ground troops, plow the battlefield with fiery furrows, and clear the path for motorized rifle subunits.

Finally we will note the aircraft’s magnificent reliability and tenacity, although specialists use a somewhat different definition for the attack aircraft—“survivability.” They assume that the Su-25 has a high degree of survivability, which is ensured by a large set of special design measures.

Concern has been shown above all for pilot safety. The designers placed him in a unique armored fortress. That is just what the Su-25 cockpit, configured in the form of a sturdy, all-welded box of titanium armor, became. Moreover, a front optical armored block protects the pilot from in front. The aircraft’s creators also did not forget about armor protection for the Su-25’s vitally important systems and assemblies.

Protected fuel tanks filled with a porous material are installed in the attack aircraft. They hold kerosene like the combs of a hive hold honey. As a result the tanks become absolutely explosionproof: if a bullet or fragment pierces such a tank, the aircraft will not catch fire and will not even lose a single drop of fuel. Instances are known from the practice of combat operations in Afghanistan where Su-25’s landed safely at their own airfields after being hit by

20-mm rounds and even surface-to-air missiles. But even if a formidable danger should arise and tongues of flame suddenly creep out, they are blocked by reliable fire protection, which is concentrated especially densely in the area of compartments adjacent to fuel tanks and near engine compartments.

Other measures also are provided for increasing aircraft survivability. In particular, the design of the main load-bearing elements of the wing and fuselage—frames, stringers, and ribs—draws attention. Expressed in engineering language, they are made damage-safe. What does this mean? The designers allow the possibility of damage to these elements in combat, but the elements themselves do not lose their load-carrying properties. Many systems of the attack aircraft are redundant, including pitch channel control, and linkages of increased survivability have been installed. It is no accident that aircraft specialists and pilots evaluate the attack aircraft’s combat qualities with high marks and that it enjoys the reputation of a very reliable aircraft: in all the time of Su-25 operation in Air Force units it has not had a single crash or a single accident connected with equipment failure.


A word about the attack aircraft’s design. It is a single-place, mid-wing monoplane with wingspan of 14.36 m. The aircraft has a single vertical stabilizer and two engines with an all-metal fuselage. The overall length is 15.53 m and the height at the upper point of the vertical stabilizer is 4.8 m.

We will note right away that the wing is supplied with powerful high-lift devices. Take a look at the drawing: maneuvering leading-edge flaps are located along its entire leading edge and flaps and ailerons are mounted on the trailing edge, with brake flaps at the tips. All this is done to give the attack aircraft the maximum possible maneuverability it so needs when making a ground attack run and breaking away from it.

Within the fuselage is the pilot’s pressurized cockpit, supplied with all necessary systems and machine units for providing comfortable conditions in an enclosed biosphere. An ejection seat which the pilot can use in a critical situation to leave an aircraft in distress is installed in the cockpit. Merely a slight movement of the hand is enough to activate the mechanism.

The attack aircraft’s fuselage is literally stuffed with modern electronics: it contains the gear of numerous systems for controlling the aircraft, power plant, weapons and so on as well as communications and navigation systems.

The attack aircraft’s fiery heart is its power plant, which is economical to the highest degree, compact, and dependable and operates reliably in all flight configurations. It consists of two turbojet engines with a cumulative thrust of 9,000 kg. Because of them the aircraft has an enviable thrust-to-weight ratio and is capable of developing a maximum flight speed near the ground of



Continued on next page.

Key:

1. Pitot tube
2. Pilot cockpit
3. Fuselage
4. Air intake
5. Hardpoints
6. Leading-edge flap
7. Wing
8. Ailerons
9. Trailing-edge flap

10. Engine
11. Horizontal stabilizer
12. Vertical stabilizer
13. Elevator
14. Aerodynamic openings
15. Brake flap
16. Reserve pitot tube
17. Main undercarriage leg
18. Front undercarriage leg
19. Rudder

up to 975 km/hr. The Su-25's normal take-off weight is 14.6 tons, and the maximum take-off weight can reach 17.6 tons.

The aircraft's tail section consists of a vertical and a horizontal stabilizer. A rudder is installed on the vertical stabilizer and an elevator on the horizontal stabilizer.

A light tricycle landing gear has been adapted for the Su-25's take-off and landing. It retracts in flight and consists of one front leg and two main legs.

The attack aircraft has a rather broad range of maneuver capabilities. It can move swiftly to the attack target at a maximum speed almost equal to the speed of sound and at the same time is capable of "creeping" quietly up to a target if necessary. Maximum flight range with maximum combat load aboard depends on flight conditions: near the ground it is 750 km and at altitude it reaches 1,250 km. The Su-25's operating ceiling is 7,000 m. The maximum operational g-load permitted is up to 6.5.

When the aircraft performs an assigned mission, it turns sharply literally on a dime. Its inestimable combat quality functions objectively here—it makes very effective use of terrain relief for breaking away from an attack. This of course leads to minimum time expenditures for returning to the home field. The attack aircraft's landing speed is so slow that the need to have a brake chute pod aboard disappeared. The length of the run after landing is very negligible—only 600 m.

It is said of the attack aircraft: "Simple to operate." These are not high-flown words, but reality itself, the more so as the designers gave it the capability of autonomous operation, accomplished with the help of an airmobile maintenance system. Have to rebase to another airfield? No problem. The airmobile system is attached to external hardpoints under the Su-25 wing and the "traveling shop" is transported in this form to the designated place. After having flown in, "unpacked" the system, and quickly performed all scheduled inspection and maintenance, the aircraft is ready for action.

There is special discussion of the Su-25's armament. As a matter of fact, what kind of "flying tank" is this if it is not capable of delivering a powerful fire assault? It must be said that the armorers made a good effort and accommodated an entire arsenal aboard the attack aircraft which includes bombs, missiles and guns. In any

case the Su-25's combat payload is very considerable: normal payload is 1.4 tons and maximum payload is 4.4 tons.

All weapons which the attack aircraft takes aboard or, more precisely, beneath the wing, are divided into two groups—unguided and guided. The unguided weapons include, for example, aerial bombs for various purposes and with various effect (including antitank bombs) with a caliber up to 500 kg. This group includes unguided rockets with a caliber from 57 to 370 mm. It also includes artillery armament: a built-in 30-mm rapid-fire cannon with a unit of fire of 250 rounds and 23-mm movable gun pods with a unit of fire of 260 rounds each.

The guided weapons group looks impressive. It can be divided in turn into two subgroups. The first includes air-to-surface missiles with laser guidance for engaging ground targets. The second includes air-to-air missiles with thermal homing heads, which the attack aircraft uses in air-to-air combat.

This armament (in different versions, of course) is accommodated on ten hardpoints beneath the aircraft wing. It is understandable that it is not enough to have a wide assortment of first-rate weapons; a person still has to take sure aim and not miss when attacking enemy targets. This task is accomplished with the help of a precision sighting system with laser rangefinder/target designator and a weapon control system.

The Su-25 attack aircraft can destroy ground targets with the first pass and with high effectiveness.

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"Patriot", "Voyennyye znaniya", 1990

Critique Of Experiment Separating Flight, Maintenance Crews

90UM0456A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major A. Kolotovkin, aviation-technical detachment commander: "Combat Training: In Search Of New Methods, An Experiment Raises Problems"]

[Text] It is not a secret that the organization of the squadron's aviation engineering service with maintenance groups divided into specialties, which evolved many years ago and which essentially has not undergone any significant changes, cannot satisfy aviators today

because the aviation equipment units, loaded with complex gear and systems, have raised requirements for combat readiness and the qualification of technicians and mechanics.

Taking this into account we have now begun to work in a slightly different manner. In the squadron there is no division into maintenance groups just as there are no technicians and mechanics, trained specifically, let's say, for certain types of aviation equipment, radio, weapons or other specialties. Instead of aircraft technicians, flight Technical-maintenance Unit specialists and maintenance groups, the machines are prepared by technical crews.

Our squadron pilots now are separated from the technical staff. Thus, the wing commanders, to whom the technicians and mechanics used to be subordinate, now occupy themselves only with the training of their pilots. And the aviation specialists are included in the aviation-technical detachment which is headed by the former squadron engineer. The technicians and mechanics have begun to service not aircraft systems but concrete areas. As a result one specialist has begun to be responsible, for example, for checking the cockpit, which used to be done by several specialists from the maintenance group.

What has the new method of work shown? Opinions on this subject are divided. Our fliers, especially those who used to have a mechanic assigned to them, are in favor of the experiment since it has freed them from a lot of bother. The squadron commander and the wing commanders, for example, now do not need to trouble themselves with matters in the barracks and a lot of administrative work. After all, all that used to take away quite a bit of time needed for flight preparation and simulation as well as pre-flight rest. That is why at times some pilots only spent time with their subordinates at the air strip and only came to the barracks to reprimand a subordinate who had done something wrong. Now the commander of the aviation-technical detachments and the crew chiefs bear responsibility for the training and education of the mechanics.

It would seem that we should be satisfied that finally we have received ground specialists under our full supervision and the squadron commanders no longer interfere in questions associated with preparation of the aircraft. On the other hand, though, there is no material incentive for the increased level of responsibilities. For example, crew chief Captain S. Manzhosov, as a former flight Technical-maintenance Unit chief, had the same job category as he does now. In addition, the salary has not changed much. However, now as a crew chief, he has more concerns and the number of people under him has increased significantly. I haven't even mentioned the increase in responsibility. Other crew chiefs are in this same situation as am I, an aviation-technical detachment commander. Don't consider it immodesty on my part that I mention my situation.

The system of double maintenance in a single shift, which is exhausting both physically and mentally, has caused a lot of grumbling. After all, it is difficult for the deputy crew chiefs to prepare and service two machines.

It seems to me that when the Air Force high command gave the go-ahead for this experiment, they did not think it through. Take for example, the variety of skills that must be taught in training a specialist which I spoke about earlier. After all, now the "gunsmith" is supposed to be personally responsible for following a checklist for the aviation equipment or radio. Of course, he doesn't know in detail the design of the equipment but only possesses the know-how to check for and determine the nature of malfunctions. This type of multi-specialty invariably leads to a leveling of his knowledge and practical skills. But we do have groups of officers who thoroughly know one specialty. Among them is the senior technician for aviation equipment Senior Lieutenant E. Testov, senior technician for weapons Senior Lieutenant M. Muslayev and others. Will their experience be lost for nothing? Maybe, it is better not to use these types of specialists for general testing but, let's say, for maintaining systems in working order and for timely repairs of those systems which they have mastered down to the smallest detail?

In short, in spite of certain advantages of the new method there are quite a few problems.

In particular, the crews still are not staffed completely by specialists; the level of qualifications of some of the aviators is low which reflects on the quality of equipment preparation. This means that the experiment must still prove that it is worthy of continuing. To put it more concisely, it is time to draw conclusions from it and decisively eliminate the weak points which have appeared.

Aviation Mechanic Sent To R-R Troops Following Disbanding Of Unit

90UM0456B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Private S. Novitskiy: "How I Became a Railroad Worker"]

[Text] In November 1988 I was drafted into active military service. I was assigned to a school for junior aviation specialists. I graduated from the school with honors and received the specialty of aviation mechanic, 3d class. After our class received its assignments, I wound up in a helicopter unit. There I worked in my specialty and passed the exam for 2nd class. But soon afterwards our unit was disbanded and they sent us, aviation specialists, to...the railroad troops.

I understand that a reduction of the Armed Forces is underway and that the Air Force is being cut back as well. But I also know that there is a shortage of specialists of our profile in those aviation units which remain. Was it really not possible to send us to work in our specialty after our unit was disbanded? After all, a lot of resources were spent on our training. I appealed to my commanders with a request that I be transferred to any Air Force unit but my appeal was denied. Does this way of doing things have our best economic and state interests in mind?

Hydrographic Ships Working in Gulf of Mexico

90UM0403A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview of Captain 2nd Rank V. Frantskevich by Captain 3rd Rank V. Sikorskiy: "On Uninhabited Shores"]

[Text] Among the Navy's ships at sea, the people taking part in the hydrographic expedition headed by Captain 2nd Rank V. Frantskevich are coping with an especially difficult mission. Hydrographic personnel from the Baltic Fleet are working in the territorial waters of the Republic of Cuba and in the coastal areas of the Gulf of Mexico. Communications with the expedition is very complex, but nonetheless our part-time correspondent Captain 3rd Rank V. Sikorskiy, an employee of the Naval newspaper STRAZH BALTIKI, succeeded in communicating with the head of the expedition, Captain 2nd Rank V. Frantskevich.

[Frantskevich] Our oceanographic expedition aboard the hydrographic ships Vizir and Giprometr, commanded by Captain 3rd Rank Mikhail Petrov and Captain-Lieutenant Sergey Kalashnikov, left a Baltic base on 26 October 1989. The cruise to their research site took 20 days and generally went according to plan, if you do not take into account the fact that the ships were able to pass around the stormy regions of the Eastern Atlantic. The hydrographic contingent is accomplishing its mission in an especially peaceful manner. They are carrying out a number of hydrographic activities both for the Republic's national economy and to guarantee the safety of those sailing in Cuba's territorial waters.

[Sikorskiy] What are the conditions under which hydrographic personnel are carrying out their research?

[Frantskevich] One feature of the expedition is that the majority of its participants are working on shore, isolated from one another. Some of the groups working along the shoreline are up to seventy kilometers apart. This section of the shoreline is not populated and is difficult even for the Cubans themselves to reach. There are difficulties in supplying the hydrographic workers with water and food. And it is not easy to withstand the local tropical climate. The mosquitoes are furious, and there is no other word I can use.

[Sikorskiy] All of this must certainly be slowing the expedition's work?

[Frantskevich] You cannot say that exactly. There have been practically no deviations from the research plan. And that is to the credit of all our sailors, warrant officers and officers who are operating at the limits of their strength and capabilities. For example, personnel from the photo development laboratory commanded by Captain-Lieutenant Yevgeniy Kornishev are qualitatively defining the accomplishment of the cartographic work. If you consider that there are only four people working there instead of the ten that are suppose to be

there, you can imagine the intensity of the stress on them. And I have to say some positive things about the personnel assigned to the hydrographic party where Senior Lieutenant Pavel Korchagin is assigned. These are the people who make soundings from the launch. Hydrographic launch commander Warrant Officer Yuriy Okhrimenko, helmsman Yuriy Shchekin and the radio navigational section's radiometric operator Senior Sailor Vasilii Smolnikov... are showing real professionalism in their work.

[Sikorskiy] How do you interact with your Cuban colleagues?

[Frantskevich] We maintain close contacts with corresponding sections from the National Hydrographic Institute. In particular, their computer center processes the data that we input. We work together in an operational, specific, business-like manner. And local inhabitants also support the expedition's specialists by providing transportation, living accommodations and food where they can. Their relations with the Soviet hydrographers is one of goodwill. And I have to mention the increased personal attention that the Cubans are showing toward the processes of perestroika that are taking place in our country.

[Sikorskiy] What can you pass on to the families of those people taking part in the hydrographic expedition?

[Frantskevich] They should not worry and should write often because the mail gets to us rather quickly. Everyone is alive, healthy and is waiting to return home. Their return gets closer every day.

Use of Navy's Radiotelephone System for Personal Communications

90UM0479A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Bogomolov and B. Usvyatsov: "Your Time Is Up...."]

[Excerpt] The editors asked B. Usvyatsov, section chief, Main staff of the Navy, to comment on the overall situation involving provision of personal-use radio communications.

* * *

By decision of the Navy Military Council, in order to improve the political state and morale of personnel assigned to naval surface ships, proposals were drawn up in 1989 pertaining to organization of radiotelephone communications enabling crew members during extended deployments to talk with family and loved ones. Following a detailed workup, a naval command authorities draft decision was drawn up.

The adopted decision prescribes phased implementation of an entire aggregate of measures to provide shipboard personnel with radiotelephone communications with shore.

The Central Naval Telecommunications Center and the fleet telecommunications centers commenced practical implementation of the first phase effective 1 February 1990. Organization of this mode of communications created an additional workload for naval shore telecommunications center personnel and required redistribution of a portion of equipment and facilities and additional training of certain communications specialist categories.

Regulations pertaining to personal radiotelephone use during the first phase specify service to telephone subscribers residing in 24 Soviet cities. Coverage areas have been determined for each naval shore telecommunications center, and a system has been worked up for requesting calls from shipboard and a time schedule for taking call requests at navy telecommunications centers. A time-of-day schedule has been assigned to each communications center for handling personal calls. In view of realistic capabilities it has been determined that every ship on an extended cruise is entitled to place not more than six personal calls each day.

The figures from an objective analysis of the operations of naval shore telecommunications centers in providing personal calls for the members of ships' companies for the months of February and March of this year will help illustrate what we have stated above:

In the months of February and March personal calls were placed between approximately 40 naval ships and 20 Soviet cities. A total of more than 2,500 calls were placed. There were a total of 107 unsuccessful attempts to place a call, with the main reason for failure to place the call being failure to answer the phone at the destination (as was the case with Lieutenant Colonel Bogomolov). Only 20 calls failed because of unsatisfactory condition of the communications link. According to responses from ships' commanding officers and deputy commanders for political affairs, crew members are very pleased at this service.

At the same time there remain a number of unresolved problems hindering improvement in this type of communications, both of an organizational and technical nature.

Tbilisi's Captain Critical of Staff Work on Ship's Regulations, SOPs

90UM0531A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "On the Path to the Ocean: View from the Bridge of the Aircraft-carrying Cruiser Tbilisi"]

[Text] I climb up to the bridge behind Captain 1st Rank V. Yarygin, captain of the Tbilisi....

As we all know, a shipbuilding program that has long been realized by our country is the aircraft-carrying ship program. Leningrad, Moskva, Kiev, Minsk, Novorossiysk,

and Baku have entered into the Navy in different ways and with a cargo of major problems at times. Should we recall a matter, as they say, from the past? But Tbilisi has just put to sea. Is it possible that Tbilisi will also carry a cargo of problems on board?

"In my opinion," says Captain 1st Rank V. Yarygin, "For now there is no total preparedness for the appearance of a ship like Tbilisi. I will explain my thought. Although Tbilisi is not the first aircraft carrying cruiser in the country, it nevertheless differs in a fundamental manner from Kiev and Baku. And we must lay the foundation ahead of time for its reception into the Navy, manning and training the crew, and the ship's accomplishment of its assigned missions."

Tbilisi is a significant phenomenon in Soviet shipbuilding. In several months, it will enter the Navy but, until the present time, there are no documents that would define the coordination procedure with the headquarters of the air group based on it or with the task force of ships of which it will become a part. There are also no documents for the air traffic control group without which Tbilisi cannot function. There are also none for the shipborne fighter aircraft control and guidance facility.

It is true that work is progressing on a portion of the documents—at the Naval Academy, at the Main Naval Staff, and at the task force headquarters. But, in the opinion of the Tbilisi's captain, the rate of development cannot be considered satisfactory.

And do ships of the Tbilisi class really not need a special preparatory track? Many things convince me of this: Both the Tbilisi TAKR [Heavy Guided Missile Aircraft-carrying Cruiser] organization and its functional design are more complex than its predecessors. Why is there no [special] track?

For now, Viktor Stepanovich thinks, the answer is known only in its most general form. Tbilisi is a unique ship for the time being, one of a few pieces of material evidence of the qualitative transformations occurring in the Navy. But it is clearing a path for itself through the Navy's old flesh, old structures, and obsolete system. That is also how it was previously: with Kiev and with the nuclear missile cruiser Kirov.... But is this dubious tradition justified even today?

The former Captain of the TAKR Novorossiysk and the current Naval Combat Training Officer, Captain 1st Rank B. Chernykh has this opinion on this subject:

"As we all know, right now surface ships are guided by a single common preparatory track for all [ships]. The most fundamental provisions that affect preparation of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers are also reflected in it. Yes, Tbilisi has its specific features. But it will sail and it will undergo all testing and the required corrections will be introduced into the surface ship preparatory track."

What is this, it is customary that new ships have regularly followed this path. But is it sufficiently effective today? When the question of increasing the quality of combat readiness is the determining factor in fleet activities. The preparatory track is a program. Today no one needs to be convinced how great a role high-quality programming plays. And is it not cheaper to model what it is now customary to work out in real life with all of the costly consequences?

Maybe Yarygin will come down from the bridge onto land and he will think differently. Not so intensely. But for now he is very worried that he will have to resolve things haphazardly. Tbilisi was laid down in 1982. And it is already going out on performance trials. But the corresponding infrastructure has not yet been created for it. Not from a lack of desire but from a shortage of resources. But will it be easier for the ship because of this?

And this is what should have been done.

Captain 1st Rank V. Fedenyuk, TAKR Tbilisi Deputy Ship Captain for Political Affairs, was the very first to be assigned. And, due to his many years experience of shipboard duty, he knows very well the value of the practice of manning and training crews that has developed in the Navy.

"If we proceed from the requirements set forth in the guiding directives," says Viktor Vasilyevich, "the manning and crew training system for ships under construction could be quite effective. But deviations from these requirements are so frequent locally that it is also very much understood: what commander will assign the best of the best with ease to a new ship? Believe me, few people will do this. This is how it also occurred with us...."

He returned approximately 100 of Tbilisi's men to their "contractors." People were utterly unfit for service on this ship.

Of course, both the cruiser's captain and political worker realized and now realize that in such a situation, considering the presence of an enormous number of factory specialists still on the ship, it is difficult to set up a service organization and to establish solid military order. But reality exceeds their most pessimistic expectations: during the crew's tenure on the ship, there have been several dozen gross deeds and five crimes.

It is true that some people think that the captain, political officer, and ship's officers are mainly guilty for the confusion that was associated with the formation of the crew. Thus, Captain 1st Rank B. Chernykh, referring to his own experience, asserts:

"Everything depends on the captain and the deputy commander for political affairs. For example, we personally selected all candidates for the crew. We sifted them through a fine sieve. And no one managed to force those upon us that we did not place."

I listen to Boris Panteleyevich and I think: That means that they also tried to force unsuitable people on him. And really we must not forget that Novorossiysk was built during the Brezhnev Era. The ship did not receive its name by accident and there were special opportunities for crew selection. But nevertheless.... Thus, why does the quality of crew manning depend on chance factors and a single man even if it is the ship captain? It is much more preferable to have a special mechanism to select people for "new ships."

"It is precisely here on Tbilisi that it is finally confirmed in thought that a special center is needed that would form and train a crew for major surface ships," says Captain 1st Rank V. Yarygin. "There is something like that in our nuclear submarine fleet."

What does Viktor Stepanovich use to argue for his proposal? First of all, new ship crews would have their own boss. Each candidate for the crew being formed would undergo a utterly biased selection [process]. And, second, the availability in this center of its own training facilities whose development would be at a rate that exceeds the introduction of new ships into construction would allow the elimination of yet one more obsolete disease of the Navy—the practical lack of preparedness of many specialists for servicing equipment installed on ships of new designs.

By the way, these proposals hardly have practical significance for Tbilisi. They are an advantage for those who will follow behind it. But they are ideas whose realization is also important for Tbilisi crewmen.

For example, take the issue of providing fire safety on the cruiser. The command staff thinks it is impossible to consider it resolved.

On American ships of this class—and here the U.S. is precisely the arbiter of style—a special subunit exists to insure fire safety. Considering the well known pragmatism of the Americans, it is hard to imagine that it was established for the purpose of inflating ship staffs. But we also do not have to copy them precisely. Really our heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers are nevertheless not comparable to U.S. Naval aircraft carriers of modern construction. For example, it is sufficient to say that the aircraft carrier Nimitz's displacement is 92,000 tons at the same time that the displacement of our newest TAKR Tbilisi is 64,000 tons altogether.

But nevertheless.... The command section of Tbilisi has repeatedly substantiated its proposals on the formation of such a subunit and sent them to various headquarters. And they have only gotten promises: they say we will probably resolve this issue around 1991.

"Yes, the problem will be resolved," confirms Reserve Captain 1st Rank P. Stashkevich, senior aide to a Department Chief of the Main Naval Staff. "Actually, for the time being Tbilisi's crew is living in accordance with the manning level close to the one approved for the cruiser Baku. But appropriate proposals have already

been prepared in particular that provide for a special firefighting group on Tbilisi.

But all of this will be. But until then? And now especially when industry is actively working on the cruiser, when fire operations occur every day at dozens of points, and when the ship's interior is literally entangled with power cables?

And generally from Tbilisi's bridge, it is obvious that daring thought, creative range, even generosity, but unfortunately also the ineradicable attempt to economize in those areas where the question affects the man, the crew, and its combat, work, and living comfort went into what is under its decks. As we all know, the ship has many decks and more than 3,500 compartments and it is simply hard to imagine the total area of the decks. All of this vast facility needs to be taken care of. Perhaps it is precisely the appearance of Tbilisi that poses the question in all its poignancy that many cruiser captains have also previously raised: We need a special servicing subunit equipped with everything necessary. In the end, it

appears to be simply archaic when the computer operator wields a mop instead of spending his spare time acquiring the subtleties of a difficult specialty.

And performance of guard duty? Here, on Tbilisi, there is a great requirement for it. And every day several dozen seamen, warrant officers, and officers are "under arms."

In short, the need for a special provost subunit is also entirely obvious. But in the appropriate sections of the Main Naval Staff they think that the ship can deal with performance of provost and patrol duty without a provost subunit.

"You should not think that we are complaining," says the TAKR captain. "We want those who come after us to find themselves in a more favorable situation. We will fulfill our duty. Tbilisi must become one of the Navy's best ships...."

It is understandable that there are also other heights besides the captain's bridge. Perhaps what can be seen from them at times with a glance entails more than the problems of one ship, the problems of a task force, or of the entire Navy. But really the opinion of a captain of a ship, especially one like Tbilisi, counts for a lot.

Review of NATO Civil Defense Programs

90UM0363A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 26-27

[Article by Col V. Simonenko under rubric "Civil Defense": "A Special Concern of NATO"]

[Text] The civil defense of NATO countries represents a system of statewide measures carried out to protect the population and economic potential against weapons of mass destruction. It includes rescue work in stricken areas as well as assistance to the populace in case of natural disasters, production accidents, and catastrophes.

The bloc leadership and the countries' governments consider the principal CD tasks to be establishing and training forces needed for mopping up in the aftermath of the enemy's employment of mass destruction weapons, organizing measures to ensure the population's protection and survivability in a modern war, and supporting the mobilization deployment of industrial and other economic installations for stable operation under conditions of an enemy attack.

The mission of CD personnel and equipment in peacetime is to give the populace assistance in fighting natural disasters, accidents, and catastrophes and mopping up in their aftermath. In recent years the CD leadership of many countries has been faced with the need to increase attention to this aspect of CD readiness, above all because of the large number of quite varied emergencies arising in the world practically continuously. Moreover, the CD leadership assumes that what will permit entities of authority to ensure survival of the populace and economy even in case of an armed conflict is an improvement in the quality of preparing the population and all CD for operations under conditions of an emergency peacetime situation.

A Civil Defense Committee has been established in the system of NATO leadership entities to come up with proposals and coordinate efforts in developing and improving CD. **Organizationally it is part of the Main Civil Emergency Planning Committee**, which in turn is responsible for planning and for most rational use of human and material resources in an emergency. The NATO Civil Defense Committee consists of a secretariat and three permanently functioning groups: for population notification; for shelter and refuge construction; and for evacuation and refugee affairs.

The United States makes the primary contribution to elaborating NATO CD theory. The work of national CD entities also has stepped up in recent years, which permitted establishing a specific CD system in the majority of bloc countries, including agencies for command and control, operational communications and notification; protective structures for the populace and entities of authority; developed population evacuation

and dispersal plans; stores of protective gear, food and medicines; authorized personnel and equipment; as well as voluntary CD units.

Responsibility for CD in the majority of NATO countries rests with the ministries of interior. The exceptions are the United States (CD entities are subordinate to the president through the Federal Emergency Management Agency), Canada (subordinate to the federal government), Portugal (subordinate to the Ministry of Defense), and Norway and Spain (subordinate to the Ministry of Justice).

Practically all countries attach great importance to establishing a network of shelters and refuges in accomplishing population protection tasks. This problem is being solved more successfully in the United States and the FRG, which make maximum use of existing underground structures, mines and natural cavities after they are additionally equipped. To this end, for example, the United States carried out a broad campaign to inspect and adapt protected spaces in existing buildings, buildings under construction, abandoned mines and so on for sheltering the populace. There were 250,000 suitable spaces registered holding 238 million persons. The CD leadership estimates that of this number, 119,000 spaces (for 120 million persons) are considered to have antiradiation protection and approximately 57,000 (for 23 million) are considered antinuclear after appropriate additional equipping. The decision was made to create antinuclear shelters holding up to four million persons at the country's main military-industrial installations and enterprises in "high risk" areas (*according to American terminology, the areas against which delivery of enemy strikes is most likely*). But private owners are unwilling to make additional expenditures connected with such construction, and so the question of the future of this program remains open for now.

The FRG plans to provide 50 percent of the country's population with reliable protective structures by the end of the 1990's. It is encouraging the construction of multipurpose underground structures which can be quickly refitted as population shelters in wartime. Work continues on subway stations, the goal being to prepare them for use in CD interests. A standard project also has been developed for the construction, outfitting and use of an underground subway station sheltering up to 4,500 persons.

Multipurpose facilities also are being built in other NATO countries, particularly Great Britain, Denmark and Norway.

But new shelters and refuges essentially are not being built in France, Italy and Belgium. This is substantiated by the fact that the majority of buildings here are of stone and have basement spaces which turn into reliable antiradiation shelters after a small amount of additional equipping. It is also envisaged using tunnels, subway stations and so on for these purposes.

The question of population evacuation and dispersal as a method of its protection in wartime is examined in different ways in NATO countries. The size of the territory, population density, development of the transportation network and other factors are taken into account here. For example, in case of war the FRG plans to evacuate up to 60 percent of the population of large cities not only to the rural area, but also to countries contiguous with the FRG.

The government of Great Britain, however, proceeds from the assumption that it is inadvisable to carry out evacuation in the country since population density is large, the main industrial and military installations are distributed evenly throughout the territory, and there are no contiguous countries. When there is a threat of attack it is recommended that the population remain in place, taking shelter in existing protective structures.

The United States is developing comprehensive plans for evacuating the population from 400 high risk areas where some 150 million persons live. Evacuation plans are printed in advertising supplements to city telephone books with an indication of the procedure for actions in emergencies, the notification system, movement routes, evacuee receiving areas, supply points, first aid stations, and other CD information.

After the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Electric Power Station, the bloc leadership recommended analyzing and if necessary revising existing emergency plans for evacuating the personnel of atomic electric power stations and the population living in their vicinity.

A special role is given to notifying the population about an imminent threat. At the present time warning systems have been established in all bloc countries. As a rule, they include warning centers, points and posts. They receive primary information about a threat such as an air attack from air defense entities, and about an imminent natural disaster from weather services, seismic stations and so on. Sirens are the principal means for immediately sounding the alarm in the majority of countries. Over 70,000 have been installed on FRG territory alone, 18,000 in Great Britain, and around 1,700 in Norway. In addition, the population receives warning signals and other emergency information over radio and television. Special hardened studios have been prepared at stations designated for this purpose. The most up-to-date, developed warning systems have been created in the United States, Canada, the FRG and Great Britain.

Armed forces units and subunits are used for rescue operations inasmuch as equipment and facilities are

limited in the CD systems of the majority of NATO countries and personnel of CD units are small in number. This is reflected in plans for using the army in CD interests in the United States, Canada, the FRG, Great Britain and Italy. Questions of organizing coordination between the armed forces and CD are rehearsed in exercises and while mopping up in the aftermath of natural disasters, production accidents and catastrophes, where specially trained military units usually are used. In addition, the firefighting service (which is the basis of emergency rescue units in a number of countries such as France, Great Britain and Italy), the police, Red Cross Society, local first aid services, and public and philanthropic organizations are widely used.

Special educational institutions train personnel for CD. Leadership personnel train in the Federal Emergency Management Agency training center (USA), the CD Academy (FRG), CD Institute (France), CD College (UK), and national CD schools and training centers (Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Greece).

Organization of population training in CD matters is similar in the majority of NATO countries. This includes training in various courses (general matters, first aid and so on), studying questions of protection against mass destruction weapons in schools of general education and other educational institutions, and involving the populace in CD exercises.

Great significance is attached to propagandizing CD ideas among the population and informing it of measures being conducted and methods of protection in emergencies. Special information services have been set up for this purpose as part of special CD entities (USA, Canada, FRG). Accounts submitted annually to the NATO CD Committee on the status of civil defense in bloc countries also have a special section called "Informing the Public."

The most widespread methods of providing information are the publication of CD pamphlets designed for various age categories, creation and public showing of thematic documentary or training films, and organization of exhibits on questions of protecting and assisting people. There are radio and television broadcasts devoted to various aspects of CD activities.

In the opinion of the NATO CD leadership, all this permits keeping people constantly ready for actions in emergencies both in peace and wartime.

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New Appointment: Maj Gen E. A. Nechayev90UM0430A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*

VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 2, Jan 90 p 68

[Biographical Data on Maj Gen of Medical Service E. A. Nechayev under "Appointments" rubric]

[Text] Maj Gen of Medical Service Nechayev, Eduard Aleksandrovich, was appointed Chief of the Central Military Medical Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and Chief of Medical Service of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

He was born on 10 Dec 1934 to a serviceman's family in the city of Smolensk. From the start of the war until 1948 the family was in the city of Sterlitamak in the Bashkir ASSR. Eduard finished six grades there. He received his secondary school diploma in the city of Magadan, where his father was transferred for service after the war.

In 1958 he was graduated with honors from the Military Medical Department of the Saratov Medical Institute and was assigned to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (now the Western Group of Forces). For a year he worked as the chief of an infirmary of a separate technical aviation support battalion and then was transferred to a military hospital, where he worked as an intern and senior intern in the surgical department. In 1964 he went for postgraduate study to the department of surgery No 1 of the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov, and within two years was appointed senior intern of a surgical clinic. He protected his candidate's dissertation and soon became a teacher at the same department.

Then he carried out the government assignment of providing international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan as a chief surgeon-consultant. He returned to the academy to the position of senior instructor. In 1985 he was sent to the GSFG (now the Western Group of Forces) as chief surgeon, and within two years was again at the academy, as the deputy chief of the clinical section. In 1988 he was transferred to Moscow as the Chief Surgeon of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

In 1977 he became a Doctor of Medical Sciences and received the academic title of professor in 1980. He has published more than 100 scientific work and has mastered two foreign languages.

He was awarded the rank of Maj Gen of Medical Service in February 1989.

He has received the Orders "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd class for organization of surgical work and personal bravery shown in the elimination of the consequences of the earthquake in Armenia, the "Badge of Honor" (1987), and many Soviet and foreign medals. The government of the Republic of Afghanistan awarded him the "Friendship of Peoples" order.

He is Russian, and was accepted into the ranks of the CPSU by the primary party organization of a military hospital in 1960.

He is married. His wife Lyudmila Andreyevna was born in 1937, and is a physician-biochemist by profession. Their daughter was graduated from the Leningrad Medical Institute and works as a cardiologist.

Lines of a Portrait (Comments from Colleagues)

"Has shown himself to be an energetic officer who knows and loves his work."

"An erudite surgeon, good knowledge of the national and foreign literature."

"Attentive and sensitive to the sick and to colleagues... Collected, businesslike, polite, and tactful."

From Responses to Questions in the "KVS" Questionnaire

Has everything turned out in your career the way you expected?—I never expected that I would direct the Medical Service of the USSR Armed Forces.

From whom do you take your example?—My model is my surgery teacher, Academician of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, Maj Gen of Medical Service Anatoliy Panteleymonovich Kolesov.

What pleases you and what displeases you in today's Army service?

I am pleased by the changes in Army work, and displeased by the drop in prestige of military medical personnel, the high accident rate, and the living standards of service members overall.

What question do you most ask yourself?—Am I taking the right action?

Your attitude toward smoking?—I have never smoked, and I have fought against this evil my whole life.

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Interbranch Concern to Aid Enterprises With Conversion90UM0449A Leningrad *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 17 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Turchak, general director of the Leninet TSNPO [Central Scientific Production Association] and president of the Konvent concern, by Ye. Nikolayev: "Concern...for Conversion"]

[Text]

Is it really easy to remake swords into plowshares?

This was the subject of the conversation with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Turchak, general director of the Leninet

TsNPO [Central Scientific Production Association] and president of the Konvent concern for the mutual exchange of scientific-technical achievements between defense and other enterprises of the national economy.

[Nikolayev] Perhaps it is worthwhile to remember that we have already run into conversion and on a significant scale. The Central State Archives for the national economy have uncovered more than 600 documents classified as "Top Secret" that reflect conversion plans for the postwar period (from 1945 to 1947). We should also remember the "Khrushchev demobilization" at the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's. And now how are we considering the accumulated experience?

[Turchak] Alas, this experience not only has not been taken into account but to a large extent has not even been declassified: the archives maintain strict silence about the thousands of documents involving conversion. And that is too bad. The restructuring of the military industry took place then under conditions similar to those today, when the main problem is essentially the same: just as before, conversion is taking place under the conditions of strict centralization and economic instability. There are no detailed programs and there is no corresponding law.

[Nikolayev] On the other hand, there is the initiative...

[Turchak] When M.S. Gorbachev spoke at the United Nations and invited all countries to shift from an arms economy to a disarmament economy, the idea found the support of most of the states. It was decided to present their national conversion plans to the session of the General Assembly. And this was affirmed in the decree of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The talk at the congress involved, in particular, the utilization of the resources becoming available from the defense industry for the production of consumer goods and equipment for the light and food industry as well as health care.

[Nikolayev] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, you mentioned the legislation on conversion. Can it be that this is the way out? Explain the meaning of it.

[Turchak] The Law on Conversion in the USSR is essential and its preparation must begin immediately. Why? All past as well as present experience shows that the planning system does not save us from conversion expenditures, especially when it is not prepared early.

As of today, the United States is the only country in the world where a bill on conversion has been drawn up at the national level and already discussed (by the way, such a bill was first introduced to the U.S. Congress back in 1963 but it did not pass at that time). The bill proposes government responsibility for planning economic conversion in the military sector.

It seems to me that the American version of the draft law could be taken as the basis for the formulation of a Law on Conversion in the USSR. The principles of the

planning of conversion are quite similar, as are the principles for the organization of the military-industrial complexes in both countries.

[Nikolayev] You are the president of an essentially new concern, the very name of which indicates its specific purpose. What will this concern do for conversion?

[Turchak] I must once again refer to foreign experience. Right after World War II, in developing new military equipment, the military-industrial complex of the United States began to orient itself toward its second, peaceful purposes. We, unfortunately, did not take this path, although there were attempts in the 1930's to introduce such an ideology into the military industry. Today we are essentially reviving these traditions. Just how is that?

There are two approaches among economists here.

The first is to invest resources addressed to defense in backward branches and production systems. (In my opinion, this is a mistaken point of view, because the gap in the technical level between the defense industry and branches working for city and municipal services is 10 to 20 years). It is simply impossible to apply military technologies without the capital restructuring of "civilian" enterprises.

The second approach, on the basis of market relations, is to turn over adapted versions of technologies capable of finding almost immediate applications in the production of consumer goods. I consider such a path to be the most rational.

Precisely it was the basis of the work of the concern recently established in Leningrad. It is interbranch in nature and the association is quite voluntary. It includes a whole series of research institutes, city VUZ's, LNTs [Leningrad Scientific Center] of the USSR Academy of Sciences, major enterprises and associations. All of them have the corresponding scientific-technical reserve, which can be utilized successfully in civilian production. The concern has its own cost accounting center that helps the enterprises with sets of documentation or even series products.

[Nikolayev] Let us define that more precisely. The concern itself does not sell specific products to city stores but helps the military plants to organize the production of consumer goods themselves. Is that right?

[Turchak] Quite right. We are performing essentially mediating functions between the branches of the defense industry and civilian enterprises taking into account the voluntary nature of the interrelationships and economic interests of both sides. The basis is commercial interest and, in the final analysis, the satisfaction of the consumer interests of citizens for goods.

The main task of the concern is the search, development, approval and introduction of the projects for specific objects of conversion.

[Nikolayev] And how is conversion proceeding in the Leninets TsNPO itself?

[Turchak] Consumer goods have already ceased to be nonspecialized goods for us. This year it is planned to assimilate an additional 12 consumer goods over and above the existing products list. Leninets is also providing technical assistance in the equipping of the special GUVD [Main Administration of Internal Affairs] machines of the Leningrad oblispolkoms for the fight against organized crime.

As you see, the range of conversion is rather broad for one association. In my view, a very important undertaking by Leninets and the concern is their participation in the development of a concept for regional cost accounting. With our specific knowledge of Leningrad and the entire northwest as the "main defense effort" of the country, we hope to make this concept more viable.

Workers Discuss Defense Plant's Economic Reform Efforts

904A0288A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 22 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by V. Savelyev: "The Reform By-passes Defense"]

[Text] Two workers—a communist and a non-party individual reflect upon life at a plant and throughout the country.

The questionnaire entitled "Your View of Perestroyka" was published in the newspaper. Herewith the questions.

1. What changed in your brigade, department or enterprise? What new managerial forms (contract, lease, cooperatives, shares of stock) are being employed and what are the results?

2. In your opinion, what is restraining the economic reform—insufficient independence for the enterprises, low competence and skills in the leaders, administrators and workers, or other factors?

3. Democratization and openness at the enterprise—are they sufficiently developed to the point where they allow a working individual to feel that he is protected? What has the election of leaders shown? What authority does the trade union and party committee have in your collective?

4. What is your personal participation in the socio-economic processes taking place in society? How do you evaluate the activity of your labor collective? What is your recommendation for ensuring that perestroyka is carried out in a more rapid and more effective manner?

The following answers are supplied by workers attached to the Rassvet Machine Building Plant—brigade leader Yuriy Fedorovich Sannikov and trouble-shooter Aleksandr Vasilyevich Chernetsov.

Information. Yu.F. Sannikov is 48 years old, a Communist and he has been at the Rassvet Plant for 26 years. Until recently, he was chairman of the plant's STK [labor committee council]. His successor in this post is a non-party individual by the name of A.V. Chernetsov, who is 39 years of age and who has been at the plant for 14 years.

1. [Sannikov] To begin with, I believe that I should discuss briefly our Plant. Until recently, the Rassvet Plant was a closed enterprise and almost unknown in the city. In terms of equipment, it embodies modern production and has fine traditions. But our situation is completely dependent upon the ministry. We are operating on the basis of the very first cost accounting model. Only 21.5 percent of the profit remains for the collective. The norms are reviewed several times annually and clearly in favor of one side. In such a situation, we are earning today only slightly more than we were prior to the reform. Meanwhile, the intensity of the work is increasing in the departments, the plans are becoming more tense and the wage fund is the same as before.

I am aware that our leaders are discussing new ideas for progressive managerial forms, and in all probability some results will be realized.

But so long as the verdict is still not in, the best workers are quietly departing—to cooperatives and joint enterprises. Last year we lost 148 individuals. The replacements were clearly at a lower level—"raw untrained youth," yes and very few of them at that. Urgent measures must be undertaken before the situation reaches catastrophic proportions.

There is still one other problem: the construction of an almost completed production building has been halted. Tremendous resources were invested and still there has been no return.

Housing is being assigned in just as unreasonable a manner. We are working at Presne and a recommendation has been made to build apartments somewhere in Solntsevo. We are prepared for this construction, only it appears that the rayispolkom [rayon executive committee] has not made a site available.

The plant has several recreation bases, including at Alushta. There they are building brick homes instead of wooden ones and also swimming pools.

[Chernetsov] It seems to me that the development of new economic forms at enterprises of the defense industry is generally proceeding slowly. But how can cost accounting be introduced for a 100-percent state order, when the price for our goods is stable, when above-plan products cannot be sold at contractual prices and when the profits are being immobilized almost completely in the treasury? It comes as no surprise to learn that among related plants nobody is devoting any thought to complete cost accounting. But is it possible that the reform was not meant for us? Who said that the "boxes" can work only under the conditions imposed by the long since compromised administrative-command system? The conversion has not yet reached the

"Rassvet" Plant. Orders are ensured for the next five-year plan in its entirety and although substantial growth is planned in goods for the population, it is clear to all concerned that maximum attention will be not be given to them, particularly in view of the fact that there is no support for the product plan in the form of resources. Thus they are racking their brains over the question of how is it possible to sit on two chairs? It is my belief that only a serious reform can change the situation in our branch. The state order for defense products is ensured the required resources and thereafter we have a free market for goods, raw materials and equipment—this then, in my opinion, is the path to be followed by the Rassvet Plant for achieving a normal economy.

2. [Sannikov] We are destroying the reform at its roots by means of normative withholdings for the state budget. We are increasing production and yet the norms are growing. Overall, the operational results of the collective are levelling off and the principle of material interest is becoming null and void.

Yes and there are some plant leaders who have never had a good word said about them. There are also some weak leaders. Thus recently the chief of the Bureau for the Development of Consumer Goods was released from his post. Here there was nothing to brag about. We have been producing pumps for automobile and luggage carriers for many years—nothing better has been developed. On the other hand, the people trust the director, Yu. Kirillov—he is a native son who has passed through all of the stages of the service ladder, from worker to director.

[Chernetsov] The training of our leaders and administrators is extremely weak when we view it from the standpoint of today's training. All developed under the traditions of the administrative system—the psychology of managing a collective, management, marketing, and I believe that their notion regarding these traditions is very general in nature.

The collective of workers has its own shortcomings. We reap the fruits of an irresponsible policy devoted to attracting them to the limit. Hundreds and thousands are brought in and still the city suffers from a shortage of working hands. Of the 44 workers assigned to us in 1975, only 6 remain at the present time.

We receive our "raw materials" from PTU's [vocational and technical schools]—here they do not teach common sense to the young people. A chisel or soldering iron are the principal training aids, and in the departments there are machines with program control and displays.

We must change radically our personnel policies and convert over to contractual relationships with the PTU's and we must pay only for good training of young specialists and interest them in obtaining grants.

3. [Sannikov] Everything that we are discussing is being viewed on the basis of all-round changes. Is it possible for journalists to visit the plant once or twice annually? There have also been many changes within the plant.

The attitudes between people are changing, albeit with some squealing. The elections of the departmental chiefs were carried out democratically and openly.

I served three years as chairman of the plant's STK [labor committee council]. At the present time, a redistribution of functions between the council and the profkom [trade union committee] is being carried out. The STK is the highest organ, and its decisions on fundamental questions are mandatory for all. The profkom must protect the interests of the workers and guarantee social fairness.

[Chernetsov] Just as in the past, the people do not feel that they are protected against administrative arbitrary rule and they do not trust the trade unions. At the present time, they are turning more frequently to the STK's, since they are aware that the "hierarchy" listens to its decisions. Over a period of six months, the council had to abolish four orders issued by a chief of one of the departments.

4. [Sannikov] What can be said regarding the mood at the plant? It is similar to that found everywhere in Moscow and throughout the country. Negative emotions and lack of confidence still predominate—here the press and our government and legislators are at fault: there are many failures, mistakes and much running from one extreme to another. The personnel desire stability based upon legality and democracy and by no means the stagnant immobility which some dream about. They wish to live and work calmly and freely, without fear and urging on, while not living in luxury but at the same time without need or shortages as many experience in other countries. Have we not truly earned this?

[Chernetsov] We are grateful to Yuriy Fedorovich Sannikov for his assistance and support. It would be difficult to adjust to conditions in the STK without him. I agree with him concerning the mood in the collective. We are astonished at times by the long period of suffering endured by our people, who to this day are still feeding an army of bureaucratic parasites of all types.

And at the plant, I would dismiss many of the administrators who are wearing out the seats of their trousers. I would add some fine specialists and genuine workers. And in this manner our labor productivity would increase by a factor of almost 1.5 with the same wages being paid out.

I associate the hopes for the economy to emerge from this crisis with the development of market relationships.

Conversion at 'Polet' Missile Engine Plant Noted
90UM0449B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "Fruits of Conversion"]

[Text]

Once they met almost exactly as in the photograph [not reproduced] and decided that their shop No 2 will cover the annual plan for the production of consumer goods by

a factor of no less than 68! Prior to the beginning of conversion, the Omsk association "Polet" produced engines for the spacecraft "Buran." Now for the first time they had to manufacture consumer goods valued at R100,000. But the shop itself raised the plan figure to R6.8 million.

It all began with the arrival of a new shop director. Even before that, they had heard about him here. Before then Valeriy Nikolayevich Chuzhikov was able to lead another chronically backward shop out of a difficult situation. With the arrival of Chuzhikov, the new shop coped with the products list target for the first time. And later in the shop they decided to become an independent subdivision and to open their own bank account.

We just had to untie the hands of the workers: the state order is being fulfilled stably. They are producing fenders for "Zhigulis," mufflers for cars, decorative aluminum slabs and metallic shingles for summer houses.

Housing Crisis In Kiev MD

90UM0457A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with General Major S. Bolbas, deputy district commander for construction and housing regarding the housing crisis in the Kiev military district: "Under Scrutiny—The Housing Problem: Twenty Thousand Without Their Own Apartments"]

[Text] That is the situation today with housing in the Kiev Military District.

Our staff correspondent in the district, Colonel A. Polyakov asked General Major S. Bolbas, deputy district commander for construction and housing to comment on this fact.

The housing problem in the district is extremely critical, especially in such cities as Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Poltava and several others, said Stelmar Sergeyevich. If there were a few more than 13 thousand families in 1981 who did not have their own apartments, then today there are approximately 20 thousand. The chances of providing each military family with a separate apartment by the year 2000 are extremely doubtful.

The district construction directorate, headed by Colonel Yu. Ardabev completes 2,500 apartments per year. The local soviets contribute their share which amounts to approximately the same number. But the waiting list gets longer instead of shorter.

In military settlements we do not experience any problems to speak of with housing. We build apartment buildings, gas furnaces, purification facilities and install powerful lines for electric energy. But in the cities where military garrisons are located, the problems are even getting worse. The architectural directorates demand that more construction be done with brick and it is in short supply. When city authorities identify a piece of land for the construction of a "military"

apartment building, they impose the most stringent technical conditions which lead to a drastic increase in the cost of housing.

One more detail. In 1980 the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers approved a resolution about the eviction from closed garrisons of those who had lost their connection with the army. The decision was made but housing in the city was not available. In ten years 5,500 families have been removed with great difficulty but an equal number still remain in military settlements.

A new problem is developing. In the district there are 6,500 reserved apartments, of which approximately 6,000 are occupied. However, as we know, troops from the groups of forces are going to be withdrawn. This means that military families will return to occupy these reserved apartments and those who live in them now will have to rent from private owners.

We also have been instructed to allocate 500 apartments in 1990 to officers and warrant officers who have been discharged as a result of the troop reductions in the Armed Forces and we still owe 138 such apartments from last year. In addition, 300 apartments have to be given to units subordinate to the central authorities. In all we are 1,000 apartments short.

I painted this picture rather bleakly so that the situation is clear to everyone. Decisive, one could say, revolutionary actions are needed in the area of housing construction. A little more than a year ago we decided to send a well-reasoned memorandum to the minister of defense in which we proposed to postpone the construction of a number of facilities for military institutes, a sports complex, an educational-laboratory wing, swimming pool, a dining hall. We proposed to freeze other construction projects and redirect the money to housing needs. Unfortunately, they did not support us. Each client wants to put into commission the projected facilities.

What solution do we see to the situation which has been created? We believe, that it is necessary to reevaluate the structure of the district construction directorate's plan and to reduce to a minimum the erection of facilities designed for barracks welfare improvements and to increase the introduction of new apartments by 1,000 per year. However, we cannot make such a decision ourselves and it cannot be done by our superiors in Moscow either. A decision about a drastic increase in investment for housing construction needs to be included in the plan for the 13th five year plan. It needs to be analyzed thoroughly and the manufacture of not only construction materials but also finishing details needs to be increased. Let's assume we can build an "extra" apartment building but where do we get the plumbing fixtures and the electric supplies, glass, radiators. All of these materials are strictly rationed. In short, it is time to complement slogans with concrete deeds, and namely, that by the year 2000 every family has a separate apartment.

Draft Evasion Problem Addressed

Rayon Military Commissar Notes Cases

90UM0361A Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 6-7

[Letter by Captain A. Gritsenko, section chief of Pervomayskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, city of Cherepovets, under rubric: "On a Current Topic": "Evasion? No, Desertion!"]

[Text] *The latest call-up of citizens for active military service is behind us. Thousands of young men joined the formation of the Motherland's defenders in accordance with the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation. But today it is a question of others... Believe me that it is bitter for me, a former "Afghan vet," to write about them, but I understand it is necessary, the more so as all last year VOYENNYE ZNANIYA twice addressed the question of shirking the performance of one's civic duty.*

I wish to tell several stories from my own bitter experience of contact with evaders.

Andrey Nikitin, a driver of the Cherepovetsstroytrans PTO [expansion uncertain—possibly Production-Technical Section] motor column, was deemed fit for military service after appearing before the induction board of the Pervomayskiy Rayon Military Commissariat of the city of Cherepovets. True, during the medical examination he confidentially informed the physician about periodic stomach pains and was sent for a more thorough examination, but the inductee ignored it and so the conclusion could be drawn that the abdominal pains had ceased.

One should have been happy for Nikitin, but a new misfortune happened to him: on arriving at the military commissariat in response to a summons, he showed his left arm clad in a cast and at the same time presented an official document with the diagnosis of "closed fracture." Waving at his contemporaries in parting, the victim set off for home, but probably out of disappointment he waved... his left hand!

Yes, yes, I did not make a slip. Not his right one, but specifically his left one. As it was later learned, there was not even a trace of any injury.

But what about the certificate and the cast? Both were counterfeits of the first water. Andrey was assisted in avoiding the draft by his girlfriend I. Vasyagina, a nurse at the Cherepovets Metallurgical Combine trauma station.

The law clearly characterizes such an act as evasion of military service, and this is why the case of inductee A. Nikitin became a criminal case. Proceedings were initiated by V. Klyukvin, senior investigator of the rayon procuracy, who soon concluded that there was no formal element of a definition of a crime in Nikitin's actions; he was only an "accessory" to manufacturing a fictitious

document. In addition, he was sincerely repentant over what had been done, as attested by his words: I dream of serving in the Army.

All in all, the procuracy transferred the criminal case to a comrades' court at the place of work. And what happened later? Nothing, inasmuch as even now Nikitin is safe and sound at home!

One regretfully has to admit that the incident described is not an isolated one. I will name three other cunning persons—Aleksandr Gryaznov, Dmitriy Kolesov, and Oleg Melekhin. They are very successfully evading call-up. Moreover, they are not working or studying anywhere.

Gryaznov, for example, did not report to the latest induction commission. Military commissariat and militia officials tried to locate him unsuccessfully for three months, but managed to meet with him only at the end of the call-up. It turns out he wanted to take a trip to Leningrad, but could not get a ticket for the return trip. Then he waited for the next notice and then, as you probably already guessed, "got sick"...

The USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation provides who is responsible for what, but it is written for obliging, honest lads. And if an inductee is not that sort? If he "dreams of service in the Army" in words, but evades the call-up in fact? In these cases, as experience shows, the law is practically impotent. It is enough for a draftee to take an oath that he did not receive notices, that he wants to serve, that he "got a bit sick," and so on, and so on, and any court dismisses the court examination, even though evading the draft essentially is the same as desertion, which under other conditions is punished by capital punishment.

A vast, lively correspondence is going on between military commissariats and the procuracy; in words the investigators admit "presence of draft evasion," but in fact... There are too many inadmissible loopholes where people are building a law-governed state.

It is important to take into account that punishment is not only retribution for what has been committed, but also prophylaxis both for the "cunning ones" themselves and for those around them. Seeing the impunity of the Nikitins who are unfriendly toward the draft, the unsophisticated ones begin to adopt their experience: they demand to be sent for examinations and take them for months, they simulate illnesses, they set off on long trips and sit it out somewhere during the call-up...

How can the contradiction be eliminated between universality of obligation and unpunished desertion, which is assuming a more and more massive nature?

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"Patriot", Voyennyye znaniya, 1990

Comment by Main Military Procuracy

90UM0361B Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 6-7

[Commentary by Col A. Chayka, Main Political Directorate of Soviet Army and Navy official: "More than the Procuracy is at Fault"]

[Text] *Captain Gritsenko's letter concerns one of the most acute problems of our life today. I leave aside the legal aspect, so to speak, of the question: For what reason and why do people who try to avoid the call-up for active military duty by hook or crook avoid criminal liability? I would like to express my opinions concerning the reasons generating such an active disinclination to fulfill constitutional duty.*

One often hears doubts as to the advisability of military service among the youth and even from people of the older generation. As shown by a random questionnaire survey, some inductees regard it in an "inert-negative" way, i.e., they show no desire to serve, but they also do not plan to evade. But some young people consider it unacceptable: it allegedly hinders them and disrupts personal plans.

I heard such an opinion from a youth from Moscow's Kuntsevskiy Rayon whose chest sported the poster "A good soldier is not yet a good politician" (?). Volodya (that is how the young man introduced himself) was against service in Soviet Army ranks, believing that this was a voluntary matter: I will serve or not as I wish. He still did not know which combat arm he was registered with, although he was being called into the Armed Forces in a few months. His very distorted impression of the Army was also backed up by rumors about "horrors" in the barracks.

Unfortunately, it is not a new picture. These "revelations" are drawn not by officials of military commissariats, DOSAAF organizations, labor collectives and educational institutions, but by those people who either are far from the Armed Forces or who nourish a clearly negative attitude toward them. The role of the mass media in shaping the outlook of the growing generation is extremely great. Statistics confirm that the newspaper most read among predraft-age youth is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the most popular television broadcasts are "A View" and "To Sixteen and Older." At the same time, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, SOVETSKIY PATRIOT and SOVETSKIY VOIN are read only by 10-12 percent of the young men. Even the military press contains very little practical advice on preparing for service and there is no orientation of inductees in military specialties. Propaganda of military schools and the officer's profession is almost entirely forgotten.

Unfortunately, one rarely will see local press articles by officials of military commissariats and DOSAAF organizations, and there is no rebuff to publications compromising military service and casting doubt on the need to perform military duty. Reports with vivid examples of

conscientious performance of patriotic duty by soldier-countrymen are still infrequent in oblast and republic newspapers. I am personally troubled and surprised by the position of some authors being printed in the country's popular publications who use rather strange expressions: "for them in the Army" and "they do not even think of restructuring, having solidly fenced themselves off." Such people obviously have one concern—to deliver a sensation (often unauthentic) as quickly as possible without having delved deeply into the essence of the problem.

For example, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ABKHAZIYA of 23 May 1989 printed information which, with reference to a decision allegedly made by the higher command authority, stated that 80 percent of inductees from Georgia would serve in the European USSR. This instantly created additional difficulties in conducting the spring call-up.

But we will not exaggerate. The feelings of publicists who raise the "Army topic" are quite understandable. They unquestionably have something to tell the readers. And if there are negative manifestations, you will not avoid them, nor should this be done; one has to write and speak about this. One must, if only so our people know the full truth about the life of their Army. You will agree, however, that this view must be objective and comprehensive, without any bias.

Is it really correct that in the press even the heroism of soldiers in Afghanistan at times is presented with a hint of irony and is tied in with the advisability of performing international duty there? Yes, Afghanistan is a new pain. But is it necessary to cast doubt on the exploits of thousands of officers and men who, having gone down the difficult roads of this war, displayed the best qualities of Soviet youth and remained true to the oath to the end? Is it not better for all of us to ask former "Afghan" soldiers what they lack for normal life and who is at fault for this? And here one should give the addresses of the bureaucrats who are doing far from everything, even of what has been prescribed and established for the Afghan vets by the Motherland. It is probably necessary to tell more about involving the Afghan vets in basic military training inasmuch as they know better than others what deficiencies in training young men for Army service develop into on the battlefield.

It is common knowledge that various independent clubs of internationalist soldiers and other public organizations which have presented themselves well have been established and are operating in many cities of the country. The problem of involving not only internationalist soldiers, but reserve soldiers in general, in mass defense work merits attention. The moral-political conditioning and life experience they have received must be used actively in military-patriotic education. At one time there was even an appeal in effect in the Army Komсомol: "Remain a soldier even in the reserve." On completing service the best soldiers would receive recommendations for working with future privates and seamen

in their collectives. It is not understandable why many interesting forms of work have been buried in oblivion now.

But there also are good examples of joint work of military units and school and enterprise Komsomol organizations such as in Moscow's Sokolnicheskiy and Frunzenskiy rayons. In particular, military sports camps established by joint efforts on the base of military units have given a good account of themselves. Hundreds of teenagers travel there in summer. Soldiers patiently teach them to shoot, to orient themselves on the terrain, and to master applied military sports.

The Druzhba Military Sports Club headed by former airborne soldier V. Doronin is successfully operating in Frunzenskiy Rayon. Here the boys not only study fundamentals of military affairs, but also broaden their political horizons and improve ideological conditioning. The Young Fleet Eagles Patriotic Club, whose alumni augment the Navy, enjoys great popularity among pre-draft-age youth in this same rayon.

The closest relationships with crews of Black Sea Fleet ships and especially with the ASW cruiser "Moskva" have formed in Sokolnicheskiy Rayon. Every year dozens of inductees head there to perform service and they honorably justify the trust placed in them. This became possible because rayon leaders—CPSU Raykom First Secretary P. Klimov, Rayispolkom Chairman A. Latushkin, Komsomol Raykom First Secretary S. Volkov, DOSAAF Raykom Chairman Colonel (Reserve) V. Klimenko and Rayon Military Commissar Lieutenant Colonel V. Ivanov—take a very direct part in mass defense work and in preparing young men for military service.

I read with great interest in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA the appeal by the labor collective of the Perm Machinebuilding Plant imeni V. I. Lenin to strengthen military sponsorship ties and not only show concern for preparing young men for performing military duty, but also not lose ties with them throughout service. What a good initiative! It needs support and development.

Our common task today is to fill military sponsorship work with new content. This must include orienting the youth in military specialties, propagandizing Army and Navy history and traditions, developing technical and

applied military sports, and assigning military units to schools, and enterprises to units. Sponsorship traditions are rich, and the Komsomol must have more than the last word to say here.

Basic military training in schools of general education and rural vocational-technical schools unquestionably demands greater attention. Most likely perestroyka is needed here not by those who are being trained, but by those who train, i.e., the military training officers, who have to renew their knowledge and methodology. AzSSR military commissariats estimate that almost half the military training instructors there are incapable of providing qualitative training of predraft-age youth by virtue of their incompetence, professional unfitness, and absence of necessary skills for training and educating the youth. Unfortunately, this is typical not just of Azerbaijan.

The basic military training facility demands considerable improvement. In Moscow, for example, less than a third of the rayons fulfilled the plan for constructing it. There are of course many organizational difficulties along this path, but there also is a lack of understanding of the importance of mass defense work on the part of some organizations and departments.

It seems to me that the firmly established practice of training specialists for the Army and Navy according to gross numbers, i.e., the number of persons graduated from various schools, for now remains a serious deterrent in training those specialists. It is high time to make quality the basic criterion, for which the training process and training methodologies should be restructured. This is the chief problem now.

In short, I believe that the blame for an increase in the number of persons avoiding call-up to active military service rests not just on the procuracies which do not wish to deal with such young people, although I do not at all plan to justify their actual connivance with violators of the Law. Obviously Comrade Gritsenko, his work colleagues in the military commissariats, and many, many Komsomol leaders and DOSAAF activists should ponder what must be done and how to improve military-patriotic education of the growing generation.

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"Patriot", Voyennyye znaniya", 1990

Training of Foreigners at Odessa Military School Admitted

90UM0438A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Mar 90 Morning edition p 6

[Interview with Major General P. Karatay, chief of the political section at the Odessa Integrated Air Defense Engineer Command School, conducted by N. Burbyga, IZVESTIYA correspondent, under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "A Service School for Foreign Armies"]

[Text] The military censorship office has declassified a number of previously closed installations. Service schools, which train specialists for foreign armies, were included among them. One of these service schools is the Odessa Integrated Air Defense Engineer Command School. Our correspondent talked with Major General P. Karatay, the chief of the school's political section.

[Karatay] Pavel Vasilyevich related,—The school was established in Gorkiy in 1937. It managed to graduate two classes before the Great Patriotic War. Even during the war years, the school did not stop training officers...

[Burbyga] When did foreign specialists begin studying at the school?

[Karatay] In 1948, the school was moved to Odessa. And in 1964, a decision was made to change the school's curriculum and establish an integrated educational institution to train air defense officers for socialist and developing nations, and nations that are friendly to us. During these years, several thousand specialists were trained. In addition, generals and other officers undergo refresher training at the school. Along with solving special military problems, the students and officer candidates become acquainted with the history of our nation, its Armed Forces, and traditions. And in this area, it must be admitted, their knowledge at times exceeds that which is shown by some of our officer candidates.

[Burbyga] Are there difficulties in working with foreign officer candidates and students?

[Karatay] Yes. You see, people, professing various religions, study at the school. We are forced to organize our work in such a manner that the differences and disagreements, which exist between states or parties, do not affect the course of studies. A system of political enlightenment has existed for a long time at the school. We answer any pointed questions in these classes.

[Burbyga] Many of your students studied at military institutions in capitalist countries before coming to the Soviet Union. How do they evaluate our system of instruction at the school?

[Karatay] In their opinion, the theoretical and methodological standards of teaching in our country is higher than in other countries. Practical exercises on combat equipment are even arranged for them. But we are seriously behind in the computerization of the training process. And we are falling farther behind. Another fact that surprises foreigners is the way each student and officer candidate is fussed over in our country. Whereas abroad, if a student does not go to classes once, the next time he is expelled.

FROM THE EDITORIAL STAFF. It was reported to us at the USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate for Military Training Institutions that similar training of foreign servicemen is being conducted at the Simferopol Integrated Service School, the Krasnodar Integrated Aviation Technical School, the Caspian Higher Naval School, the Lvov Higher Military Political School, and in nearly forty more USSR Ministry of Defense military training institutions. They train personnel for foreign armies in both command and engineering specialties for units in the Ground Forces, Navy, Signal Corps, and Air Forces.

Servicemen from Afghanistan, Cuba, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and other countries friendly to the USSR study at our military training institutions.

Training military specialists for foreign countries is practiced not only in the USSR, but also in other developed nations of the world. For example, in the USA, the FRG, France, and England.

Statement of Veterans' Council on German Reunification

*90UM0335A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 9,
26 Feb-4 Mar 90 p 4*

[Statement of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces: "Statement of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Political events in Europe have recently begun to rapidly develop. General attention, including our particular attention, has been riveted to them and to the process of German unification which has actually already begun.

Any constructive steps directed at construction of a "Common European Home" as an expression of the legitimate historical result of the victory over Fascism and the postwar arrangement of the world without nuclear weapons, military confrontation, and without force no matter which side initiates them causes satisfaction and support among us. We support the well-known initiatives undertaken in this direction by the Soviet leadership.

We do not doubt the German people's right to unification. However, we must express our uneasiness regarding the fact that the non-constructive plans and hurried actions of certain circles in the West that are associated with the movement for unification of the GDR [German Democratic Republic] and FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] may become an obstacle to the All-European peace process with its fundamental principle of inviolability of postwar borders.

The pictures associated with the past war against Fascism are still alive in the memory and consciousness of the Soviet people, especially veterans. Its lessons must not be forgotten. Mankind paid too heavily for its permissive attitude toward the instigators of the Second World War in 1937-1939. That is why we are more painfully and acutely perceiving the fact that unification of the GDR and FRG is strongly surpassing construction of the "Common European Home."

Certain forces of the FRG are using the open borders between the GDR and FRG and between West Berlin and the capital of the GDR for undisguised interference in the internal affairs of the German Democratic Republic for the purpose of destabilizing it and the unconditional acceptance of West German conditions for unification.

Judging by the Chancellor's statement, the Government of the FRG is not prepared to provide guarantees of the inviolability of postwar borders and to repudiate territorial claims against both Poland and the Soviet Union. The Federal Constitutional Court's decision on the existence of the Third Reich within the 1937 borders continues to remain in force. Washington and Bonn leaders are not only not currently thinking about the FRG's

departure from NATO but they are also not thinking about a unified Germany outside the North Atlantic Alliance. This violation of the balance of power is fraught with dangerous consequences for Europe and for the entire world.

In sum, instead of a "Common European Home" which has in mind integrating both German states, a real danger of the beginning of a "German Europe" has appeared. Radical efforts of the world community are required to prevent this.

Guided by its vital experience and consciousness of the responsibility for the world's future, on the eve of the 45th Anniversary of the Victory over Fascism, we address a real warning to all who have a direct relation to this process and also to the broad world community, especially to veterans of the Second World War, and we propose:

First, to take the required steps so that the basic principles of the Four Allied Powers Treaty on the Demilitarization and Democratization of Germany be totally complied with prior to formation of a single German State. This must also include conversion of military production and dispersal of Neo-Nazi and revanchist organizations. Only compliance with these principles can create a guarantee of the reality of assurances that "war will never originate but only peace should originate from German soil" as the head of the German Government stated recently in Moscow. The solidity of European borders should also be consolidated in appropriate legal acts.

Second, we very decisively declare our solidarity with all progressive forces of the German Democratic Republic. The people of the GDR, as also any other people, have the right to free elections under conditions of a stable political and economic environment but not the choice that an atmosphere of pressure from without, supercharged nationalist fever, and its worsening economic situation that is no fault of its own are attempting to impose on them. The current German Democratic Republic which has carried out profound democratic transformations enjoys great sympathy and prestige in the world. Millions of citizens of the GDR of various generations have created a truly anti-Fascist state and a reliable bulwark of peace and security in the center of Europe under difficult conditions and in the presence of well-known deformations. All of this has caused and causes a sense of respect and gratitude of all honest peoples of the Earth.

The attempts of those who, during the formation of a single German State, would now like to infringe upon the GDR's right and interests are intolerable and irresponsible.

Third, we turn to the USSR Supreme Soviet with an urgent appeal to undertake the steps required to neutralize possible negative consequences that result from the unification of the two German States and protection

of the rights and interests of our country and our Ally—the German Democratic Republic—in this region.

We appeal to all social organizations of the Soviet Union and other European states and the world to protest interference in the internal affairs of the GDR and support the process of the construction of a "Common European Home" with the participation of both German States.

To the eternal memory of the fighters against Fascism and the millions of people who died in the Second World War!

Peoples of Europe, be vigilant!

The All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces.

New Japanese Radar

90UM0464A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Article: "Station of Discovery"]

[Text] According to the weekly JANE'S DEFENSE, the artillery units of the Japanese ground forces have a radar station intended to determine the positions of firing mortars. The radar station is mounted on a single-axle trailer and has an antenna of the "phased grid" type, which is put in a horizontal position in preparing the station for movement.

Liquid Artillery Propellant for U.S. M115

90UM0464B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "With a New Charge"]

[Text] In the United States, according to a report by the journal DEFENSE, they are testing a demonstration model of a 155-mm gun, for which they are not using the traditional solid powder as the propellant charge but a liquid propellant—nitrate hydroxide of ammonia.

The gun was built by the American firm General Electric on the carriage of a 203.2-mm M115 howitzer and it is equipped with a 39-caliber barrel. In the first stage of testing in the summer of 1988, they fired the gun using two liters of propellant charge. In so doing, as the press reported, the initial velocity of standard projectiles weighing 43 kg was in the range of 389 to 395 meters a second. The second stage of testing was completed in the spring of last year, in which they used five liters of liquid propellant and the average initial velocity of the projectiles was 586 meters a second. The dispersion of values of the initial velocity was characterized by an average deviation of 0.25 percent. They then fired using a charge of seven liters, which gave the gun an initial velocity of about 670 meters a second.

According to the contract, the first demonstration model of the gun is to be fired 300 times by September of this year. As early as this summer, however, the firm plans to manufacture a second demonstration model 155-mm gun using liquid propellant, which will be able to give the projectiles a velocity of up to 986 meters because of the greater barrel length (52 caliber) and the increase in the volume of the propellant chamber to 14 liters. According to calculations, the maximum firing range from this gun will be 32 km with conventional projectiles and up to 40 km with rocket-assisted projectiles, whereby the length of the recoil is not supposed to exceed 0.41 meter.

In the first half of the 1990's, a third model of the gun may be built with a 16.6-liter propellant chamber, which will make it possible to raise the initial velocity to 1,070 meters a second and the firing range of projectiles with a base gas generator to 50 km.

Israeli Reconnaissance Aircraft

90UM0464C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "Reconnaissance Aircraft"]

[Text] In the FRG, as reported by the journal MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES, they have begun flight testing of experimental models of the light high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Egrett-1 and Egrett-2 with takeoff weights of 3,630 and 4,200 kg, respectively. The aircraft were built by a group of West German firms and are basically intended for the performance of radio engineering reconnaissance.

Lessons of Afghanistan Pondered by Major

90UM0400A Moscow KOMMUNIST

VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1 pp 11-12

[Article by Major A. Melnik, former staff member of the 40th Army: "I Want to Share How Lessons are Learned"]

[Text] Recently we have heard increasingly frequent demands to publicize and list the names of those who made the decision to move our military forces into Afghanistan. Officials have maintained a very significant silence on this score, making do with announcements that the decision was made in secret by two or three persons. In "righteous anger" the public thought: "Well, if we learn the names of these people, then so on and so forth...."

And then recently in A. A. Gromyko's interview, which appeared in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, we learned a bit about how the decision was made. K.M. Tsagolov (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 39, 1989) names Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov as being responsible for this decision. He did not mention Suslov, who, in my opinion, had a direct "ideological" relationship to this decision. And so, what comes next? What has changed because of this information? Whom do you ask? After all, those who died in this war, including my comrades in arms, cannot be brought back to life.

It seems to me that the problem lies elsewhere. We must "dig" somewhere else to find what we are looking for. It is not necessary to analyze the fact that the decision was not made democratically. Rather we should dissect the deep stratum of the political situation which led to making such a decision. After all the fact that a decision is made democratically does not guarantee that it is correct.

For this reason, I repeat, lessons should be extracted not from how the decision was made or from "who made the decision" (everyone knows the answer to this, after all it was an open secret), but from that international situation and those methods of supporting our foreign policy interests, which in 1979 led us to introduce troops into Afghanistan. And what gets me riled up is the fact that nowhere, not in the press, not on television, not in the speeches of our leaders, is anything said on this matter. I am concerned that the lessons of Afghanistan might pass us by...

In my opinion, the main lessons of Afghanistan are as follows:

1. Priority for ensuring our interests in the international arena should be given to peaceful means, not military ones. Our influence upon peaceful development must be determined primarily by economic potential rather than by military might.

2. Our support of revolutionary movements and parties must be based primarily upon economic and ideological assistance. There was an alternative to the introduction of troops into Afghanistan in 1979. However, this alternative was not used because of the command and

administrative system, the prime mover of which were methods of intimidation, including military pressure.

3. The thesis of non-interference of a party in the affairs of another party (for example the NDPA [National Democratic Party of Afghanistan]) need not prohibit frank discussion of various aspects of the interrelations between the CPSU and some other party.

4. We must not acquire friends and allies abroad within the context of a clash between two countries, when we single-mindedly occupy the side of one of them, thereby pushing the other side to go cap in hand to the West and the USA. Today in order to put an end to the Afghan conflict it is necessary, in my opinion, to work not only with Najibullah, but also with [Benazir] Bhutto and the leaders of the Afghan opposition, Modzhaddedi, Khalili, and so forth.

5. It is necessary to recognize that the West and the USA have their own interests throughout the world, just as we do. The balance of interests of the USSR and the West in the "third world" must not be created in local wars and in converting the nations of the "third world" into an arena of conflict and of a balancing of the accounts of the West and the USSR; rather we should create along with these nations a mechanism for seeking a balance of interests.

From my point of view, this is the world order we must come to if we are to prevent situations such as the one in Afghanistan from repeating themselves.

I suppose that another epoch will come to replace the one in which we were fighting in Afghanistan and that the main factor of the new epoch will be a course toward cooperation among all governments, rather than the division of the world into opposing groupings or camps.

Unfortunately, both in life and in politics it is often true that lessons are learned only when they are acquired with difficulty. The difficult, but necessary lesson of Afghanistan has shown the total groundlessness and unacceptability of the methods of the command-administrative system both for us and for the Afghan revolution.

Perhaps this difficult, but necessary lesson, this critical decade of our military forces' presence on Afghan soil has somehow led to a consolidation of new political thinking both in the USSR and in Afghanistan.

At the same time the lessons of Afghanistan contain a warning: in the international arena one cannot make policy using the method of trial and error. The broadest degree of glasnost is needed in all things; and scientifically based decisions are needed, which are developed in the course of frank and polemical discussions.

Today we know that from the very beginning the "Afghan campaign" had its enemies and opponents. I wonder how events might have developed if from the very start their opinion—the opinion of an uneasy and competent minority—had been taken into consideration!

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